Erdoğan’s Strategy for PKK’s Disarmament, Elections, and Power

Erdoğan has also sought to capitalize on several domestic factors. First, the approaching 2028 presidential election creates a limited window for negotiating political compromises or constitutional amendments before electoral considerations come to dominate the political agenda. Second, competition over Erdoğan’s eventual succession has intensified uncertainty within the governing camp.[vii] Third, the talks with Öcalan have created the possibility of broader political understandings that could affect both the reconciliation process and future constitutional negotiations.

Under the existing legal framework[viii], the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) is tasked with preparing periodic reports assessing whether the PKK has ended its armed activities and dismantled its organizational structure. The reports are submitted to the National Security Council, chaired by Erdoğan. Following the Council’s approval, individual cases can be reviewed, subject to exclusions including those involving murder or life sentences.

Accordingly, the cases of those who meet the criteria are addressed through the postponement of prosecutions, investigations, and penalties, depending on the nature of the crimes attributed to them. Although the government maintains that these measures do not constitute a “general amnesty,” their practical effect resembles a form of conditional legal relief for approximately 3,500 to 3,600 prisoners and some 2,000 fighters in mountainous regions to return to their families and resume their normal lives.[ix] The law explicitly excludes those convicted of premeditated murder, as well as the organization’s leadership cadre, who are expected to seek asylum in Iraq or Europe.

The pro-government Turkish newspaper Hürriyet reported in late September that a four-way coordination mechanism has been established, involving Ankara, Baghdad, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah, under the supervision of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT).[x] According to this mechanism, members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) will surrender their weapons to authorities in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, or the central government in Baghdad. The weapons would then be inventoried, with the records retained by MIT.

According to the newspaper, under the proposed mechanism and outside Turkish borders, between 7,000 and 8,000 members of the PKK are expected to surrender their weapons and return to Turkey, particularly those who came from Iraq and Syria, coinciding with the announcement of the decision to dissolve the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[xi]

In a parallel development, it is noted that the PKK enjoys a popular base estimated at 70,000 to 80,000 people in Europe[xii], including the organization’s leadership, and some of them could return to Turkey as soon as the law comes into effect.

In Sinjar, some 2,200 individuals[xiii] are reportedly expected to join the Iraqi army. In addition, approximately 8,000 residents of Makhmour camp[xiv] – families originally from southeastern Turkey – could return to Turkey.

In the same vein, the evacuation of PKK camps and hideouts will be subject to rigorous field monitoring, beginning in the Haftanin and Gara regions of Iraqi Kurdistan. Once the evacuation of these sites and the dismantling of the PKK’s organizational presence have been verified, the MIT will submit a detailed report to the Turkish National Security Council, which will then issue an official decree formally determining that the PKK’s organizational presence has ended.

Despite the potential significance of the process in ending four decades of conflict, Erdoğan has sought to retain substantial control over its implementation. The legislation does not itself guarantee broader political or democratic reforms, contributing to opposition concerns about how the process will be implemented. At the same time, opposing legislation tied to disarmament and an end to armed violence carries significant political costs, helping explain the breadth of parliamentary support.

Erdoğan’s influence over the process is evident in three areas. First, there is no independent third-party mechanism for monitoring implementation. Verification therefore remains largely in the hands of Turkish state institutions, giving the executive substantial influence over determinations of compliance. Second, MIT remains the principal state interlocutor with Öcalan, while the authorities tightly control access to him, including visits and correspondence. Third, the scope of any political concessions remains closely tied to the government’s broader political calculations. This gives Erdoğan leverage in negotiations with Öcalan and the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), particularly over constitutional amendments and the timing of future elections.

Regionally, Ömer Çelik, the official spokesperson for the Justice and Development Party (AKP), affirmed that the goals of a “terror-free Turkey” and a “terror-free region” are inseparable and intertwined.[xv] He indicated that the parliament’s ratification of this law constitutes a firm response to imperialist and Zionist hegemonic projects, emphasizing that the repercussions of this decision will extend to the Iraqi, Syrian, and Iranian arenas.