Despite Egypt’s favourable description of improvements made to women’s status and position in their National Report on Human Rights, submitted in October 2024 in accordance with the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the country ranked 135th out of 146 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index in that same year.[i] According to the Egyptian Labour Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) in 2023, female labour force participation (FLFP) rates had actually steadily declined over the prior five years, sitting at 21% in 2018, and falling to 18.8% by 2023.[ii]
The benefits of increased gender balance in labour force participation are well known to the Egyptian government, who also stated their intent to reform. Introduced in 2015, the 2030 National Strategy for Women’s Empowerment aims to increase FLFP rates to 35% by the end of the decade.[iii] Increases in FLFP rates would have significant benefits for the Egyptian economy.
The economic gender gap causes Egypt to lose around 34% in annual GDP.
It is understandable that the IMF’s primary focus revolves around stabilizing a country with a public-dept-to-GDP ratio of 95.9 per cent at the end of the 2022-23 fiscal year.[iv] However, according to an IMF report in 2015, the economic gender gap causes Egypt to lose around 34% in annual GDP.[v] One report also suggests a programme of female empowerment would reduce poverty rates to around the 10% figure.[vi] This would correspond with another of Egypt’s Vision 2030 goals, namely, to decrease poverty to around 20% from the current 29.7% rate. Increased FLFP rates would not solely be of benefit women’s overall rights and opportunities, but actually work towards the IMF’s proposed ‘economic stabilization plan’, whilst also helping Egypt’s Vision 2030 succeed in other meeting other aims.
This is where the IMF has a role to play as an organization that possesses a unique ability to influence Egyptian legislation, as seen with Egypt’s recent decisions on fuel subsidies and the instalment of a flexible exchange rate, whilst also having an ability to dictate where their financial support is allocated.
The IMF has previously focused on Egypt’s need to improve women’s rights, although the most recent Extended Fund Facility (EFF), ratified in 2024, lacks any pre-requisites which directly seek to improve women’s rights as they relate to labour force participation. Providing Egypt with a rise in financial support of up to $8 billion dollars, the agreement is instead contingent on Egypt’s following of a ‘strong economic stabilization plan’. This has so far included a move to a flexible exchange rate system, but primarily, a promotion of the country’s private sector, seen as key to attracting foreign investment.[vii]
Heightened focus on the private sector would provide an opportunity to improve FLFP rates. There is a considerable gap between female participation in the public and private sectors as a result of a series of issues ranging from loose enforcement of sexual harassment laws to a gender pay gap. The number of women working privately is almost half of those in the public sector.[viii]
Therefore, at a time of increased investment into Egypt’s private sector, addressing the significantly lower percentage of women working in the private sector is crucial. It is also worth noting that in the context of a declining public sector within Egypt, with numbers of women working in the government sector falling from 1,9 million in 2012 to 1,7 million in 2022[ix], the importance of Egypt’s private sector will only increase over time.
IMF agreements with Egypt
The IMF’s focus on gender inequality as a condition for EFF agreements with Egypt has declined over time. The organization’s $12 Billion Extended Agreement for Egypt in 2016 illustrated its willingness to engage with social protection measures, setting one of its key goals as ‘labour market reform to create jobs and increase labour market participation, especially among women and young people’.[x] In practice, this presented itself as a 250 million EGP commitment to spending on public nurseries. Whilst subsidized early childcare has proven potential to increase the likelihood of a women being employed, its success in Egypt was limited and labelled as ‘perfunctory’.[xi] FLFP rates continued to decline. Nonetheless, it provides valuable lessons for future attempts to increase female participation.
Attempts to make women more available for work have had limited success, and therefore it seems reasonable to target improvement in the private sector. Whilst it may be true that women are more likely to look for work if their childcare is subsidized, they are unlikely to conduct their search within the private sector whilst forms of gender discrimination persist in both pay and employment processes. In this respect, a tailoring of the IMF’s already clear intent to promote private sector growth to one that also considers gender inequalities within this policy area could meaningfully improve the 2016 Agreement.
Notwithstanding, the 2016 agreement offered more intent to increase FLFP rates than any subsequent IMF-Egypt agreements. In both the 2020 and current 2024 agreements, any such rhetoric regarding women’s labour participation has been absent. Whilst the 2020 agreement can in part be excused for existing within the special circumstances of the Covid-19 Pandemic, the 2024 agreement appears a reversal on the IMF’s plans to continue to enforce conditionality on gender inequality, which the Fund had previously defined as an ‘important innovation’.[xii] One such reason may be because IMF conditions since 2016 have been increasingly concerned with macroeconomic growth.[xiii]
However, as outlined above, a focus on improving FLFP, would facilitate this growth. Attention on FLFP rates, especially such low percentages in the private sector, should be seriously considered by the IMF.
