Iran’s Transition from Hierarchical to Flat Leadership

The rise of numerous parallel institutions, relatively equal in power and influence, and functioning in place of a single political institution, is a significant development. While the Iranian political establishment under the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was a unified and highly cohesive entity, it transformed after his death into a collection of parallel institutions with limited interconnectedness. This transformation was not confined to the political establishment; it was also reflected in the military, which, once characterised by cohesive leadership, fragmented into sectors following the removal of its top tier of commanders, resulting in a decline in cohesion. This shift was evident in developments on the ground and in statements by Iranian officials. For example, during the early days of the war, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi indicated[iii] that local commanders within the Revolutionary Guard had gained greater decision-making autonomy and were operating under an open-fire doctrine based on pre-established instructions.

The rise of fragmented decision-making processes and the emergence of decisions characterised by inconsistency and contradiction have become increasingly evident. This phenomenon was reflected in the lack of alignment between the Iranian Foreign Minister’s position and that of the Revolutionary Guard regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, the political establishment formed a negotiating team comprising dozens of individuals, each representing one of the various institutions within the regime. Parliament Speaker and head of the negotiating delegation, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, alluded to this when he emphasised[iv] that the large size of the delegation was intended to encompass the diverse viewpoints within the Iranian political landscape and to “conduct the necessary consultations”. While this has complicated communication with the Iranian side, particularly given the absence of the Supreme Leader and the resulting difficulties in establishing rapid contact, and prompted U.S. President Donald Trump to assert[v] that he does not know who is leading Iran “or with whom we are dealing”, it has also prevented the adoption of a “final decision” on any major issue.

The militarisation of Iranian decision-making and the growing power of the military, as the institution that bears arms and maintains the broadest presence within Iran, are particularly significant. This does not refer to the Iranian army (Artesh), which has generally not been a focus of the strike and assassination campaign targeting Iran’s security leadership and which remains largely absent from key decision-making processes.[vi] Rather, it concerns the Revolutionary Guard and its affiliated military institutions. While the Revolutionary Guard’s influence on the political scene was previously constrained by the figure of the Supreme Leader – who, by constitutional design and historical precedent, stood above the institution – his absence has removed this constraint and eliminated the limitations that had prevented the Guard from dominating the political landscape. In its quest to consolidate its hegemony, the military establishment has sought to impose a state of emergency to prevent the convening of institutions that could define its powers or intervene in the decision-making process, including Parliament, the Expediency Discernment Council, and the Supreme National Security Council. The Revolutionary Guard’s dominance over decision-making has repeatedly thwarted efforts to reach a final agreement, and diplomatic channels have failed to produce workable solutions with the U.S. The difficulties[vii] encountered by the Speaker of Parliament – despite his affiliation with the Revolutionary Guard – in formulating a solution due to the Guard’s opposition are particularly noteworthy. Similarly, the Revolutionary Guard rejected Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s statement, made[viii] in a post on X, that the Strait of Hormuz was open to navigation; instead, Guard leaders insisted that the strait would remain closed, effectively imposing their will.

Thus, the transformation of Iran’s decision-making apparatus into a flat structure has fragmented what was once a cohesive and unified institution into several parallel entities. This has produced inconsistent and sometimes contradictory decisions, while making it impossible to reach unified and final decision or even to identify the entity that actually holds the reins of power and with which an agreement could be reached. At the same time, this absence has entrenched the power of the Revolutionary Guard, transforming it into the dominant decision-making institution by virtue of its armed capacity and extensive organizational presence. No significant decision can be made without its participation or approval.