The joint U.S.-Israeli bombing campaign launched on 28th February hinged on two outcomes: that the Iranian people would take to the streets and overthrow the government, or that the regime would be so weakened by the bombing that it would be forced to negotiate to stop the devastation. Although a two-week ceasefire[i] was finally reached after 38 days of continuous operations, none of the intended outcomes were achieved. While they are still possible, the likelihood decreases by the day. Since the assassination of top Iranian leadership and the destruction of Iranian military assets and infrastructure could not bring the regime to its knees, the only logical path forward to achieve this goal, other than appeasement, is through escalation, which in this case, is total war.
Introducing “total war”
A state engages in total warfare[ii] when it prosecutes a war that is unrestricted in terms of the weapons used, the territory or combatants that are targeted, or the objectives pursued. The laws of war are often set aside, and there is little distinction between military and civilian targets, in order to accomplish operational objectives. In the most desperate instances, unconventional means, like nuclear weapons[iii], can be brought to the table if a state cannot accomplish its stated objectives through conventional methods, such as combined arms manoeuvre warfare. While in this case, the most extreme demonstrations have not been used, the targeting of civilian and dual-use (military and civilian) infrastructure revealed how, before the ceasefire, the conflict was becoming a form of total war that was not being conducted at the conflict’s inception.
Since the U.S. and Israel could not pressure the Islamic Republic to reopen the Strait of Hormuz on their terms[iv], force the termination of their nuclear and missile programmes, and end support for regional proxies, widening the war effort to cripple the state as a whole could serve as the basis of a hasty plan B. U.S. President Donald Trump warned[v] that this new phase of the conflict would be so devastating that it would take Iran “20 years to rebuild, if they’re lucky, if they have a country.” If the latest ceasefire collapses, the U.S. and Israel could continue this strategy expeditiously. As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned[vi], Israel’s “finger is on the trigger.”
It must be understood that both the U.S. and Israel were pursuing this strategy for different reasons. The Trump Administration wanted to raise hell[vii] in Iran to force the regime[viii] to concede to its demands. The Israelis want to increase overall pressure on Iran by also targeting civilian infrastructure and preferring a pathway that avoids a diplomatic re-opening towards the regime. This puts American and Israeli aims at odds.[ix] By killing potential negotiators, Israel prevents the U.S. from reaching a diplomatic solution. At the same time, President Trump’s willingness to negotiate takes the pressure off Tehran and allows the regime to consolidate power. Potentially engaging in total war is to Israel’s advantage because it will not only hurt the regime but, more importantly, further weaken Iran’s status as its principal geopolitical rival in the neighbourhood.
The shift to total war
The 38-day conflict revealed an uncomfortable truth about American and Israeli war aims. Both countries are incapable of eliminating Iran’s nuclear[x], ballistic missile[xi], and drone-producing[xii] programmes, even when conducting joint operations and receiving logistical support[xiii] from their regional allies in the Gulf. While the Pentagon attempts to boast[xiv] about the reduction in Iranian missile attacks over the course of the conflict, the reality on the ground tells a different story.
U.S. intelligence assessments[xv] report that even after five weeks of bombardment by the U.S. and Israel, Iran still retains close to 50 per cent of its missile launchers and drone capabilities, in addition to a large percentage of cruise missiles used for coastal defence. Although U.S.-Israeli military action[xvi] so far annihilated[xvii] Iran’s navy, air force, and reduced its missile and drone arsenal, it must be known that Iran’s military[xviii] was already in a weak state before the war began.
Israel's current strategic objective is focused on degrading Iran’s ability to function as a state and, therefore, project power.
Since the attacks on Iranian military assets and senior leadership have become a form of “mowing the lawn,”[xix] Israel’s current strategic objective is focused on degrading Iran’s ability to function as a state and, therefore, project power. While the U.S. has taken identical actions[xx] targeting Iran’s infrastructure, as stated rather aggressively[xxi] by President Trump, the difference lies in the desired outcome. The rhetoric[xxii] from the Trump Administration was a tactical ploy[xxiii] to bring the Iranians to the negotiating table to capitulate on American demands[xxiv] regarding Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes, and more recently, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
Israel’s new strategic calculus is to neutralise the Islamic Republic as a whole. This dual-purpose solution aims to remove Iran as a major geopolitical rival in the region and project the Iranian people’s dissatisfaction with their living conditions onto the regime to overthrow it.
If Iran’s military response after the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was not indicative of its commitment to resistance[xxv], the appointment of his son, Mojtaba, as his successor most certainly was. Israeli defence officials said as early as the second week of the war that the overall objective was not regime change, but to enable a “slow collapse” scenario.[xxvi] This would see the regime weakened to the point that, over time, it would undergo a gradual erosion of its stability and, therefore, its legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian people. The realisation that more than 13,000 bombs[xxvii] were unable to unseat the regime has pushed the Israelis to facilitate an overthrow that would derive from projecting the anger of the Iranian people onto the Islamic Republic itself.
