This article is an excerpt from the Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum’s recently published policy paper on UK AI Diplomacy.
Critical minerals, metals, and rare earth elements (REEs) are essential for producing green energy systems and advanced technologies, from smartphones to electric cars. They are also the building blocks of computer hardware and data centres, which are vital for the development and scaling of AI technologies.
While deposits of these vital resources are dispersed across multiple geographies, their production is concentrated in the hands of several key players[i]: Australia accounts for more than half of the world’s lithium supply, South Africa for more than 70% of platinum, and the DRC for over 70% of cobalt.
Meanwhile, China dominates REE production while also controlling much of the mineral refining process, creating a bottleneck in global supply chains. In total, it accounts for more than half of the world’s critical mineral supply and 80% of its raw material refining. It is also the largest producer of solar photovoltaic panel manufacturing and lithium-ion batteries, cementing its position as the lead supplier of electric vehicles and granting it significant leverage[ii] in the global AI arms race.
China’s dominance in supply chains exposes the UK to a high risk of shocks, both economically and politically. Diversifying supply chains is therefore a top priority for the UK government, particularly as it increases its adoption of new clean technologies. The MENA region can be a strategic partner for doing so, allowing the UK to realise the three stated goals outlined in its Critical Minerals Strategy[iii]: accelerated domestic growth capabilities, collaboration with international partners, and enhanced responsiveness, transparency, and responsibility for international markets.
The MENA region has the potential[iv] to become a dominant player in the critical minerals market. It has abundant reserves of natural resources that are the subject of increasing global demand. Saudi Arabia[v], for instance, holds deposits of copper, zinc, iron, aluminium, manganese, and chromium, as well as 25% of the world’s tantalum reserves—metals that are essential for tech and energy industries. As part of its ambitions to reduce domestic fossil fuel demand and pursue economic diversification, Riyadh is investing heavily in its mining industry[vi], aiming to increase its GDP contribution by 58 billion USD (44.3 billion GBP) in the next 10 years. Likewise, the UAE’s growing mineral sector[vii]—estimated at over 10 billion USD (7.6 billion GBP)—is expected[viii] to contribute 5% to non-oil GDP by 2030.
While it does not have significant mineral and metal reserves, Bahrain plays a strategic role in global supply chains through refining and manufacturing. For example, Alba[ix]—one of the world’s largest aluminium smelters—is a major supplier of refined aluminium, which is essential for the aerospace, automotive, construction, and renewable energy industries. Aside from aluminium, Bahrain has well-established industries[x] in steel, iron, and other metal processing, serving as a regional hub for metal-based manufacturing.[xi]
Beyond the Gulf, Morocco is a leading player in the global phosphate industry[xii]—a critical mineral for battery manufacturing and agriculture—holding about 70% of the world’s estimated reserves and ranking as the world’s largest producer. The Moroccan economy relies heavily on its minerals sector, which makes up nearly a quarter of its exports and accounts for 10% of its GDP.
Israel is at the forefront with cutting-edge technologies[xiii] that extract minerals like potash and magnesium from seawater, and are subject to growing international attention.[xiv] Courtesy of these technologies, Israel ranks sixth in global potash production.[xv] It also recently announced plans to establish a raw materials plan for domestic production of defence technologies.
Their strategically important geographies also give these countries an upper hand in global trade. Key ports[xvi] like the UAE’s Jebel Ali and Morocco’s Tanger Med Port play an important role in importing and exporting raw materials[xvii] within the region while also acting as transit hubs for materials sourced from Africa, Asia, and South America. GCC countries are particularly invested[xviii] in supply chain resilience, adapting infrastructure, regulation, and economic partnerships to remove supply chain obstacles and ensure frictionless trade.
For the UK to capitalise on these opportunities and reduce Chinese influence in Middle Eastern ‘swing states’, it should strategically invest in the region’s minerals sector.
