As the war in Gaza struggles on, countries in the Middle East and beyond continue their calls for a two-state solution as the answer to the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Largely ignored is international history’s reading of like efforts that suggests the ambition marks a triumph of hope over reality.
Consider the record over more than two centuries: Norway and Sweden, India and Pakistan, the former Yugoslavia, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Koreas, Taiwan and China, the Union and the Confederacy. These European, South Asian, Far Eastern and North American pairings may seem unconnected with Israel and Palestine, but each case represents different approaches that resulted in partition success or failure with potential implications for the Israelis and Palestinians today.
What produced results is not hard to parse. No fault divorces that split domestic adversaries along uncontested geography went well. So did midwifed separation dictated by powerful third parties. Civil war and insurgency brought mixed outcomes, except when foreign military forces tipped the scales. Crushing military defeats both overwhelmed and promoted partitions. Mutually hurting stalemates opened power sharing doors. The popular vote kept some fracturing states together but divided others. Rarely but often in a dramatic fashion, leaders had epiphanies and resolved impasses.
Unfortunately, drilling down into the cases produces a dim verdict on the prospect of translating past partitions into a workable model for an Israel-Palestine split. For one thing, the relationship does not fit the global two-state profile. The divisions that plague the parties are obvious and mind-bogglingly complex: national identity, historic and religious association with the land, external pressures on regional stability, diasporic claims and domestic politics all play a role.
Historical examples
Start with the history of partition’s gold standard for success: the no fault divorce. Here countries polarized by irreconcilable national, social, economic or sectarian divisions concluded a voluntary split was the better course than living contentiously together. Israel and Palestine never approached, much less crossed the no fault threshold and there is little prospect that they can.
The cases of Norway and Sweden, Czechoslovakia, and Malaysia and Singapore are instructive. In 1905, Norway thrust into union with Sweden following the Napoleonic era turned to the ballot to bolt from the Swedish federation.[i] In Stockholm, its Scandinavian partner acquiesced. No fault worked. The same was true for the Czechs and Slovaks, whose union, born out of the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, fractured as the Communist Block collapsed. Unable to bridge differences over the political centralization of the Czechoslovakian state, economic disparities and cultural distinctions led political leaders Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar to agree to end the union.[ii] The result produced the 1993 “Velvet Divorce.”
Singapore’s breakup with Malaysia was bumpier, but no fault prevailed. Following independence from the United Kingdom, hoped-for economic synergies helped bring about the long-sought union with Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak in 1963.[iii] Optimism could not overcome latent cleavages, however. With the Malays unwilling to grant equal partnership, racial tensions exploded into ethnic riots. Two years into the union Malaysia’s parliament annulled the marriage and the parties went their separate ways.
Why did divorce succeed? In each instance domestic politics worked to generate more or less peaceful division. Further, the absence of irredentist claims durably locked in state splits. To be sure, in other efforts at divorce, the results were a mixed bag. In Canada facing Quebec separatism[iv], and in the United Kingdom, where the Scots sought the same[v], voting publics kept countries together. Spain did the same, in its case by suppressing Catalonian demands for an election.[vi] And in Russia’s case, the no fault divorces following the fall of the Soviet Union led to Russian revanchism marked notably by the invasions of Ukraine.
The divorce court idea between Israel and Palestine has come a cropper despite efforts to broker an amicable Israeli-Palestinian deal. The sad history speaks for itself. The failed Oslo accords signed in the 1993 White House ceremony by PLO leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin[vii] were intended to be the interim step to final no fault divorce.
Unresolved issues and domestic objections punctuated by a dozen Palestinian terrorist attacks on the streets of Israel and the Israeli terrorist assassination of Rabin[viii], and twenty-nine Palestinians in Hebron[ix] sank the agreement. Fifteen years later, failure arrived once more after the talks between Ehud Olmert and Mohammed Abbas stumbled. Israeli settlement building continued, and the Palestinian leader declared only returning to the “June 4, 1967 borders—without detracting a single inch, and without detracting a single stone from Jerusalem”[x]—would work.
Midwifery has provided a prominent model for birthing a two-state solution as well, albeit without results. Whether it was UN resolutions (notably the 1947 General Assembly Resolution 181 and later Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338); separate international efforts (the 1991 Madrid Conference and progeny); the 2002 Saudi Initiative and US efforts (the Clinton 2000 Camp David Arafat/Barak summit, George W. Bush’s Quartet Road Map in 2002-2003); the 2007 Annapolis Abbas-Olmert talks; the 2013-2014 Secretary of State John Kerry effort), to mention a few, disappointment followed all. The reasons include differences among principals as well as the international community’s inability to dictate, much less enforce their resolution.
