The Long Road to a Substantive Settlement in Yemen

The Iranian-Saudi agreement is not the first of its kind between the two rivals. Saudi-Iranian relations oscillate between extreme hostility—the Saudi Embassy in Tehran has twice been sacked and burned, the last time after the execution of Shia religious leader al-Nimr by Saudi Arabia in 2016[iii]—and fragile agreements for coexistence in the region.[iv] While the contents of this agreement are confidential, the joint statement released by the Chinese government[v] declares that the two parties agree to implement the Security Cooperation Agreement of 17 April 2001. In other words, the agreement is to implement a two-decade-old agreement that was not originally put into effect. While both sides would like to refocus on domestic economic issues that require stability, the impact of a fragile thaw can easily be overstated. In terms of the Yemeni conflict, the Iranian foreign minister has been touring the region insisting that Iran’s support of the Axis of Resistance, which includes the Houthi in Yemen, will continue.[vi] Nevertheless, the Saudis are making contacts with all the organizations in the Axis of Resistance in the Arab world backed by Iran. The Saudi foreign minister visited Syria for the first time.[vii] What remains to be seen is whether the new air of negotiation and conciliation will bear fruit. In the Yemeni case, the Saudis may very much want to extricate themselves. The Saudis have always been and will always be involved in Yemen because the Saudis see Yemen as a security threat even without the Houthi, but Saudi involvement prior to 2015 was restricted mostly to subsidizing political patrons. In 2015, the Saudis shifted course and began a massive air campaign in support of Yemeni government forces to defeat the Houthi. The campaign backfired not only militarily by failing to dislodge the Houthi but also politically by allowing the Houthi to capitalize on Yemeni nationalist sentiment and opening the Saudis to international criticism for inflicting large-scale civilian suffering. The Saudis have spent tremendous sums on a wasted military campaign and now pay to prop up the economy in the areas controlled by the anti-Houthi forces in Yemen. These stubborn realities may prevent the Saudis from washing their hands of the Yemeni quagmire.

The most striking development in the Yemeni talks was the exclusion of the Yemeni government from the talks. Here Saudi and Houthi interests align to a certain extent, and therefore, Iranian pressure was unnecessary to initiate talks. The Houthi claim to be the sole representative of Yemen and refuse to talk with the Yemeni government. The Houthi frame the war as defense of the nation against foreign aggression. The Houthi are the Yemeni nation, and the Saudis and their American backers are the aggressors. The Yemeni government, in the eyes of the Houthi, are no more than puppets of the Saudis and Emiratis. The Saudis’ primary interest is securing their southern border with Yemen, regardless of who governs the country. The Saudis attacked the Houthi because they saw them as a threat to the Saudi border, but if the Houthi were willing to guarantee Saudi security, the Saudis would have no problem with Houthi dominance in Yemen. The Saudis have sought separate agreements with the Houthi to secure the Saudi frontier with Yemen in the past. As early as 2018, Saudi officials met directly with Houthi representatives in Oman with the Yemeni government, but talks quickly fell apart. [viii] The Saudi Houthi talks are more substantial this time, building on several years of back-and-forth proposals. But while Yemeni officials say they are “coordinating” with the Saudis in the talks, their exclusion indicates the Saudis are willing to deal with the Houthi. The Saudis did attempt to position themselves in Sanaa as mediators rather than a party to the talks and the Houthi reacted angrily, but the negotiations continued, nonetheless.