The Horn of Africa has become a highly congested geopolitical space where Turkey is gradually emerging as a key player. The growing alignment between Turkey and Ethiopia is primarily driven by pragmatic geopolitical interests on both sides, reflecting a broader trend of middle powers reshaping regional dynamics in Africa.
On 17th February, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Ethiopia. This is the second such visit – the first took place in 2015. Turkey’s foreign policy has changed dramatically since. Ankara has become more engaged across Africa, especially in the Sahel and the eastern part of the continent. Before the trip to Ethiopia, the Turkish president also visited Egypt, furthering the normalisation process with the Arab country and highlighting how Ankara increasingly applies a regional approach to this part of Africa.
Relations between Ankara and Addis Ababa have been friendly for over a century, despite alignment within rival blocs during the Cold War. In 1926, Ethiopia was the first country the young Turkish Republic recognised in Sub-Saharan Africa. The particular expansion of ties has taken place over the past years and is well reflected in a 2024 deal[i] that Ankara helped secure between Ethiopia and Somalia regarding potential sea access for Ethiopian trade.
During Erdoğan’s visit, the countries signed[ii] a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation that would lead to joint production and projects. This particularly concerns cooperation in hydroelectric energy, the area in which Turkey has extensive know-how. Given that Ethiopia wants to develop energy beyond the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the Turkish experience will be of vital importance. Both sides also discussed cooperation regarding COP31, which will be held in Turkey in 2026, and then in Ethiopia next year.
Why Ethiopia matters
For Turkey, Ethiopia is of particular geopolitical importance. First, it is a large and fast-growing economy on the African continent. The country seeks to establish overall trade routes to reach the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, thereby expanding its trade potential. Turkey, on the other hand, seeks new markets for trade, especially for its weapons industry. Currently, bilateral trade stands at around $300 million[iii], and both sides have agreed to expand it to at least $1 billion. A similar position prevails regarding investment ties. Turkey has been one of the biggest investors in Ethiopia, tapping into its growing number of industrial parks and open investment climate. For the moment, around 250 Turkish companies (employing a pool of some 20 thousand workers) with an overall investment of $2.5 billion in 13 projects are present in Ethiopia, making it the second-largest investor[iv] in the country after China.
Secondly, beyond bilateral engagement, Turkey’s policy should be seen in the light of the shifting balance of power in the Horn of Africa. For instance, Israel’s activism in Somaliland is one reason. Last December, Tel-Aviv recognised Somaliland as an independent state to gain a foothold near the south of the Arabian Peninsula to better contain the Houthis in Yemen. The Turkish-Israeli competition in the Horn of Africa adds another layer to the already tense relations that have developed between Israel and Turkey in Syria following the fall of the Assad dynasty. Ankara’s thinking is straightforward and based on balance-of-power calculations. Amid Iran’s weakened position in the Middle East, it hopes to contain Israel’s ambitions. Turkey cannot achieve this outright militarily, but can apply a containment strategy whereby it builds positive relations with Ethiopia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others to limit Israel.
Another reason is related to Turkey’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the countries which likewise seek greater influence in the region and compete with each other through investments in critical infrastructure, such as ports and railways. There is also Iran, which has managed to normalise relations with Addis Ababa, and the two even signed[v] a security treaty in May 2025. The document envisions closer collaboration on issues such as preventing cross-border crime and training in the military and security domains. Competition in the Horn of Africa is thus intensifying, and Turkey strives to remain ahead of its geopolitical rivals.
Ethiopia’s strategic calculus
As for Ethiopia’s interests, the country pursues a foreign policy that might be characterised as multi-aligned. It avoids anchoring on a single great power, and the burgeoning relations with Ankara allow Addis-Ababa to better navigate in a multipolar world. Both Turkey and Ethiopia seek to position themselves as middle powers, strong enough to avoid taking sides but still needing each other’s help to mitigate regional tensions. Ethiopia also aims to avoid conditionality when seeking foreign aid. Turkey is a partner that, unlike Western countries, seems more comfortable with Addis-Ababa, as it avoids tying democracy-building, human rights, and similar issues to the provision of economic aid. In broader terms, the Turkey-Ethiopia alignment illustrates how regional orders are increasingly shaped by middle powers operating through flexible partnerships rather than rigid blocs, and it challenges the assumption that African geopolitics will be dominated exclusively by great powers.