Whatever the substantive details, the midwifery model’s failures are instructive: When it comes to midwifery, the power of enforcement matters a lot. Britain’s departure from its South Asia imperial holdings in 1947 is a case in point. The same year the United Nations first unsuccessfully attempted an Israel/Palestine partition buy-in several thousand miles to the east, Britain used its sovereign authority on the sub-continent to divide the real estate and create the Indian and Pakistani states.[xi] The August action sparked dramatic sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing as millions of fearful Muslims and Hindus sought safe haven in the new kindred nations. Despite the lingering dispute over Kashmir that spawned multiple wars over decades, partition held.
In sum, the successes notwithstanding positive results producing durable partitions through no fault divorces and political midwifing are rarities. More often violence determines outcomes when ethnically, religiously or politically divided populations are at loggerheads. Until the current Gaza war, Israel’s use of force to settle matters fell well below the military campaigns of others, for example Russia, Sri Lanka, Nigeria and the United States. Each unleashed crushing military campaigns to bring Chechen, Tamil, Biafran and Confederate rebels into the fold. The Gaza war has become the Jewish state’s test but fraught. Israel seeks no political integration.
The Israeli-Palestinian conundrum
Unlike other separatists in Ireland, Croatia, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, French Indochina and Algeria—all struggles where insurgents sought to split countries or relieve colonial yokes—the Palestinians had ambition but never capacity to conduct an effective uprising against Israel. The same holds for the enlistment of foreign militaries on their behalf. Distinct from East Pakistan, the breakaway Yugoslav regions of Bosnia and Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Turkish Cyprus, South Korea and Taiwan, where Indian, NATO, Russian, Turkish and US forces threw themselves in as combat allies and political stewards, the Palestinians never had effective external military backing to attain their goals.
The Gaza war has thrown Israel-Palestine prewar expectations asunder putting in play three partition defaults distinct from aforementioned classic strategies that promote or restrain partition: An unconditional Hamas defeat that durably scotches Palestinian attacks from the territories but also excludes Israeli absorption, a mutually hurting stalemate or leadership epiphany.
For his part, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains unwilling—or unable—to lay out Israel’s goals beyond the stated eradication of Hamas, much less an end game and political resolution for Gaza and the broader Palestinian issue. Indeed, the Israeli leader appears inclined to let the war in Gaza speak for itself, mimicking the Allies goal of unconditional surrender of the Axis. As in that case the goal aims not only to destroy Hamas but also change the Palestinian political culture including irredentist claims to the Jewish state.
In their 2003 eight case examination of US post-conflict nation-building Rand Corporation authors found only “Germany and Japan set a standard for post-conflict nation-building that has not been matched.”[xii] In the remarkable transition Washington converted the Axis adversaries into liberal democratic allies. The recent US experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the difficulty Israeli fulfillment would face. The American experience is not unique. While the North Vietnamese and Taliban military victories durably imposed their brand of authoritarian and religious extremist politics on their defeated adversaries, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe failed. The odds that Israel could emulate success are questionable.
The other end of the Gaza war spectrum lies the mutually hurting military stalemate. Should Jerusalem’s operations simply bog down into months or more of inconclusive fighting, would the impasse inspire an “enough” moment on all sides to prompt a durable solution?
Northern Ireland and El Salvador offer apt illustrations. After the long decades of “the Troubles” pitting Catholics and Protestants killing thousands in civil strife, the impasse sobered the communities to accept the mediated resolution in the form of a power sharing agreement fashioned by former US Senator George Mitchell.[xiii] Likewise, the far bloodier stalemated 1980s El Salvador civil war pitting the insurgent Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) against the government translated to the 1989 FMLN entry into the political process.[xiv]
Israel’s commitment to remain the Jewish homeland excludes replication. Yet arguably the hurting stalemate opens the possibility of a durable cessation of hostilities allowing the parties to lick their wounds and soberly evaluate next steps. Some may hope a stalemate could open the door to third-party international security assurances to enforce a divide. For Israel this is a non-starter given failed legacies marked by the UN 1967 withdrawal from the Sinai opening the gates war and the hollowness of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to keep the peace on Israel’s northern border.
