Syria’s Future Between Fragmentation and Rival Reconstruction

Since Assad’s fall and subsequent fleeing from Syria in late 2024, the country has entered a transitional phase with efforts to rebuild state institutions. In October 2025, the first parliamentary elections since Assad’s ouster created a 210‑member assembly, partly elected and partly appointed, as a step toward restoring stable political life amid post-war displacement. The interim government, led by al‑Sharaa, introduced a provisional constitution and a multi-year roadmap for broader elections and institutional reconstruction. Economic governance bodies, including the Syrian Development Fund and the Supreme Council for Economic Development, have been set up to coordinate reconstruction and attract foreign direct investment. These developments signal a cautious move toward political pluralism, although challenges remain.

The current governance landscape in Syria is profoundly fragmented. Years of conflict since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011 have produced localized forms of legitimacy, competing centres of authority, and asymmetric visions for the future of the state. Sectarian and ethnic identities – shaped by decades of authoritarian rule – continue to structure political expectations and fears across the country. Assad’s “Alawitization” of the military and security sectors entrenched the association between regime survival and communal survival, deepening sectarian cleavages that now define the post-conflict order.

In today’s landscape, the Alawite community along the coastal region finds itself politically marginalized after having long served as the backbone of Assad’s security apparatus. This shift intensified local tensions. In March 2025, following an ambush, clashes erupted between the HTS forces and Alawite “Assad regime loyalists”, leading to mass revenge killings of 1,500 Alawite civilians.[iv] Al-Sharaa vowed to hold accountable those responsible and a first trial was held in mid-November 2025.[v]

In the South, the Druze of Suwayda now insist on preserving their margin of self-governance, with some even calling for complete independence. This demand resulted in violent clashes between the Druze and HTS forces; then between the Druze and Bedouin tribes in July 2025, resulting in over 1000 deaths, an ongoing siege on Suwayda, and repeated calls for independence by Al-Hijri and his followers. This crisis risks the long-term fragmentation of Southern Syria and the solidification of the crisis along the current lines of clashes.[vi]

Claims of autonomy are not exclusive to the Druze community in Syria. The Kurdish movement – organized under the Democratic Autonomous Region of Northeast Syria (DAANES) – has long pursued self-rule, and the prospect of a future Kurdistan. During the years of conflict, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were the U.S. and the UK’s most reliable on-the-ground partner in the fight against ISIS. This cooperation allowed the Kurds to have territorial control over strategic areas in Syria – Turkish borders, access routes to Iraq, vital trade, energy and security corridors, and the control of 95% of the country’s oil and gas resources.

For Turkey, however, Kurdish self-rule along its southern border is considered a threat to its own national stability. Ankara has framed any form of Kurdish political, administrative or security control as an extension of the PKK terrorist threat, prompting successive incursions on these SDF-ruled areas.

Despite these pressures, in October 2025, the SDF agreed to integrate into the Syrian National Army, within three consolidated divisions, instead of individually. This is an important step toward state reconstruction, and if implemented, a successful step toward national unity In January 2026, Al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, leader of the Kurdish forces, signed a ceasefire agreement following recent clashes in which government troops ceized most of the Kurdish held territory.

Beyond the challenge of centralizing power amid Druze and Kurdish autonomy claims, the HTS government also struggles with an equally serious problem: its inability to discipline and unify its own factions.

When Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham (HTS) – a rebel armed group with jihadist origins and historic links to Al-Qaeda – assumed power in December 2024, one of its earliest peacebuilding initiatives was the attempted integration of rebel factions into a unified national army. The goal was to consolidate power and present a coherent security apparatus, yet this effort stalled in the absence of a genuine disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process. A year after the collapse of the Assad regime, the apparatus is composed of multiple armed sub-factions, foreign fighter contingents, and local militias with varying agendas – some more pragmatic and willing to adapt to Al-Sharaa’s more progressive engagement with the West, others rather rooted in and adhering to hard-line Islamist ideology.

This persistent fragmentation illustrates structural weaknesses in authority, service-delivery, and overall state legitimacy. These weaknesses complicate any transition to more centralised state authority, increase the risk of renewed disintegration, and make the broader Syrian governance settlement more fragile.

Furthermore, these dynamics intersect with competing visions for Syria and the Levant region: Turkey seeks to contain Kurdish influence, Gulf states prioritize containing Iran, while Israel seeks to protect itself and minorities from any spill-over effects.

With Iran significantly weakened, Turkey and Israel have become the two primary regional powers and competitors. This clash was depicted in three different instances in 2025 alone. Israeli strikes south of Homs hit a warehouse (or multiple warehouses) containing Turkish missiles and air defence systems transferred to the site in September 2025. Israel hit Syrian bases scoped by Turkey in east Syria in April 2025, and an Israeli airborne raid near Damascus recovered surveillance equipment, allegedly planted by Turkey in August 2025.[vii] The U.S.’ establishment of a base near Damascus could balance this new friction.[viii] Indeed, a stabilizing U.S. presence institutes points toward a significant opening for a scenario of de-confliction with Israel.