The Female Labour Force in Egypt
In contrast to the men in Egypt, women heavily favour jobs in the public sector over the private sector. Despite only accounting for around a quarter of Egypt’s total share of employment, 39% of women in the labour force work in the public sector compared to only 22% in the formal and unformal private sectors.[xiv] Whilst both of these figures refer to women already in the labour force, the problem arises when one considers that in many cases, women prefer inactivity to private sector jobs.
The private sector has failed to compensate for falling numbers of public sector jobs since the suspension in the 1990s of guaranteed state sector jobs to high school diploma and higher education degree holders, and in turn this has greatly harmed Egypt’s FLFP rates.[xv]
Such reluctance amongst women to join the private sector is because of a combination of poor working conditions and provisions, including workplace harassment, gender discrimination in employment, a gender pay gap, and poor provisions for mothers. On the one hand, the public sector is popular because of numerous non-monetary benefits.[xvi] An ingrained pride in working for the country is accompanied by a greater sense of security in the job position. Indeed, around 80% of women employed in the public sector between 2012 and 2018 retained their jobs.[xvii]
On the other hand, the public sector also presents a significant number of financial advantages for women compared to employment in the private sector. The public wage premium for women outside of those at the top of the wage distribution sits at around 18% percent in comparison to private wages. Indeed, the gender pay gap in the private sector as of 2018 sat at around 30% compared to only 2% in the Public Sector.[xviii] Furthermore, whilst Egyptian law grants up to 120 days maternity leave with full pay in the Public Sector, that number is only 90 days in the Private Sector. The private sector’s faults lie therefore in both financial and non-monetary handicaps.
As a result, more must be done to resolve these deficiencies in order to make the private sector a more viable option for women seeking work. Creating a safer, and more economically advantageous environment would encourage many Egyptian women to turn to this area as supposed to inactivity or dropping out of the labour force, and thus subsequently make a significant difference to FLFP rates.
How can the IMF help?
The IMF’s ability to encourage more opportunities for women in the private sector lies in the provision of both financial and legislative advice to the Egyptian government.
To facilitate these required improvements to Egypt’s private sector so as to benefit FLFP rates, only a slight tailoring to the current conditions of the EFF is required. The Fund must ensure their economic assistance is being allocated in a manner which directly benefits women in the private sector whilst also encouraging the Egyptian government to prioritise legislation that will render the private sector a safer environment with more opportunities for women.
The IMF’s urging of the Egyptian government to adopt certain policies is not a new idea. Even the most EFF has prompted El-Sisi’s government to reverse long-standing fuel subsidies. One of the four main conditions for the current IMF agreement with Egypt is tax reform to ‘generate adequate fiscal space to finance much needed expenditure programs[xix] and subsequently, on the 26th July, Egyptian fuel prices were raised by 15 percent.[xx] A flexible exchange rate was deemed one of the main elements of the IMF supported program with Egypt.[xxi] It therefore holds that the IMF has some ability to influence Egyptian legislation, and thus a genuine potential to have a positive effect on FLFP rates.
Consistent throughout the recent joint submission regarding ‘crises of women and girls’ rights in Egypt’, are calls to combat gender and sexual violence prevalent across the country. The paper, submitted by notable Egyptian and MENA feminist and human rights groups, including NWF, the Centre for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance, and The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, opens with 6 parts addressing various forms of violence committed against Egyptian women. Resolution of such actions are thus central to the Egyptian feminist cause, and failure to resolve unsafe working conditions constitute one of the main barriers to women entering the private sector. As the NWF’s own report on women’s rights lamented, Egypt’s joining of the optional protocol to the Convention on the elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), as well as reviewing legislation for the establishment of an Anti-Discrimination Commission would meaningfully improve the situation.
In this respect, the IMF could include, as one of their provisions for financial assistance, that Egypt adopt the proposed Anti-Discrimination Commission Law. This law would allow for the creation of an independent commission to review acts of sexual harassment in the workplace, and thus pave the way for future legislation regarding unsafe working environments, resolving the NWF’s claim that ‘constitutional protections against discrimination towards women [are] not translated into concrete legislative measures’.[xxii]
Furthermore, the IDF can assist with overcoming the lack of funding towards projects aiming towards female empowerment. The NWF discusses the absence of funding towards the implementation of laws combatting violence against women and describes of general budget constraints that threaten the continuing allocation of around 14% of the State Budget towards women’s improvement.[xxiii] Whilst general financial assistance from the EFF should naturally lessen these described constraints, the IMF still has a duty to ensure that funds are appropriately allocated towards combatting workplace harassment. The observance of both legislative and financial advice regarding sexual harassment has the potential to significantly improve working conditions, and by tackling such a prominent barrier for the female workforce, should in turn see FLFP rates rise.
In a similar manner to the recommendation that IMF aid in the improvement of private sector working conditions, the IMF’s ability to encourage more opportunities for women in the private sector lies in the provision of both financial and legislative advice to the Egyptian government.