Leadership epiphany and authority marks the third default. The storied Nixon goes to China moment in 1972 found its equivalent in Anwar Sadat’s 1977 trip to Jerusalem.[xv] Both built on unique circumstance. In the US/China case the breach in Sino-Soviet relations and the domestic economic dysfunction generated during the Great Cultural Revolution created the opportunity to break the long divide.
For Sadat ego together with the country’s economic distress, unbearable military burden and determination to win back the Israeli occupied Sinai prompted the audacious outreach. Timing proved propitious as Israeli hawk Menachem Begin who had only recently assumed the premiership was open to deal. Despite the surprising synergy a difficult 1978 Camp David summit followed that only in the eleventh hour consummated a historic framework that gave birth to the March 1979 peace agreement.[xvi]
Conclusion
The result reflects an Israel/Palestine interface with all the characteristics of a chronic illness that policy can try to manage but not cure. Classic no fault and midwifed treatments have failed repeatedly. No third party that can dictate terms via negotiation or force. Tit-for-tat violence remains part of the region’s DNA. A mutually hurting stalemate, epiphany or international security assurances that offer resolution are not in the offering. Wishing this landscape were otherwise is a chimera, not a plan. Rather, when today’s guns go silent, the odds are that Palestinians will continue to reside in Gaza and West Bank limbo backed against a traumatized Israel tightening tourniquets as needed to assure the legacy of October 7 is “never again.”
[i] The Royal House of Norway (2025). ‘Dissolution of the union, 1905’, retrieved from: https://www.royalcourt.no/seksjon.html?tid=28690#:~:text=The%20dissolution%20of%20the%20union,a%20separate%20Norwegian%20consular%20service.
[ii] Villa Tugendhat (2012). ‘The agreement to divide Czechoslovakia was signed at Villa Tugendhat twenty years ago’, retrieved from: https://www.tugendhat.eu/en/pred-dvaceti-lety-byla-ve-vile-tugendhat-podepsana-smlouva-o-rozdeleni-ceskoslovenska/.
[iii] Tin Seng, L. (2025). ‘Singapore’s separation from Malaysia’, Singapore National Library Board¸ retrieved from: https://www.nlb.gov.sg/main/article-detail?cmsuuid=9641f35d-3ae5-41d8-9fa6-7ca8b845ea53.
[iv] Britannica (2025). ‘Quebec separatism’, retrieved from: https://www.britannica.com/place/Canada/Quebec-separatism.
[v] UK Parliament (2025). ‘Scottish independence referendum’, retrieved from: https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/scotland-the-referendum-and-independence/.
[vi] BBC News (2019). ‘Catalonia’s bid for independence from Spain explained’, 18 October 2019, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29478415.
[vii] Office of the Historian (2025). ‘The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process’, retrieved from: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo.
[viii] Peri, Y. (2000). The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, Redwood City: Stanford University Press.
[ix] BBC News. ‘1994: Jewish settler kills 30 at holy sight’, retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/25/newsid_4167000/4167929.stm.
[x] Abrams, E. (2012). ‘Peace Was Not at Hand’, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 May 2012, retrieved from: https://www.cfr.org/blog/peace-was-not-hand.
[xi] National Army Museum (2025). ‘Independence and Partition, 1947’, retrieved from: https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/independence-and-partition-1947#:~:text=The%20birth%20of%20India%20and,bitter%20legacy%20to%20this%20day.
[xii] Dobbins, J. et al. (2003). ‘America’s Role in Nation-Building’, retrieved from: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753.html.
[xiii] Mitchell, G. (2025). ‘Senator George Mitchell: Northern Ireland’s peace must evolve. And if it is here to stay it must be shared’, The Irish Times, 16 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/2025/04/17/senator-george-mitchell-northern-irelands-peace-must-evolve-and-if-it-is-here-to-stay-it-must-be-shared/.
[xiv] CIA. ‘El Salvador: The FMLN After the November 1989 Offensive’, retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000049257.pdf.
[xv] BBC News. ‘1977: Egyptian leader’s Israel trip makes history’, retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/19/newsid_2520000/2520467.stm.
[xvi] History.com (2025). ‘Israel-Egypt peace agreement signed’, retrieved from: https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/march-26/israel-egyptian-peace-agreement-signed#:~:text=In%20a%20ceremony%20at%20the,establishing%20diplomatic%20and%20commercial%20ties.