Towards a Joint US Policy in Syria and Lebanon

In recent years, several other state actors have begun to ignore the Lebanese-Syrian border when it comes to shaping their regional strategy. Most significantly, Iran has built a range of proxy militias to expand its interest throughout the region, from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean. Within Lebanon and Syria, Hezbollah is a powerful cross-border force, wielding significant political, economic, and military power across the two states. Meanwhile, there are signs Russia is exploiting Syria’s relationship with various factions in Lebanon’s sectarian parliament to increase its influence in the country,[i] alongside its policy of targeted, strategic investment in both struggling economies.[ii] In short, two key regional actors have managed to integrate their Lebanon and Syria policies by exploiting the porous relationship between the two nations, thereby maximising their own influence throughout the Levant.

One impetus for this policy trend is the high degree of cross-border economic activity between the two countries. In the past decade, international media outlets have often highlighted the blow the Syrian crisis has dealt to Lebanon’s economy, as manifested in border smuggling and the burden of over one million Syrian refugees.  In reality, however, the relationship goes both ways. The 2019 Lebanese banking crisis also had a ripple effect on the economic landscape in neighbouring Syria,[iii] where political and business elites rely on Lebanese banks to store their fortunes. For decades, unregulated capitalist Lebanon has operated as the ‘lung’ of the Syrian economy, and the recent failure of its financial institutions sent Syria’s finances into freefall,[iv] triggering an acute economic crisis on top of the damage caused by a decade of war. The rate of inflation skyrocketed[v] and public sector expenditure was restricted,[vi] with a commensurate drop in living standards for ordinary Syrians.

On the other hand, the Syrian government and its business allies have been able to benefit from instability and a lack of transparency in Lebanon in order to evade international sanctions and smuggle goods into the country.[vii] The Lebanese state, for instance, estimates that 30-50% of its oil imports are smuggled across the Syrian border,[viii] which has proved a major  obstacle  in attempts to solve the country’s ongoing fuel crisis. With such a large chunk of its oil supply exported illicitly to Syria, the Lebanese government’s recent attempts to raise fuel prices can have little effect on demand. A fully operational border has not existed between the two countries for decades, and is unlikely to be implemented any time soon. As such, some degree of mutual economic integration is an inevitable political reality.

The reasons for treating the Lebanese and Syrian economic crises together are, therefore, self-evident. Yet, in contrast to its Iranian and Russian rivals, the United States has continued to run two distinct policies in relation to Syria and Lebanon. These policies are often at odds with each other, and their divergence seems to emanate from domestic political concerns rather than any tangible nuance in the Lebanon-Syria relationship. In the case of Syria, bipartisan congressional pressure to ‘punish’ Assad’s regime for human rights abuses,[ix][x] and a desire from the foreign policy establishment to weaken any state in the Iranian sphere of influence, have led to the imposition of a heavy sanctions regime and pushback against normalisation with Damascus.[xi] On the other hand, policy on Lebanon has historically been treated as subordinate to the US-Israel relationship, rather than as part of a wider regional framework. In contrast to Bashar al-Assad, the politicians responsible for the Lebanese crisis are unknown to Congress and the American public, and there is no urgent desire to hold them accountable, provided they do not cooperate with Iran.