On 20 April Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune chaired a meeting of the Council of Ministers, during which several draft laws were approved, one of them concerning the declaration of “general mobilization”.[i] While this does not necessarily equate to a declaration of war, and it can also be triggered by major threats, natural disasters, or security challenges requiring the full readiness of both state and society, the announcement stirred considerable debate and speculation at both the local and regional levels. Many observers interpreted it as a potential sign that Algeria may be preparing for a phase of direct confrontation,[ii] particularly in light of the expanding belt of security threats that has been tightening around the country year after year.[iii] This climate of uncertainty may have prompted some within Algeria’s political and strategic elite to consider the option of launching a war on one of several fronts, seeking to shift the regional balance of power in Algeria’s favour and deter further threats from its adversaries.
However, the widespread belief that Algeria can wage and win such a war carries significant risks. There are strong and rational arguments for embracing an approach grounded in restraint, strategic patience, and a clear avoidance of military confrontation. The strategic importance of preserving the prestige and perceived strength of both the army and the state, on the other hand, is a factor rarely addressed in official discourse or public commentary in Algeria.
A belt of crises pushing Algeria toward war
At a time when Algerian-French relations are severely strained — following France’s official recognition of Western Sahara as part of Moroccan territory and Algeria’s recent arrest of the Francophone dissident Boualem Sansal — a new front of tensions has emerged to Algeria’s south.[iv] This involves the three Sahelian states of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, all backed by Russia (a traditional Algerian ally) and the Wagner paramilitary group. The trigger came on 31 March, when Algeria shot down a Turkish-made Malian drone it claimed had violated its southern airspace.[v] Since then, the situation has steadily escalated, with the Sahelian states accusing Algeria of sponsoring terrorism in the region.[vi] Algeria responded by closing its airspace to aircraft arriving from Mali.[vii]
To the east in Libya, Algeria remains deeply concerned about the growing influence of regional powers like the UAE and international players like Russia[viii], particularly their increasing support for Khalifa Haftar — who previously threatened Algeria with escalation.[ix] There are fears that Haftar might launch a new offensive to seize western Libya, bringing his forces dangerously close to Algeria’s eastern border. These developments have recently prompted Algeria to strengthen coordination with Egypt in an effort to align their security strategies and stabilize the situation in Libyan.[x]
Meanwhile, on Algeria’s western flank, tensions with Morocco over Western Sahara have intensified significantly. This is especially true in light of U.S. President Donald Trump’s renewed political activity over the territory. Within the context of the Abraham Accords, the U.S. recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the territory in exchange for Rabat normalizing ties with Israel.[xi] The Trump administration stated on 8 April that any negotiations to resolve the conflict over Western Sahara should be based solely on a Moroccan plan that offers the region limited autonomy under the sovereignty of the kingdom. Any attempt to impose a Moroccan-led solution to the Western Sahara outside of an internationally supervised framework of negotiations is firmly rejected by both the Polisario Front and its chief backer, Algeria, raising the spectre of a wider escalation in an already volatile region.[xii]
In this context, a number of Algerian officials and analysts have begun to emphasize the country’s significant military capabilities as a key factor in confronting and possibly overcoming these mounting challenges through direct confrontation, should circumstances demand it.[xiii] Confidence in this approach has been further reinforced by Algeria’s continued investment in acquiring advanced military technology[xiv], most notably the recent procurement of Russian stealth aircraft, including the Sukhoi Su-57[xv][xvi] and Su-35.[xvii]
Moreover, the Algerian leadership has made a point of publicly projecting military strength at every opportunity, through regular desert and border exercises,[xviii] and most visibly, through the grand military parade held in central Algiers during the latest celebration of the anniversary of the Algerian Revolution on 1 November.[xix]
The widespread belief among ruling elites, intellectuals, as well as the broader public that Algeria can wage and win a war represents a serious risk in its own right, one that rivals the security risks encircling the country. There are strong, rational arguments for adopting an approach rooted in restraint, strategic patience, and a firm avoidance of military confrontation. These include the limited capacity of Algeria’s rentier economy to absorb the costs and fallout of war, the risk of internal unrest — including the potential resurgence of mass protests following the interruption of the 2019 Hirak movement — and the unpredictable nature of warfare itself, including the uncertain roles of third-party actors who might side with adversaries, or the shifting loyalties of presumed allies.
