Middle East War’s Next Phase: Who Will Open the Strait of Hormuz? – Part II

Taking control of the Strait of Hormuz and securing the Bab el-Mandeb strait are primary and urgent objectives. Recovering Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles is an additional goal the coalition has yet to achieve. The U.S. is mobilizing significant forces to these ends.

Among Iran’s key strategic assets, Kharg Island is particularly critical. As the principal export terminal through which the vast majority of Iran’s crude oil is shipped,[xi] it underpins the state’s external revenue base and, by extension, funds a substantial proportion of IRGC activities, including the sustainment of its regional proxy network. Given its importance, Kharg has long featured in U.S. contingency planning and operational modelling, with scenario-based exercises conducted since the early 1980s.[xii] More broadly, the IRGC also maintains extensive illicit financial and commercial networks designed to circumvent international sanctions and sustain the regime’s revenues.[xiii] [xiv]

In parallel, the IRGC’s “strategic reserve” in Yemen in the form of Ansar Allah (the Houthi movement) continues to pose a credible threat to maritime security in the Bab el-Mandeb. Situated at the southern entrance to the Red Sea between Yemen and Djibouti, the strait is a vital conduit linking the Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal and, by extension, global trade between Europe and Asia. Since aligning itself with the broader anti-Israel regional axis, Ansar Allah has intermittently targeted commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden using missiles, drones, and explosive-laden craft, and has already demonstrated its willingness to expand the conflict through direct attacks beyond maritime targets.[xv]

A further and more complex dimension of the conflict lies in Iran’s nuclear programme and the location and control of its highly enriched uranium stockpile. Preventing the IRGC from retaining or weaponising this material is widely regarded as a central objective of the U.S. and its partners. According to reporting based on IAEA assessments and related intelligence, Iran has accumulated a significant quantity of uranium enriched to 60% U-235 – material that remains below weapons-grade but is technically close to the threshold required for rapid breakout.[xvi]

While elements of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure have been degraded through sustained military action, assessments indicate that key components of its programme and material stockpiles remain intact and under IRGC control.[xvii] This raises the prospect that the uranium stockpile could either be converted into a pathway for weaponisation or leveraged diplomatically in any future negotiations, including those involving external actors, such as Russia and China. In this context, both Russia and China may have a strategic appetite to influence developments more actively – Russia through security guarantees, nuclear diplomacy, and leveraging its role in multilateral frameworks; and China through economic incentives, energy partnerships, and mediation efforts aimed at preserving regional stability and safeguarding its trade interests.[xviii]

The U.S. intelligence community assesses that Iran is unlikely to reopen the strait voluntarily.[xix] Tehran is expected to continue constraining maritime traffic to sustain pressure on global energy markets, prompting Washington to prepare contingency plans that include the potential use of force.

In support of sustained operations in the region, the U.S. has significantly expanded its naval and air presence[xx], with more than a third of its deployable maritime and aviation assets now concentrated in the Middle East theatre. This posture currently includes two operational aircraft carrier strike groups, with preparations underway for the deployment of a third. The arrival of the USS George H.W. Bush, which departed Naval Station Norfolk on 31 March 2026, would raise the U.S. carrier presence in the region to three. The USS Abraham Lincoln remains positioned in the Arabian Sea in support of ongoing operations, while the USS Gerald R. Ford has been temporarily withdrawn to the Mediterranean following technical damage sustained in a fire incident and is undergoing repairs in Crete.[xxi]

Taken together, the deployment of multiple carrier strike groups underscores the scale of U.S. commitment to maintaining maritime access through both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. However, given the systemic risks to global energy flows, the stabilisation of these chokepoints is increasingly framed not as a unilateral task, but as a broader international security requirement. Any durable solution would therefore require coordinated engagement among the United States, Gulf partners, European allies, and other stakeholders dependent on uninterrupted energy transit.

With Pakistani mediation, the U.S. and Iran are considering extending the current cease‑fire by another two weeks.[xxii] While Trump is focusing on recovery of the enriched uranium stockpile, imposing limits on Iran’s missile program, and dismantling its proxies, European countries and their Gulf partners are planning a post-war mission to free up shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. As part of an international defence plan, French President Emmanuel Macron is planning to send mine-clearing and other military vessels to the region, with the goal of restoring shipping companies’ confidence in using the strait after the fighting has ended.[xxiii]