Bilateral Partnerships in Critical Minerals
Building on the recent minerals cooperation agreement[xix] signed between the UK and Saudi Arabia, the UK could consider expanding its access to Gulf minerals by signing similar bilateral agreements with the UAE and Bahrain. The UAE is actively pursuing government-to-government (G2G) partnerships in essential minerals as part of its strategic objectives[xx], and Bahrain has a lot to offer in metal processing. A wider Gulf material alliance would serve several UK interests simultaneously. It would diversify and strengthen supply chains vital for AI and renewable energy while also creating new avenues for joint business ventures in mining and processing. Importantly, it could also accelerate negotiations for a comprehensive UK-GCC free trade agreement[xxi]—which is a top priority for the UK at present.
Joint R&D in Mineral Processing
The UK could leverage its robust industry and academic institutions to facilitate joint R&D initiatives between MENA partners focused on technologies—potentially AI-driven—that optimise mineral extraction and processing. Israel’s expertise[xxii] in desalination and mineral extraction from seawater could help the UK and Abraham Accords countries co-develop mineral recovery methods. Research and development efforts could also be geared toward developing AI-enhanced mineral mapping technologies[xxiii], allowing resource-rich countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE to identify and develop their reserves more effectively. Saudi Arabia is already exploring AI integration in mineral exploration, and the UK could enhance these efforts by integrating its advanced tech industry.
UK-MENA Critical Minerals Investment Fund
To serve the shared objective of securing critical minerals supplies, the UK and its MENA partners could create a dedicated investment fund aimed at financing exploration and refining projects. The UK is already investing[xxiv] in overseas projects that grant it greater access to critical minerals and has recently approved export finance in this field.[xxv] It could partner with like-minded GCC countries such as Saudi Arabia, which has committed to a 100 billion USD (76.4 billion GBP) investment in its mining sector as part of its Vision 2030 plan, in order to access larger capital pools and share financial risks. The fund could also support regional innovation in this sphere, investing in start-ups and joint ventures that utilise AI technologies for critical minerals and mining efforts. A UK-MENA investment fund would create a unified bloc in the critical minerals sector that would benefit partners’ overall trade and investment strategies.
At the height of a global AI arms race and clean energy transition, the UK is in a pivotal moment to proactively advance its strategic interests through AI diplomacy in energy and technology. Answers to its domestic energy challenges and broader geopolitical interests can both be found in the MENA region. Bahrain, Israel, Morocco, and the UAE can, separately and combined, support two of the UK’s most ambitious objectives: becoming a clean energy and AI superpower. They offer valuable propositions in critical minerals, AI-supporting infrastructure development, and clean energy systems—three necessities for a clean energy transformation.
[i] Calderon, J.L. (2022). “How Critical Minerals Became So Critical”, Milken Institute Review, 31 October 2022, retrieved from: https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/how-critical-minerals-became-so-critical.
[ii] Bolstad, P. (2021). “Energy Independence Doesn’t Mean What It Used To”, Foreign Policy, 26 July 2021, retrieved from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/26/energy-independence-climate-change-us-national-security/.
[iii] Gov.uk (2023). “Resilience for the Future: The UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy”, 13 March 2023, retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-critical-mineral-strategy/resilience-for-the-future-the-uks-critical-minerals-strategy.
[iv] SRMG Think (2024). “Strengthening MENA Supply Chains for Clean Energy”, retrieved from: https://www.srmgthink.com/sites/default/files/2024-12/Strengthening%20MENA%E2%80%99s%20Supply%20Chains%20for%20Clean%20Energy_Final_10%20Dec%20%281%29.pdf.
[v] Harshan, A. (2024). “Saudi Vision 2030: Kingdom mining industry’s journey to become ‘Regional Powerhouse’”, Global Business Outlook, 29 January 2024, retrieved from: https://globalbusinessoutlook.com/economy/saudi-vision-kingdom-mining-industrys-journey-become-regional-powerhouse/.
[vi] Haytayan, L. and Yahyaoui, A. (2024). “Life Beyond Oil: Saudi Arabia’s Mining Ambitions”, Natural Resource Governance Institute, 16 October 2024, retrieved from: https://resourcegovernance.org/articles/life-beyond-oil-saudi-arabia-mining-ambitions#:~:text=As%20part%20of%20its%20goal,to%20%2475%20billion%20by%202035.
[vii] Zawya (2023). “UAE’s minerals sector set to hit $10bln by 2025, say experts”, 17 March 2023, retrieved from: https://www.zawya.com/en/markets/commodities/uaes-minerals-sector-set-to-hit-10bln-by-2025-say-experts-suxqk3uc.