From a financial standpoint, the IMF have the opportunity to implement provisions to ensure their funds are deployed to provide more female jobs within the private sector in the face of the current dominance of male-dominated industries, as FLFP rates are being harmed by a lack of suitable jobs for women. In recent years, male-dominated areas such as construction, manufacturing, logistics and transportation have formed the largest hiring sectors in Egypt. It doesn’t appear as if this trend is changing during Egypt’s current promotion of the private sector, with Egypt’s Trade Facilitation Committee’s decision to take a new risk-based approach at the border in order to reduce the time it takes for goods to cross suggesting a continued focus on expanding manufacturing and transportation companies within the private sector.[xxiv]
Therefore, in order to promote female employment in the private sector, greater funds can be allocated to industries that appear more conducive to female employment. As a specific case study, the pharmaceutical industry could be prioritised. With female employees historically sitting around 35%[xxv], this industry has a comparatively high female employment rate, and thus investment could build on existing developments. In addition, this industry is also an attractive area for foreign investment. Such is outlined by the recent 50-million-dollar investment from AstraZeneca in September 2024 to expand its production facilities in the country.[xxvi] Increased investment in this industry would not only provide more opportunities for female workers, but also adhere to the proposed ‘strong economic stabilization plan’.
There is also room for legislative advice from the IDF, to improve the female experience in the private sector. The current proposed New Labour Law would reduce the time worked for new employees in order to become eligible for maternity pay from ten to six months.[xxvii] However, in a similar manner to the Anti-Discrimination Commission Law, the NWF again complains of the government’s failure to enact this ‘crucial legislation’.[xxviii] Encouragement towards the Egyptian government to finally adopt this law could again result in genuine increases for FLFP rates, because the private sector would consequently become a more accessible and suitable environment for Egyptian female worker.
Conclusion
The IMF’s Extended Fund Facility Agreement with Egypt is providing the Arab country with up to $8 billion. In supplying this financial assistance, the IMF have provided conditions, though not enough attention has been given to the need to raise female participation in the labour force. Nevertheless, one of the IMF’s conditions is for Egypt to promote their private sector, and if tailored correctly, such an expansion could have significant benefits on Egyptian FLFP rates. During such growth, the IMF could simultaneously ensure that the private sector is becoming a safer, and more inclusive environment, through legislative advice to the government, and provisions that dictate an increase in funds that are allocated towards women’s development in the workforce. Such action would increase FLFP rates, and thus not only improve gender equality, but also have some real long-term benefits to the country’s GDP with increased levels of productivity. In this respect, other nations and NGOs wishing to invest in Egypt should follow a similar course of action.
[i] World Economic Forum (2024). ‘The Global Gender Gap Report: 2024’, Geneva: World Economic Forum.
[ii] Assaad, R. and Krafft, C. (2024). ‘Introducing the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey 2023’, In Economic Research Forum Working Paper Series, 1748.
[iii] National Council for Women (2017). ‘National Strategy for the Empowerment of Egyptian Women 2030 Vision and Pillars’, retrieved from: https://nwm.unescwa.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/national-strategy-for-the-empowerment-of-egyptian-women-2030-en.pdf.
[iv] Dworkin, A., Lons, C. and Megerisi, T. (2024). ‘Value for money: Why and how Europeans should support the failing economies of Egypt and Tunisia’, ECFR, retrieved from: https://ecfr.eu/publication/value-for-money-why-and-how-europeans-should-support-the-failing-economies-of-egypt-and-tunisia/; Alterman, J.B. and Byman, D. (2023). ‘The World Can’t Solve the Israel-Hamas War Without Egypt’, Foreign Policy, retrieved from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/24/israel-hamas-war-egypt-sisi-rafah-crossing-muslim-brotherhood-sinai/.
[v] Gonzales, C., Jain-Chandra, S., Kochhar, K. and Newiak, M. (2015). ‘Fair Play: More Equal Laws Boost Female Labor Force Participation’, 23 February 2015, retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1502.pdf.
[vi] Bohl, D. (2018). ‘Sustainable Development Goals Report: Egypt 2030’, International Studies, retrieved from: https://korbel.du.edu/resources/sustainable-development-goals-report-egypt-2030.
[vii] IMF. (2024). ‘IMF Executive Board Completes the First and Second Reviews of Extended Fund Facility Arrangement for Egypt, Approves Augmentation of the Arrangement’, retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/03/29/pr24101-egypt-imf-executive-board-completes-first-second-reviews-eff-approves-augmentation.
[viii] Assaad and Krafft (2024). ‘Introducing the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey 2023’.
