The Ethnic Trap: How Armed Separatist Groups Could Derail Iran’s Democratic Future

The recent Jewish–Kurdish conference in London shows why careful language matters.[vii] The event, held on 6–7 September 2026, brought together Kurdish and Jewish scholars, activists and civil-society representatives. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar addressed[viii] the conference by video, praised Jewish–Kurdish relations and noted that the Kurdish people had not achieved political independence. His remarks were a public statement by a senior Israeli official, but they did not announce a formal Israeli policy on Iran’s borders or support for Kurdish armed action.

The conference itself does not prove the existence of an Israeli plan to create a “Greater Kurdistan”. Cultural cooperation between Jews and Kurds should not automatically be described as a conspiracy. In the present climate, however, support from an Israeli minister for Kurdish political aspirations can easily be interpreted inside Iran and Turkey as part of a wider regional strategy. This is especially sensitive while Israeli–Turkish competition is growing and speculation continues about using Kurdish forces against Tehran.

Inside Iran, the distinction between formal policy and political perception can easily disappear, making any perceived foreign support for ethnic fragmentation politically explosive.[ix]

Media reports have described American and Israeli efforts to mobilise Iranian Kurdish fighters against Tehran.[x] Such reporting is different from a publicly declared government policy, and Israel has not formally announced such a plan. The political consequences, however, do not depend entirely on whether such a policy exists. Reports of foreign contact with armed ethnic groups can strengthen the belief that outside powers may use Iran’s internal divisions for their own strategic purposes.

Israel conducts digital diplomacy aimed at regional audiences in several languages, including Persian, Arabic, Kurdish and Turkish, using language-specific pages and social-media accounts.[xi] Its Persian-language campaign presents Israel as an opponent of the Islamic Republic and a friend of the Iranian people, while in Kurdish it portrays itself as a supporter of Kurdish rights and political aspirations. Similar messages are directed at Arabic- and Turkish-speaking audiences. This allows Israel to appeal to different communities, even when their political interests may conflict. This message appears to have found a receptive audience among some Iranians, although public attitudes towards Israel remain divided. A 2026 survey found that 51 per cent held a positive view of Benjamin Netanyahu and 38 per cent a negative one.[xii] This does not amount to general support for Israeli policy, but it shows that Israel has attracted some public sympathy inside Iran. Any suggestion that Israel also seeks to weaken or fragment Iran could damage that support, increase public suspicion and help Tehran portray its opponents as partners in a foreign project.

It could also reinforce a longstanding government narrative. The Islamic Republic has long tried to portray democratic activists, journalists and minority-rights campaigners as foreign agents. A real or perceived threat to Iran’s borders allows the authorities to transform a debate about freedom into a struggle for national survival.

The costs would not stop at Iran’s borders. Fragmentation could spread instability across the region. Kurdish armed mobilisation could pull in Turkey and factions based in Iraqi Kurdistan. Attempts to mobilise Iranian Azeris could create a dangerous contest involving Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran. A Baluchi conflict could cross into Pakistan. The result could be rival authorities[xiii], local militias and a regional struggle without a clear end. Air strikes can create a political vacuum; they cannot control what fills it.

The risks would also extend to Iran’s nuclear calculations. If Tehran became convinced that foreign powers intended to destroy Iran as a state, nuclear weapons could begin to appear less like an ideological project and more like protection against national collapse. Such a perception could strengthen voices within Iran’s nuclear debate[xiv] that present weaponisation as a final form of deterrence. A threat to the country’s territorial integrity could therefore increase pressure for the very nuclear outcome that Israel and the United States seek to prevent.

Using Iran’s ethnic communities as instruments of a wider regional conflict would cross a dangerous line. It is also unlikely to produce a controlled outcome in which Iran is weakened by internal ethnic conflict and becomes less able to project power across the region. Instead, it could turn a campaign against the Islamic Republic into a perceived threat against Iran itself, alienate Iranians who once viewed Israel positively and give Tehran a powerful excuse to present every opponent as a foreign-backed separatist.

Iran’s democratic future depends on a movement able to cross ethnic, linguistic and regional divisions. Armed separatist parties or Foreign-backed ethnic groups cannot offer that common ground. Their lack of a proven public mandate, reliance on outside support and military approach may weaken the national opposition, endanger minority communities and help the Islamic Republic survive. Iran needs equal citizenship, cultural rights and meaningful decentralisation, but these goals will not be achieved by turning ethnic communities into tools of proxy war. The Islamic Republic may eventually fall or give way to a different political system, but Iran will almost certainly outlive it. A strategy that appears to force Iranians to choose between political freedom and the survival of their country could lead many to place territorial security first.