[viii] Minerals Meridian. “UAE’s mining sector to contribute 5% to non-oil GDP by 2030”, retrieved from: https://mineralsmeridian.com/2023/10/15/uaes-mining-sector-to-contribute-5-to-non-oil-gdp-by-2030/.
[ix] Alba Smelter (2025). Retrieved from: https://www.albasmelter.com/en/.
[x] Bahrain Steel (2025). “About Us”, retrieved from: https://www.bahrainsteel.com.bh/?utm_source=chatgpt.com#!/aboutus.
[xi] ReportLinker (2025). “Bahrain Metal Products Industry Outlook 2024-2028”, retrieved from: https://www.reportlinker.com/clp/country/665901/726415.
[xii] Capmad (2024). “Mining Resources: Critical and Strategic Metals In Morocco”, 12 July 2024, retrieved from: https://www.capmad.com/mining-en/mining-resources-critical-and-strategic-metals-in-morocco/.
[xiii] ICL. “2022 Corporate Responsibility (ESG) Report”, retrieved from: https://icl-group-sustainability.com/reports/icl-a-glance/.
[xiv] Sharma, A. (2025). “India-Israel critical minerals partnership on cards for AI/ML-driven exploration”, CNBC TV18, 18 February 2025, retrieved from: https://www.cnbctv18.com/business/india-israel-critical-minerals-partnership-on-cards-for-ai-ml-driven-exploration-19560798.htm.
[xv] Pistilli, M. (2025). “Top 10 Potash Countries by Production”, Investing News Network, 26 February 2025, retrieved from: https://investingnews.com/daily/resource-investing/agriculture-investing/potash-investing/top-potash-countries-by-production/.
[xvi] Harmon, R. (2024). “8 ports in the MENA region make Lloyd’s List’s One Hundred Ports 2024”, Logistics Middle East, 28 August 2024, retrieved from: https://www.logisticsmiddleeast.com/ports-free-zones/8-ports-in-the-mena-region-make-lloyds-lists-one-hundred-ports-2024.
[xvii] DMCC (2024). “The Future of Trade: Critical Minerals Edition”, retrieved from: https://2509857.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na1.net/hubfs/2509857/FOT/Future%20of%20Trade/FOT%20Critical%20Minerals%20Edition%202025/The%20Future%20of%20Trade%20-%20Special%20Critical%20Minerals%20Edition%202025.pdf?hsCtaAttrib=186150004265.
[xviii] Bin Al Khalifa, A. (2024). “How the Gulf’s nations are adapting to global supply chain challenges”, World Economic Forum, 2 December 2024, retrieved from: https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/12/gulf-countries-supply-chain-resilience/.
[xix] Gov.uk (2023). “UK and Saudi Arabia pledge to deliver closer cooperation on critical minerals”, 11 January 2023, retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-saudi-arabia-pledge-to-deliver-closer-co-operation-on-critical-minerals.
[xx] Dempsey, H. and Cornish, C. (2024). “How Gulf states are putting their money into mining”, Financial Times, 1 April 2024, retrieved from: https://www.ft.com/content/59298650-540a-43cd-86f8-a6c6db0aa906.
[xxi] Gov.uk (2024). “Trade Update: UK-Gulf Cooperation Council FTA negotiations”, 19 February 2024, retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/trade-update-uk-gulf-cooperation-council-fta-negotiations.
[xxii] ICL Group (2025). Retrieved from: https://www.icl-group.com/innovation/.
[xxiii] Davies, R.S. et al. (2025). “Artificial intelligence and machine learning to enhance critical mineral deposit discovery”, Geosystems and Geoenvironment, 4(2), May 2025, retrieved from: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2772883825000111.
[xxiv] Gov.uk (2024). “UK approves use of export finance to secure critical minerals”, 31 October 2024, retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-approves-use-of-export-finance-to-secure-critical-minerals.
[xxv] Gov.uk (2023). “£15 million funding boost to strengthen supply of critical minerals”, 27 February 2023, retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/15-million-funding-boost-to-strengthen-supply-of-critical-minerals.