The power of prestige — Status without war
Alongside these factors, it is essential to give significant weight to the strategic importance of preserving the prestige and perceived strength of both the army and the state.
Hans Morgenthau considers prestige an “indispensable element of a rational foreign policy,” emphasizing its strategic value as it enhances a state’s power.
Prestige belongs to a broader conceptual family that includes honour, status, reputation, respect, glory, credibility, pride, and legitimacy. States make self-evaluative judgments about their standing, not by comparing themselves with every country in the world, but through an assessment of their relative status vis-à-vis “significant others.” The country’s military power is one of the most obvious elements of attaining this status, alongside other elements.[xx]
Prestige can be understood as “the commanding image — whether genuine or deceptive and carefully crafted — associated with a particular state, shaped by how it views itself and how it is perceived by others. This image gains respect — whether willingly granted or coerced — by other states.”[xxi]
There is little disagreement about the considerable military power that Algeria possesses, which grants it regional prestige and status across North Africa, the Sahel, and the western Mediterranean. Reports show that Algeria is the fifth-largest arms importer globally and the leading importer in Africa. The country has allocated a military budget of $25 billion for 2025.[xxii] Its status among the top 40 global military spenders is regarded domestically as a strategic achievement. Russia remains Algeria’s main partner and arms supplier, providing access to some of the most sophisticated Russian-made weapons, such as the S-400, Iskander ballistic missiles, and, more recently, the Su-35, with potential plans for acquiring the fifth-generation Su-57 fighter jets. These deals support Algeria’s narrative of regional superiority and shift the regional balance of power in its favour, further strengthening the trust on Russia and reinforcing Algeria’s sense of security against perceived regional threats.[xxiii]
Morocco, the immediate competitor to Algeria, reached its peak in arms imports earlier, between 2010 and 2014, when its acquisitions increased more than tenfold compared to the period between 2005 and 2009.[xxiv] For 2025, Morocco’s military budget is estimated at approximately $13 billion.[xxv] According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for 2024, Morocco ranked 29th among the world’s 40 largest arms importers.[xxvi] Within the North African region, it ranked second after Algeria (53 %), accounting for approximately 34% of total regional arms imports between 2020 and 2024.[xxvii]
This strength, in Algeria’s favour, might tempt some Algerian analysts — and even the general public — to feel overly confident and to advocate for the option of war in response to any of the aforementioned challenges. However, this line of thinking is profoundly flawed.
Several arguments speak against such a course of action, including the risk of falling into potential foreign provocations aimed at dragging Algeria into an unwinnable quagmire, including from Haftar, Saheli states, or Morocco’s policy actions on the Western Sahara. Maintaining the prestige of state and army is on one them — a crucial element that every regional or global military power must safeguard, as it constitutes a core source of pre-emptive deterrence and national security.
To safeguard this prestige — which Algeria has established through robust armament, large-scale military drills, strong alliances, or a combination thereof — it should refrain from entering into war. Instead, it should leverage its military prestige to project power and influence regionally. This is because the outcomes of war, especially contemporary hybrid warfare, are notoriously difficult to predict. Such conflicts tend to unfold along uncertain paths, shaped by the complexity of strategic calculations, the use of multi-level tools and tactics, and the intricate dynamics between actors and their often-competing interests — even among allies. In moments of acute crisis, the most rational and realist approach for any militarily strong state, including Algeria, is to demonstrate strength and a clear readiness to utilize its capabilities — military or otherwise — as a means of deterrence to prevent escalation. Direct military engagement remains the least favoured and most cautious course of action. For this reason, prestige can be associated with restraint and a policy of non-intervention.[xxviii]
In contrast, the erosion of military prestige often leads to a weakened deterrent posture, undermining both national security and regional/international standing.
Lessons from history and considerations for the present
Iraq under Saddam Hussein serves as a stark reminder. Saddam’s overestimation of Iraq’s military strength led to catastrophe during the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, ultimately triggering the disintegration of the Iraqi state.[xxix]
Israel serves as a compelling example in this context. Since its war against Hezbollah in 2006, repeated unsuccessful military engagements in Lebanon and Gaza have gradually eroded the long-standing myth of the “invincible army”[xxx] — a prestige/status Israel had earned following its overwhelming victory in the 1967 Six-Day War against several Arab armies. That prestige, bolstered by its significant military superiority over neighbouring states, has since come under increasing strain.[xxxi]
The United States has grappled with this dilemma time and again: following the Vietnam War (1975), after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and throughout its two-decade-long war in Afghanistan.[xxxii]
Thus, prestige can be more valuable than firepower. A miscalculated war can strip a nation of both. For a country like Algeria — which has not engaged in a major conventional war in over half a century — this is an especially important consideration.
