Syria amidst Regional Turmoil

Syria’s neighbour, Lebanon, is experiencing the most violent ripple effects of the Iran war. Iran-backed Hezbollah militants involved Lebanon in the regional escalation by firing six rockets on Israel’s less than 48 hours after the war on Iran started. The Israeli response was rapid and escalatory, involving heavy bombardment throughout Lebanon, which killed over 1000[iv] and displaced nearly one million.[v] Israel said it was willing to pursue a similarly extensive operation as in the Gaza Strip[vi] if Hezbollah kept its arms. Meanwhile, the Lebanese state has been institutionally paralysed, and the national army remains vulnerable to internal divisions.

In this context, rumours that Syria would engage in the fight to disarm Hezbollah are circulating, particularly after Damascus gathered troops[vii] along Syria’s border with Lebanon. However, the Syrian government has emphasised that these are defensive security measures and denied any intention to join the fight between Israel and Hezbollah. By the same token, U.S. special envoy to Syria Tom Barrack reaffirmed[viii] that Washington did not ask Damascus to ‘take action’ in Lebanon. Despite such official assurances, the risk of inadvertent escalation or the indirect involvement of Syria in the Lebanese conflict cannot be dismissed.

The current government in Damascus has a long history of enmity with Hezbollah, not only stemming from an ideological dispute, but also due to the collective memory of violence most Syrians associate with Hezbollah fighters. Hezbollah played a vital role on the ground throughout Syria’s 13-year-long conflict and was responsible for massacres against Syrian rebels and civilians alike. Despite this, since assuming office last year, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has avoided any confrontation with Hezbollah. In August 2025 Al Sharaa told[ix] a group of Lebanese journalists that he had to ‘let go of the wounds we have because of Hezbollah’s aggression in Syria’. Al-Sharaa has been focusing his efforts on regime-building inside Syria and constructing a new foreign policy posture that would insulate the country from external conflicts. He seems to care less about foes outside Syria than challenges at home, while bearing in mind the fact that his troops neither have the capacity nor the experience to fight outside their native territories.

The U.S. might have a different view in this regard as Lebanon lacks the logistical and political capabilities to disarm Hezbollah on its own. This could prove disastrous for Syria and Lebanon alike.

Comparisons to Lebanon’s experiences in 1976 underscore how external approval of Syrian intervention in Lebanon once shaped regional dynamics. 50 years ago and following U.S. and Israeli permission, Hafiz Assad deployed Syrian troops to the country to help the Maronites in their fight against the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

Assad had played one party against the other to ensure that no one would gain enough power to challenge his own agenda. The operation came with long-term consequences for Lebanon’s sovereignty: Syrian troops stayed in the country for decades, controlling all aspects of political life. Hezbollah was further empowered while the Lebanese state was weakened.

While today’s geopolitical conditions are different, any Syrian intervention in Lebanon would have far more severe consequences. Unlike in 1976, Syria’s intervention would likely be framed in sectarian terms, and could exacerbate existing tensions, further destabilizing Lebanon’s already fragile political system and fragmenting the Lebanese army along sectarian lines.

Although the government in Damascus appears aware of these dangers, its ability to fully control events on the ground remains uncertain. The Syrian military includes factions with varying ideological orientations, and recent incidents have raised questions about centralized command. Clashes in coastal areas in March 2025 and in Suwayda in July illustrated the government’s difficulty in containing affiliated armed groups and preventing localized violence from escalating.

In Lebanon, where sectarian sensitivities are deeply entrenched and memories of Hezbollah’s role in Syria remain vivid, the risks would likely be even more acute.