Yemen’s Southern Front: Strategic Leverage, Fragmentation, and Regional Risk

At the local level, the STC’s territorial gains carry immediate security, economic, and political consequences. The flashpoint is Hadhramaut[ii], Yemen’s largest governorate and primary oil-producing region. The STC launched a military campaign it labeled[iii] “The Promising Future,” framing the operation as an effort to impose security and reclaim local resources[iv] – rhetoric that obscures its broader political and economic objectives.

Hadhramaut, home to major oil fields and PetroMasila, Yemen’s largest oil company, constitutes a strategic prize. The Masila Basin and associated blocks, including Al-Maseelah, have long anchored Yemen’s crude output and export capacity.[v] Control over these assets enhances the STC’s ability to finance its operations independently of the central government, reinforcing longstanding ambitions for southern autonomy rooted in the pre-1990 South Yemen state. By securing pipelines, processing facilities, and critical installations, the STC gains leverage over revenue streams and supply chains, strengthening its bargaining position vis-à-vis both the internationally recognized government and its Gulf patrons.

The December 2025 offensive builds on prior STC attempts to expand eastward: in 2022, forces moved into Abyan and Shabwa[vi], and in 2023 into Hadhramaut[vii], only to be repelled by Saudi-backed militias and restrained by Omani diplomacy. Unlike earlier campaigns, which faltered due to limited Emirati coordination and robust Saudi-backed resistance, the 2025 advance reflects a recalibration of regional power projection, with Abu Dhabi leveraging financial, logistical, and intelligence support to expand the STC’s operational autonomy[viii] while Riyadh contends with the fragility of the internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), internal political pressures, and competing Gulf priorities. Omani mediation has been less effective given the STC’s assertive posture and Muscat’s careful balancing between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.

Security dynamics have shifted decisively. STC control of the Wadi Hadhramaut corridor not only displaced Saudi-backed National Shield Forces and allied tribal factions but also established operational command over key transit routes, pipelines, and energy installations[ix], amplifying the council’s leverage vis-à-vis both the PLC and Gulf patrons. While the STC portrays its operations as securing the south from Houthis, al Qaeda, and other “terrorist threats,” clashes with coalition partners reveal persistent volatility in intra-coalition relations.[x]

Civilian populations face heightened risk of displacement, disruption of essential services, and economic instability. Demonstrations in Aden calling for STC President Aidarous al-Zubaidi to declare independence[xi] underscore the political undercurrents. These protests gained added weight after the STC announced its intention to hold a referendum on southern independence within the next two years.[xii] While lacking a recognised legal framework, the declaration formalises the council’s long-standing objective and signals confidence that recent territorial and resource gains can be translated into an institutionalised path toward separation.

Yemen’s humanitarian crisis compounds these risks. Indeed, Yemen’s humanitarian crisis shows no sign of abating[xiii], with an estimated 19.5 million people – more than half the population – requiring assistance in 2025, including 4.8 million internally displaced people. In December 2025 alone, fighting around Seiyun reportedly displaced at least 5,418 individuals toward Marib Governorate.[xiv] Hadhramaut itself has roughly 1.4 million residents[xv], meaning a substantial share of the population could face new insecurity, while local governance and essential services remain vulnerable.

At the national level, the STC’s advances expose the fragility of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Aden, the temporary capital since the Houthis captured Sanaa in 2014, remains a coalition of competing factions[xvi] held together by shared opposition to the Houthis rather than functional political integration.

The advance drew the STC into direct confrontation with the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and its allied local power brokers, notably the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance led by Sheikh Amr bin Habreish.[xvii] The STC’s takeover of Hadramout exposes the fragility of the PLC, whose cohesion rests largely on opposition to the Houthis. As government authority weakens, Saudi leverage diminishes, while the UAE gains leverage by backing the STC as an effective surrogate ahead of any future Saudi-Houthi settlement. The STC’s refusal to withdraw from Hadhramaut and al-Mahrah[xviii] signals just how conditional that unity has become.

Seeking to counter this narrative, PLC Chairman Rashad al-Alimi claimed that Saudi-backed Homeland Shield forces had achieved ‘record success’[xix] in retaking military and security positions near the Saudi border. The announcement highlights Riyadh’s continued capacity for localized security interventions, but also underscores the contrast between episodic tactical gains and the STC’s sustained control over territory, revenues, and governance.

Economically, STC control over Hadhramaut threatens fiscal viability[xx], as PetroMasila and associated energy revenues are critical for funding salaries, allied forces, and public services. A de facto divided economy entrenches fragmentation, complicating reconstruction and incentivizing further secessionist claims elsewhere.

Politically, the STC consolidates domestic legitimacy by portraying its operations as responsive to popular southern demands and essential for security. By claiming control over all eight southern governorates and presenting itself as Washington’s frontline partner[xxi] against Iran-backed Houthis, al-Qaeda affiliates, and Muslim Brotherhood factions, the STC signals an ambition for international recognition, or at least strategic leverage.

While these overtures align rhetorically with U.S. strategic interests in countering Iran and stabilizing the region, Washington is likely to respond cautiously; the council’s unilateral military actions, lack of formal integration into Yemen’s government, and legal and political risks associated with a de-facto secessionist actor limit the likelihood of immediate endorsement.