As Hamas Reorients Itself, Will Qatar’s Mediation Role in Gaza Shrink?

Israel had previously derived benefits from Qatari mediation and the channel could not be discarded outright because it is supported by the U.S. too. A full rupture with Doha would therefore lead to further tensions with Washington.

Some Israeli criticism gives less emphasis to the earlier coordination between Qatar and the Israeli government. Doha’s cash support for Gaza was coordinated with Benjamin Netanyahu’s government from November 2018.[ix] Funds arrived at Ben Gurion Airport and were transferred through the Erez crossing to Hamas authorities. A substantial portion was distributed to low-income households after Israeli security vetting of recipients.[x] Israeli officials defended the arrangement at the time as a means of addressing humanitarian and economic pressures in Gaza and contributing to short-term stability. Critics later argued that the policy also helped sustain Hamas’s rule. That history has become part of Israel’s domestic debate over the policy, which seeks to distinguish between the original objectives and longer-term effects, especially as part of criticism of Qatar’s role amid wider debates over responsibility for the failure to prevent 7th October 2023. Israeli security policy has increasingly emphasized pre-emption: in Gaza, in the West Bank, in the war with Iran, and in the strike on Qatar itself. Under that logic, any residual Qatari mediation would operate under tight Israeli supervision.

A similarly restrictive approach can be seen in recent disputes with some European partners. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar announced the immediate expulsion of Dutch representatives from the international Gaza support centre in Kiryat Gat[xi] [xii], and the government has considered similar steps against British and other European officials after they condemned settlement expansion in the West Bank.[xiii] These measures suggest that Israel is seeking greater control over the terms of external involvement, and that it is willing to restrict certain partners’ involvement. As European roles have been restricted in this way, a reduction of Qatari mediation could also follow.

Israeli objections cluster around three claims: that Qatar’s hosting of Hamas leaders after 7th October gave the movement political shelter and an incentive to retain arms; that some Qatar-based media coverage has been supportive of Hamas and/or terrorism; and that reconstruction finance can be diverted, directly or indirectly, to Hamas. The reason these objections point to restriction rather than abolition is the structure of U.S. policy in the region. The Trump administration has favoured distributing roles among allies in order to share financial, political and military costs: joint campaigning with Israel against Iran; a reduced U.S. posture in Syria coordinated with Ankara; and an attempt to push Saudi Arabia towards a more prominent role in the Red Sea. Qatar fits into this pattern. Washington also relies on Doha in the Iran file as well as in a wider set of security, diplomatic and economic ties. These interests argue against discarding Qatari mediation in Gaza.

The implication is clear enough. A Qatari ground force in Gaza is not a serious prospect; Doha has limited experience large-scale troop deployments abroad, and Israel would not accept it either. Qatari influence through reconstruction – infrastructure, education, relief and cultural projects – on the other hand is more plausible, but only under close Israeli and American monitoring. Gaza’s reconstruction needs are too large for that money to be refused outright.