[ix] New Woman Foundation et al. (2025). ‘Joint UPR submission: The Crisis of Women’s and Girls’ Rights in Egypt 2019-2024’, retrieved from: https://nwrcegypt.org/en/joint-upr-submission-the-crisis-of-womens-and-girls-rights-in-egypt-2019-2024/.
[x] Lagarde, C. (2016). ‘IMF Executive Board Approves US$12 billion Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility for Egypt’, retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/11/11/PR16501-Egypt-Executive-Board-Approves-12-billion-Extended-Arrangement.
[xi] Clark, S. et al. (2019). ‘The Impact of Childcare on Poor Urban Women’s Economic Empowerment in Africa. Demography’, 56(4); Diab, O. and Hindy, S.I. (2021). ‘IMF’s social protection between rhetoric and action: The case of Egypt’, Middle East Critique, 30(4).
[xii] IMF (2019). ‘2018 Review of Program Design and Conditionality’, International Monetary Fund.
[xiii] Ghafar, A. (2021). ‘Causes and consequences of inequality in Egypt’, The Muslim World, 111(1).
[xiv] Assaad and Krafft (2024). ‘Introducing the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey 2023’.
[xv] Al Jazeera (2024). “Egypt raises fuel prices to lock in IMF loan tranche’, 25 July 2024, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/25/egypt-raises-fuel-prices-to-lock-in-imf-loan-tranche.
Lassassi, M. & Tansel, A. (2022). ‘Female labor force participation in Egypt and Palestine: An age–period–cohort analysis’, Review of development economics, 26(4).
[xvi] Assaad and Krafft (2024). ‘Introducing the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey 2023’.
[xvii] Deng, J. et al. (2024). ‘Labor market transitions in Egypt post-Arab Spring. Middle East development journal’, 16(1).
[xviii] Said, M., Majbouri, M. and Barsoum, G., (2022). ‘Sticky floors and glass ceilings: gender wage gap in Egypt’, Feminist Economics, 28(4).
[xix] IMF. (2024). ‘IMF Mission Concludes Visit to Egypt for the Fourth Review under the Extended Fund Facility’, retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/11/20/pr-24429-egypt-imf-mission-concludes-visit-to-egypt-for-the-4th-review-under-the-eff.
[xx]Al Jazeera. (2024). ‘Egypt raises fuel prices to lock in IMF loan tranche’, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/25/egypt-raises-fuel-prices-to-lock-in-imf-loan-tranche.
[xxi] Georgieva, K. (2022). ‘IMF Executive Board Approves 46-month US$3 billion Extended Arrangement for Egypt’, retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/12/16/pr22441-egypt-imf-executive-board-approves-46-month-usd3b-extended-arrangement.
[xxii] New Woman Foundation et al. (2025). ‘Joint UPR submission: The Crisis of Women’s and Girls’ Rights in Egypt 2019-2024,’ retrieved from: https://nwrcegypt.org/en/joint-upr-submission-the-crisis-of-womens-and-girls-rights-in-egypt-2019-2024/.
[xxiii] New Woman Foundation et al. (2025). ‘Joint UPR submission: The Crisis of Women’s and Girls’ Rights in Egypt 2019-2024’, retrieved from: https://nwrcegypt.org/en/joint-upr-submission-the-crisis-of-womens-and-girls-rights-in-egypt-2019-2024/.
[xxiv] World Bank Group (2024). ‘Egypt’s Private Sector: A Driver of Future Sustainable, Inclusive Growth’, retrieved from: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2024/12/11/egypt-s-private-sector-a-driver-of-future-sustainable-inclusive-growth.
[xxv] Al-Ayouty, I. (2017). ‘R&D performance in the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Case Study of Egypt’, European Journal of Sustainable Development, 6(2).
[xxvi] Euromoney (2024). ‘Unshackling Egypt’s private sector’, retrieved from: https://www.euromoney.com/article/2e2es7vwpypi7hneuvklc/sponsored-content/unshackling-egypts-private-sector.
[xxvii] Clyde and Co. (2024). ‘MEA Employment Predictions 2024: Egypt’s New Labour Law’, retrieved from: https://www.clydeco.com/en/insights/2024/06/mea-employment-predictions-egypt-labour-law.
[xxviii] New Woman Foundation et al. (2025). ‘Joint UPR submission: The Crisis of Women’s and Girls’ Rights in Egypt 2019-2024’, retrieved from: https://nwrcegypt.org/en/joint-upr-submission-the-crisis-of-womens-and-girls-rights-in-egypt-2019-2024/; United Nations Development Programme and Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (2021). ‘Renaissance of Egyptian women: Leading roles and societal contribution’, retrieved from: https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/arabstates/English_Full-Report_Sep-12-167-207.pdf; Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (2023). ‘The National Agenda for Sustainable Development Egypt’s Updated Vision 2030’, retrieved from: https://mped.gov.eg/Files/Egypt_Vision_2030_EnglishDigitalUse.pdf.