In its local region, however, Ethiopia needs Turkey’s help in containing Egypt, with which Addis Ababa has historical tensions over the use of Nile water resources. Turkey’s diplomatic reach and influence are also instrumental[vi] to Ethiopia’s ambition to find a solution to the conundrum of being a landlocked country through agreements with Somalia, Djibouti, and potentially Eritrea.
Security cooperation and the limits of alignment
There is also a security dimension to burgeoning relations between the two countries. Defence collaboration has advanced rapidly since 2021, when several agreements were signed. Two years later, a comprehensive bilateral military cooperation agreement covering joint drills, information sharing, counter-piracy activities, and defence industry partnership was approved[vii] by the Turkish parliament. Ankara is a major drone producer, and Ethiopia has long acquired drones to fight Tigrayan groups in the north of the country. This is especially important given the tenuous situation[viii] on the ground following the 2022 Pretoria Agreement between the warring sides. Ethiopia is also facing another conflict in the Amhara region. Here too, Turkish weaponry would be of major help. For Turkey, defence cooperation with Ethiopia serves multiple purposes. It expands Ankara’s defence export market in Africa, reinforces its reputation as a reliable security partner, and provides leverage in a region where military balance directly shapes political outcomes.
The durability of the alignment depends on Ethiopia’s internal trajectory. Ethiopia remains a state undergoing profound internal transformation, with unresolved tensions along ethnic, regional, and federal lines. A stable, centralised Ethiopia enhances the value of long-term strategic partnership; while a fragmented Ethiopia could entangle Ankara in complex internal dynamics and pose risks to its investments. Despite such uncertainties, the strategic logic underpinning alignment between the two remains strong. Ankara’s engagement with Ethiopia is therefore part of Turkey’s overall push to elevate its position in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel.
This process is also animated by shifting geopolitics in Eastern Africa, which has grown increasingly intertwined with the Middle East. The space has become more geopolitically congested than ever, and Israel and the wealthy Gulf states’ engagement has heightened the stakes for Ankara. With their partnership, Turkey gains access to one of Africa’s most important political centres, a growing defence market, and influence over Red Sea dynamics without direct territorial commitments. Ethiopia gains a powerful external partner capable of supporting its security needs, amplifying its diplomatic voice, and facilitating its long-term quest for maritime access. As neither side is bound by ideological affinities the relationship will continue to be based on the principles of pragmaticism, interests, and adaptability.
[i] Reuters (2024). “Somalia, Ethiopia agree to work together to resolve Somaliland port dispute”, 12 December 2024, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/erdogan-meets-somalia-ethiopia-leaders-separately-amid-somaliland-dispute-2024-12-11/.
[ii] ENA (2026). “Ethiopia, Turkiye Strengthen Strategic Ties as PM Abiy and Erdogan Formalize Major Deals”, 17 February 2026, retrieved from: https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_8331519.
[iii] Borkena (2026). “Ethiopia, Turkey Reach Deal to enhance trade relation to $1 billion”, 17 February 2026, retrieved from: https://borkena.com/2026/02/17/ethiopia-turkey-reach-deal-to-enhance-trade-relation-to-1-billion/.
[iv] RFI (2026). “Turkey deepens Ethiopia ties with energy deals amid regional tensions”, 18 February 2026, retrieved from: https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20260218-turkey-deepens-ethiopia-ties-with-energy-deals-amid-regional-tensions.
[v] Addis Standard (2025). “News: Ethiopia, Iran police chiefs sign security, intelligence collaboration MoU”, 6 May 2025, retrieved from: https://addisstandard.com/ethiopia-iran-police-chiefs-sign-security-intelligence-collaboration-mou/?amp=1.
[vi] Abdu, S.K. (2026). “Ethiopian premier says he sought Turkiye’s diplomatic support on sea access during Erdogan’s visit”, Hiiraan Online, 18 February 2026, retrieved from: https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2026/Feb/204456/ethiopian_premier_says_he_sought_trkiyes_diplomatic_support_on_sea_access_during_erdogans_visit.aspx.
[vii] Kenez, L. (2023). “Turkey approved military agreement with Ethiopia amid escalation between Cairo and Addis Ababa”, 13 April 2023, retrieved from: https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/04/turkey-approved-military-agreement-with-ethiopia-amid-escalation-between-cairo-and-addis-ababa/.
[viii] Simoncelli, M. and Cybulski, J. (2026). “Ethiopia Tigray region could be on the brink of war, again”, DW, 27 February 2026, retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-tigray-region-could-be-on-the-brink-of-war-again/a-76142512.