Algeria’s decision-makers may be fully aware of these stakes. Historically, regimes dominated by the military[xxxiii] have often shown greater restraint, prudence, and strategic acumen in matters of war[xxxiv] than their civilian-led counterparts.[xxxv]
To conclude, starting a war is easy; ending it in one’s own favour is far more difficult. That is why — among many reasons — wise men have long spoken of the “art of avoiding war,”[xxxvi] or winning without fighting[xxxvii] — an approach that demands restraint, and strategic foresight.[xxxviii] In an era of regional upheaval and shifting alliances, it is not military intervention but strategic restraint that will best safeguard Algeria’s influence and security.
[i] Algeria Press Service (2025). “President Tebboune Chairs Meeting of Council of Ministers,” 20 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.aps.dz/en/algeria/57142-president-tebboune-chairs-meeting-of-council-of-ministers.
[ii] Watanserb (2025). “Algeria’s New Draft Law on National Mobilization: A Response to Regional Instability,” 23 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.watanserb.com/en/2025/04/23/algerias-new-draft-law-on-national-mobilization-a-response-to-regional-instability/.
[iii] Atlasweb Info (2025). “General mobilization in Algeria: A strategic response to regional tensions”, (YouTube video), 20 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XxvZvNkvqMM.
[iv] Les Décodeurs, Le Monde (2025). “Why Are Diplomatic Relations Between France and Algeria So Strained” , 18 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2025/04/18/why-are-diplomatic-relations-between-france-and-algeria-so-strained_6740364_8.html.
[v] Agenzia Fides (2025). “Diplomatic Crisis between Algeria and the Three Countries of the Sahel Alliance,” 8 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.fides.org/en/news/76229-AFRICA_ALGERIA_Diplomatic_crisis_between_Algeria_and_the_three_countries_of_the_Sahel_Alliance/.
[vi] Benhizia, I. (2025). “The Stakes of the New Crisis between Algeria and the AES Regimes,” Modern Diplomacy, 22 April 22, retrieved from: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/04/22/the-stakes-of-the-new-crisis‑between‑algeria‑and‑the‑aes‑regimes/.|
[vii] Ewokor, C. (2025). “Algeria blocks flights from Mali after drone row,” BBC News, 7 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c045zp1l3nko.
[viii] “The Arab Weekly (2024). “Military Mobilisation of Haftar Forces Raises Concern in Algeria,” 11 August 2024, retrieved from: https://thearabweekly.com/military-mobilisation-haftar-forces-raises-concern-algeria.
[ix] Agag, U. (2018). “Haftar’s Empty Threats Don’t Disturb Algeria,” Middle East Monitor, 21 September 2018, retrieved from: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180921-haftars-empty-threats-dont-disturb-algeria/.
[x] Egypt State Information Service (2025). “Abdelatty Says Ties with Algeria ‘Historic’, 17 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/207176/Abdelatty‑says‑ties‑with‑Algeria‑‘historic’‑2025‑04‑17‑203006‑GMT?lang=en‑us.
[xi] Yerkes, S. and Triche, N. “Trump’s Lesser-Known Deal of the Century? Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2025, retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/02/western‑sahara‑morocco‑sahrawi‑trump?lang=en.
[xii]Reuters (2025). “US Says Moroccan Proposal Should Be Sole Basis for Western Sahara Talks,” 8 April 2025, retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-says-moroccan-proposal-should-be-sole-basis-western-sahara-talks-2025-04-08/.
[xiii] El‑Djeîch Magazine (2025). “Preventing Algeria’s Gains, Ministry of National Defence (Algérie)”, accessed 5 July 2025, retrieved from: https://www.mdn.dz/site_principal/sommaire/revues/revue_el_djeich_an.php.
[xiv] Khechib, D. (2019). “Why Algeria Is Arming Itself Militarily?”, Insamer, 10 September 2019, retrieved from: https://en.insamer.com/why-algeria-is-arming-itself-militarily_1613.html.
[xv] Carlin, M. (2025). “Algeria to Become Launch Export Customer for Su-57 ‘Felon’,” The National Interest, 18 February 2025, retrieved from: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/algeria-to-become-launch-export-customer-for-su-57-felon.
