KRI Leaders Seek a New Track in Relations with Iran

Statements by senior leaders of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) at the Middle East Research Institute (MERI) forum, which took place in Erbil from 12 to 14 October, have placed relations with Iran at the center of a broader political debate. These positions combine efforts to prevent Iranian Kurdish armed groups from launching attacks from Iraqi territory with calls for greater engagement with Tehran. This apparent consensus marks a rare point of agreement among Iraqi Kurdish leaders, even as the forum appeared to expose divisions within the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

Nechirvan Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Region, sharply criticized[i] the activities of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups during the US-Israeli war with Iran. He stated that the KRI had shut its border with Iran and cautioned against slowing armed groups to use Iraqi Kurdish territory for operations against neighbouring countries. In response, Khalid Azizi of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) reiterated his party’s commitment not to use the KRI as a rear base against Iran.

At the forum’s 12 October session, Bafel Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), presented a possible diplomatic alternative to armed operations launched from Iraqi Kurdistan. Talabani stated[ii] that the PUK had initiated discussions with Iranian officials on a potentially lengthy process aimed at addressing the Kurdish issue in Iran.

Amid questions over the forum’s representation of Kurdish political forces from outside of Iraq, the office of KDP leader Masoud Barzani distanced itself[iii] from the event on 13 October. The statement also prompted speculation about divisions within the KDP leadership.

Some commentators have interpreted the growing diplomatic visibility of Nechirvan Barzani and Bafel Talabani as a sign of shifting influence within Iraqi Kurdish politics. Others viewed the statement as an indication that Masoud Barzani was aligning himself more closely with his son, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, than with his nephew, Nechirvan Barzani.

The positions articulated at the forum reflect shifts in Kurdish political calculations since the regional conflict began with US-Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 28. Early in the conflict, reports suggested that Iranian Kurdish armed groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan may launch a cross-border offensive with support from the US and Israel. No such mobilization materialized. Iranian Kurdish opposition groups include the KDPI, Komala, the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK).[iv] Several of these groups have maintained bases in Iraqi Kurdistan for years. Although multiple groups have retained armed wings, they have conducted few sustained armed campaigns against Tehran.

The presence of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups has long placed Erbil between pressure from Tehran and its political and cultural ties with Kurds across the Iranian border. Iraq promised to disarm the factions and relocate them away from the border as part of a security agreement[v] between Baghdad and Tehran in March 2023. Tehran has continued to demand tighter restrictions on these groups while carrying out strikes against their positions in the KRI.

Meanwhile, Iraqi Kurdish leaders have sought to position the KRI as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran. In mid-May, Nechirvan Barzani reportedly contacted senior Iranian officials[vi] as part of an initiative involving the administration of US President Donald Trump. Iranian officials reportedly rejected Barzani’s proposal to host discreet talks in Erbil between US representatives and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In an attempt to identify another possible channel, Bafel Talabani travelled to Tehran on 15 September to meet with senior Iranian officials.[vii]

Despite their parties’ domestic rivalry, Nechirvan Barzani and Bafel Talabani appear to support regional diplomacy. Since the Kurdistan Region’s parliamentary election on 20 October 2024, the KDP and PUK have remained unable to agree on the formation of a new regional government.[viii] The forum therefore points toward compartmentalized politics rather than broader Kurdish reconciliation. The KDP and PUK remain rivals at home while finding common ground on regional security questions where the costs of disagreement are particularly high.

On 19 October, representatives from Tehran, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and Baghdad will convene to discuss the future of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties. On 13 October, Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim Al-Aboudi declared that Baghdad was “committed to resolving the issue of the Iranian opposition.”[ix] In addition to this, Aboudi said Baghdad would put pressure on Tehran to halt its ongoing attacks on the groups. Any conversations, though, seem to be in the early stages.

KDPI representative Khalid Azizi told reporters that his party would be prepared to respond if Tehran made a formal request for communication, but he currently sees no opportunity for a dialogue.[x] Azizi added that the broader coalition of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties had not yet discussed the possibility of engaging with Tehran.

The proposed discussions could indicate whether the 2023 security framework can develop a political track alongside its existing security provisions. That would be much more difficult to achieve if Iranian strikes continued. The emerging diplomatic track could also test the limited cooperation displayed at the forum. Progress in talks with Tehran or Washington may sharpen intra-Kurdish rivalries, particularly if competing leaders seek to control the channels of communication.