The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is considered to be a key ally to Washington in the Middle East. Their extensive strategic cooperation on various regional and international issues over the past few years highlights this. One of the most critical areas cooperation between Amman and Washington is counterterrorism. Jordan is a member of the Global Coalition to defeat ISIS, an initiative formed in 2014 comprising more than 90 states committed to defeating the influence of and threats posed by ISIS.[i] This longstanding cooperation is set to continue, with discussions underway on resuming the Eager Lion exercises in Jordan at the beginning of summer 2026, marking the 12th iteration of the program since its launch in 2011.[ii]
The fourth Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) governing U.S. foreign aid to Jordan was signed in September 2022. The seven-year agreement, covering FY2023–FY2029, contingent on congressional appropriations, commits the U.S. administration to disburse a combined total of $1.45 billion per year in economic and military assistance for Jordan.
The United States and Jordan are also bound by a series of defence-related agreements, including a 1996 status of forced agreement, a 2006 acquisition and cross serving agreement in addition to a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in 2021. The 2021 DCA fits into a longer pattern of U.S.–Jordanian military cooperation that came into sharper public focus with the launch of the U.S.-led campaign against the Islamic State in 2014. This cooperation was reaffirmed in May 2024, when Jordan and the U.S. joined the 11th iteration of Eager Lion, the largest multinational military exercise ever hosted by the kingdom.[iii]
Successes notwithstanding, a recent debate in the House of Representatives in Amman has brought renewed attention to questions surrounding U.S.-Jordanian security cooperation and how such issues are discussed in the public sphere.[iv] During a parliamentary session, MP Saleh Armouti raised concerns regarding foreign military involvement as a potential risk to Jordanian security. Speaker of the House Mazen Qadi firmly rejected this framing, emphasizing that Jordan’s security partnerships do not pose a threat to national stability.[v]
The exchange itself was not the first of its like. Jordan’s security partnerships – particularly with the United States – have long been a subject of periodic political debate, often resurfacing during moments of heightened regional tension. The current debate, however, is notable due to its public-facing nature.
The issue of U.S.-Jordan security cooperation appears to be a double-edged sword in the Jordanian public’s mind. On the one hand, most Jordanians view the United States as a preferred partner in strengthening Jordan’s military capabilities, seeing the relationship as a source of strategic leverage and increased international standing. On the other hand, the presence of U.S. forces in Jordan is perceived by some as increasing the kingdom’s vulnerability rather than enhancing its security, an ambivalence reflected in a nationally representative poll conducted by NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions.[vi]
When Jordanians were asked about the extent to which they support Jordan enhancing its military capabilities, an overwhelming 91.7% expressed full support, while a further 6.9% indicated partial support, pointing to near-universal approval. Opposition remains marginal, with just 1.2% falling into the categories of partial or full opposition.
The pattern of responses suggests a broad convergence of views, with limited variation across levels of support. Overall, the findings indicate strong public endorsement of efforts to strengthen Jordan’s defence capabilities amid a volatile regional environment. Building on this Jordanians were asked which country they would prefer to support Jordan in strengthening its military capabilities. The United States ranked first at 24.2%, reflecting confidence in its military expertise, strategic experience and overall influence. Regional actors also featured strongly, with Saudi Arabia cited by 16.1% and Egypt by 14.7%, pointing to trust in neighbouring states with established security roles in the Middle East.
Jordanian caution toward the presence of U.S. military forces on the ground is shaped by regional experience. The attack on the Al-Udeid Airbase in Qatar offers an illustrative example: despite hosting a major U.S. military base, Qatar was still targeted by Iran, in retaliation for Washington’s intervention during the 12-day war between Iran and Israel.[vii] This has reinforced the perception that foreign military deployments can, in certain contexts, increase exposure rather than guarantee protection. From this perspective, the presence of U.S. forces may carry higher security costs, as host countries can become indirect targets, complicating the balance between the strategic benefits of close military cooperation and the risks associated with regional confrontation.
U.S.-Jordan security cooperation continues to operate within a well-established strategic and legal framework, shaped by longstanding agreements and joint activities. As regional conditions evolve, discussions around security cooperation remain part of broader policy and public conversations in Jordan. In this context, perceptions of security arrangements are influenced by regional developments rather than by any single event or statement.
[i] Global Coalition (225). “Our Mission”, accessed 18 December 2025, retrieved from: https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/.
[ii] Jordan Armed Forces – Arab Army (2025). “Initial Planning Conference for Eager Lion 2026 Exercise Kicks Off in Amman,” 19 October 2025, retrieved from: https://www.jaf.mil.jo/NewsViewEn.aspx?NewsId=60291.
[iii] U.S. Department of State (2025). “U.S. Security Cooperation With Jordan,” 20 January 2025, retrieved from: https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-jordan/.
[iv] Jeremy M. Sharp (2025). “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research Service, 19 May 2025), retrieved from: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL33546.
[v] مدار الساعة، “القاضي يرد على العرموطي: لا قواعد أميركية في الأردن,” alsaa.net, 10 December 2025, retrieved from: https://alsaa.net/article/625801/القاضي-يرد-على-العرموطي-لا-قواعد-أميركية-في-الاردن.
[vi] NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2025). Foreign Relations Survey (FRS) – Wave V: Analytical Report, Amman: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, October 2025, retrieved from: https://www.kas.de/documents/279984/0/KAS+FRS+Wave+V+-+Analytical+Report+-+Final+%281%29.pdf/6167031c-1e83-b0e9-be32-b501479212e8?version=1.0&t=1763365308460.
[vii] Alshaikh, H. et al. (2025). “Striking a US Ally: Israel’s Attack on Qatar and the Erosion of Regional Stability,” Arab Center Washington DC, 9 September 2025, retrieved from: https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/israel-attack-on-qatar-and-the-erosion-of-regional-stability/.