[xvii] Suciu, P. (2025). “Algeria Receives the First Su‑35, but Still Waits for the Su‑57,” The National Interest, 25 March 2025, retrieved from: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/algeria-receives-the-first-su-35-but-still-waits-for-the-su-57.
[xviii]Middle East Monitor (2021). “Algeria Holds Military Exercises Using Live Ammunition on Borders with Morocco, Western Sahara,” 20 January 2021, retrieved from: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210120-algeria-holds-military-exercises-using-live-ammunition-on-borders-with-morocco-western‑sahara/.
[xix] “Military Parade Celebrating 70th Anniversary of Liberation War Wraps Up,” Algerian Press Service, 1 November 2024, retrieved from: https://www.aps.dz/en/algeria/54873-military-parade-celebrating-70th-anniversary-of-liberation-war-warps-up.
[xx] Götz, E. (2021). “Status Matters in World Politics,” International Studies Review, 23(1), 228–243, retrieved from: https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/23/1/228/5905886.
[xxi] Steve Wood, op. cit.
[xxii] Boussel, P. (3035). “Algerian Military Buildup Diverts Eyes from Economic Frustrations,” GIS Reports, 3 March 2025, retrieved from: https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/algerian-military-buildup/.
[xxiii] Ibid.
[xxiv] Hussain Z. and Tartir, A. (2025). “Recent Trends in International Arms Transfers in the Middle East and North Africa”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 10 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2025/recent-trends-international-arms-transfers-middle-east-and-north-africa.
[xxv] Bernacchi, G. (2024). “Morocco to Increase Defense Budget, Boost Local Industry”, The Defense Post, 23 October 2024, retrieved from: https://thedefensepost.com/2024/10/23/morocco-defense-budget/.
|[xxvi] Kasraoui, S. (2024). “Morocco Retains Position as 29th Largest Arms Importer Worldwide”, Morocco World News, 12 March 2024, retrieved from:
https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2024/03/22162/morocco-retains-position-as-29th-largest-arms-importer-worldwide/.
[xxvii] Zain Hussain and Alaa Tartir, op, cit.
[xxviii] Bennett Brake J. (2022). “Prestige and the Restraint of Power in International Relations”, (PhD diss.), University of Cambridge, retrieved from: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/9de3f344-10af-457f-abfd-f9b301de934f/download.
[xxix] Hosmer, S.T. (2025). “Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak,” RAND Corporation, accessed 5 July 2025, retrieved from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg544af.8.
[xxx] Al-Arian, S. (2024). ‘War on Gaza: How 7 October forever destroyed the myth of Israeli military invincibility’, Middle East Eye, 5 July 2024, retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/gaza-israel-7-october-destroyed-myth-military-invincibility.
[xxxi] Al-Arian, S. (2024). “War on Gaza: How 7 October Forever Destroyed the Myth of Israeli Military Invincibility,” Middle East Eye, 5 July 2024, retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/gaza-israel-7-october-destroyed-myth-military-invincibility.
[xxxii] Xinhua News Agency (2023). “Origins, Facts and Perils of U.S. Military Hegemony”, retrieved from: https://english.news.cn/20230906/117fcc979a6642e592ac00c1fd971e4b/db6f88b21a4e48c695719b44d716ab3d_junshibaquanyingwendinggao.pdf.|[xxxiii] Desch, M.C. (2001). Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, retrieved from: https://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title/1310/civilian-control-military.
[xxxiv] Desch, M.C. (1998). “Soldiers, States, and Structures: The End of the Cold War and Weakening U.S. Civilian Control,” Armed Forces & Society24(3), 389–405, retrieved from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/45346821.
[xxxv] Saunders, E.N. (2007). Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, retrieved from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt7zgb7.
[xxxvi] Kaplan, R.D. “The Art of Avoiding War,” The Atlantic, June 2015, retrieved from: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/the-art-of-avoiding-war/392060/.
[xxxvii] Gershaneck, Prof. K.K. (2020). ‘To Win without Fighting’, Expeditions with MCUP, April 2020, retrieved from: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1109751.pdf.
[xxxviii] Gershaneck, K.K. (2020). “To Win without Fighting: Defining China’s Political Warfare,” Expeditions with MCUP, 17 June 2020, retrieved from: https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/Expeditions-with-MCUP-digital-journal/To-Win-without-Fighting/.