Israel’s new targets
As the likelihood of regime change has decreased over the past month, Israel has begun to redefine the meaning of “operational success.” Barely two weeks into the war, on 12 March, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar stated[xxviii] that the primary objective of Operation Roaring Lion is to “remove the existential threats that Iran poses to Israel for the long term.” Sa’ar added that the mission aims to “weaken the regime, particularly its repression forces, in a way that creates the conditions that will ultimately allow the Iranian people themselves to bring about that change.” He went on to describe regime change as something that “may be a consequence of the operation; it does not necessarily have to be part of the military campaign itself.”
Strikes on gas fields in southern Iran and the strikes on two IRGC-linked steel factories reveal how the IDF began its gradual shift to focus on economic targets and Iranian infrastructure.
In a similar shift of rhetoric, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed[xxix] on 20 March that Iran was no longer capable of enriching uranium or manufacturing ballistic missiles. Ten days later, Israeli media reported[xxx] that the country’s political leadership, including Defence Minister Israel Katz, ordered the IDF to shift its focus to strike economic targets within Iran. Strikes on gas fields[xxxi] in southern Iran on 18 March and the 27 March strikes on two IRGC-linked steel factories[xxxii] reveal how the IDF began its gradual shift to focus on economic targets and Iranian infrastructure.
In the first week of April, Iran’s Ministry of Health and the Iranian Red Crescent Society reported[xxxiii] that damage to over 90,000 homes and 442 health facilities across the country had disrupted access to essential healthcare. Israeli strikes hit the Pasteur Institute[xxxiv], Iran’s century-old medical research and primary vaccine production centre. Tofigh Daru[xxxv], one of Iran’s biggest state-run pharmaceutical companies and producers of anti-cancer drugs and anaesthetics, was targeted on the premise that it supplies fentanyl for chemical weapons development.
Iranian universities[xxxvi] have also been hit. Imam Hossein University and Malek Ashtar University of Technology were struck for reportedly supporting the regime with chemical weapons research and development. Two Tehran universities, Shahid Beheshti University and Sharif University of Technology, were similarly targeted due to suspected links to Iran’s nuclear programme.
In Alborz province, just 40 kilometres from Tehran, an electrical facility[xxxvii] was struck, causing power outages and temporary blackouts throughout Tehran and Alborz provinces. Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz announced on 6 April that two different petrochemical facilities[xxxviii], responsible for a total of 85 per cent of Iran’s petrochemical exports, were successively hit, and that Israel would continue its campaign[xxxix] against Iranian infrastructure.
What does Israel gain?
Israel’s strategy could result in the government in Tehran more closely resembling the al-Sharaa administration in Damascus, regardless of whether restrainers, hardliners, or a new regime is in power. Meaning, its new security services would be militarily weakened[xl] to the point that they could not conduct offensive operations. These forces would also be too preoccupied with potential sectarian conflicts[xli] within their own borders to reorganise as a cohesive military capable of flexing its muscles and standing up proxies[xlii] across the region.
The bombing of economic infrastructure[xliii], the continuous assassinations of Iran’s top leadership, and the destruction of military assets are all part of a concentrated effort to decisively weaken Iran as a state. Israel does not want a Venezuela-like scenario in Iran, since a collaborator from within the regime only ensures its survival, and buys time to rebuild its military assets and reorganise its weakened chain of command across its political apparatus and security services.
In a world where the Iranian military post-Islamic Republic is combat-ineffective, it will be unable to present a military or security threat to Israel. With Libya, Iraq, and Syria all in disarray[xliv] following decades of conflicts, both from foreign and domestic actors, the status as regional powers they once held under Muammar Ghaddafi, Saddam Hussein, and Bashar al-Assad, respectively, is over. What remains are fractured states[xlv] with sectarian conflicts that have no end in sight.
Israel has realised that the paramount question is not who is in power, but whether or not Iran can project power.
After 38 days of uninterrupted war, Israel has realised that the paramount question is not who is in power, but whether or not Iran can project power. Total war is not being waged just to facilitate an overthrow of the regime, but to cripple its ability to project power as a major actor in the region. With hostilities currently paused, the U.S. continues to search for a victory for its most urgent goal: eliminating Iran’s nuclear programme.[xlvi]
Even if Iran cedes these demands, it will likely not be enough to satisfy the security concerns of America’s primary Middle Eastern political and military partner: Israel. The reason for this is simple. To Israel, victory is more than mere concessions or even the overthrow of the Shiite clerics in Tehran. Victory means removing any existential security threats. Iran must be crippled so severely that it is unable to pursue any of its hegemonic ambitions in the region, regardless of who replaces its supreme leader. Until then, Israel seems determined to work towards this goal by any means[xlvii] necessary.
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