Sudanese Armed Forces’ Preference for a Military Outcome: An Obstacle to Sustainable Peace in Sudan

There are several factors that contributed to the SAF’s strength. First, competition for international attention since 7^th October 2023 and the U.S.–Iran war may have reduced Sudan’s prominence on foreign policy agendas, thereby easing the pressure Khartoum perceives. Second, Saudi Arabia’s position has evolved from neutral mediation to clearer support for the army. Reports indicated that Pakistan was on the verge of signing a $1.5 billion deal to supply weapons and aircraft to Sudan.[v] Reuters later reported that Saudi Arabia considered financing the weapons package before stepping back in April 2026, after Western governments reportedly advised Riyadh to avoid entanglement[vi] in proxy conflicts on the African continent. Despite the retreat, these events underscored that Saudi policy had moved beyond a purely mediating role. Third, the SAF has also benefited from multiple other countries and their varying forms of support: Iranian[vii] and Turkish[viii] drones and military equipment, and Egyptian[ix] political and logistical backing, potentially reinforcing the SAF leadership’s belief that a regional balance of power is moving in its favour.

The army presents itself as the legitimate state institution confronting an RSF-led “rebellion.” Yet this narrative collides with the reality that followed the 2018-19 Sudanese revolution, in which both the army institution and the RSF participated in the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and, later, in the Sovereign Council under the Constitutional Document (August 2019).[x] This shared role in Sudan’s post-2019 transitional order certainly complicates the SAF’s portrayal of the RSF as a rebellion.

In July 2026, the U.S. State Department’s additional package of sanctions on the Sudanese government came into effect under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act. They followed Washington’s determination from April 2025[xi] that the government of Sudan had used chemical weapons during the conflict in 2024. The additional measures[xii] included restrictions on multilateral financing, exports[xiii], and aviation. This step added to Washington’s broader pressure on Sudan’s belligerents and could be understood as part of its strategy – as a member of the current Quad, comprising the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE [xiv] – to push the SAF toward reducing excessive force and opening up to a negotiated ceasfire. However, ongoing regional support limits the effectiveness of these sanctions and fuels the army’s confidence in its ability to impose a fait accompli on the ground.

Academic Sharath Srinivasan, in his book, “When Peace Kills Politics: International Intervention and Unending Wars in the Sudans” (2021)[xv], warns that the pattern of international settlements in Sudan often reproduces conflict. Srinivasan points to the reduction of peace to deals among armed elites, the exclusion of civilian forces, and the legitimization of violence through the granting of sovereign positions to armed actors. Srinivasan’s critique offers a useful lens through which to assess the limitations of the Jeddah Declaration (May 2023). The declaration was negotiated between the two conflicting parties and focused on the protection on civilians and providing access for the delivery of humanitarian supplies.[xvi] In the absence of a parallel civilian political process, this risked reinforcing the perception that armed actors remained the gatekeepers of Sudan’s future.

The current reality confirms that the SAF’s continued pursuit of military leverage – alongside the RSF’s own offensives – and both sides’ regional support networks, prolong the conflict, exacerbates the humanitarian crisis, and makes a negotiated settlement more difficult to achieve. Initiatives that remain confined to military elites or are imposed without a deep understanding of local communities also risk contributing to the repetition of the mistakes of the past.

Sustainable peace requires a different approach: an initiative that engages a broad spectrum of civilian constituencies, local communities, traditional leaders, civil society organisations, and displaced populations with clear mechanisms for political transition and graduated, effective sanctions against those who obstruct progress. It also requires stronger U.S. coordination within the Quad to address regional contradictions and aim to restrict external military supply lines[xvii] to both sides. Without this, the military option will remain the dominant language, and the suffering of the Sudanese people will continue.