Iran After the Islamic Republic and The Pahlavi Question

Firstly, western governments, particularly the U.S., frequently speak of ‘listening to the Iranian diaspora’. This language should be treated with much skepticism. The U.S. does not consult the Palestinian diaspora on Gaza policy, nor the Iraqi diaspora on Baghdad, nor the Yemeni diaspora on Sana’a. Diaspora voices are amplified as legitimate interlocutors when they align with the U.S.’ strategic regional interests, not necessarily because they represent the population inside the country. Despite President Trump’s refusal to meet with Pahlavi, his rhetoric has amplified protest narratives that mirror diaspora advocacy. Likewise, White House envoy Steve Witkoff met with Pahlavi to discuss the protests.[ix] Together, these actions feed into narratives of the U.S.’ alleged objective of delegitimising Iran’s current regime. Secondly, Pahlavi’s image as a puppet of American and Israeli interests in the Middle East persists in public perception. He has been in exile for almost half a century and has little to no domestic mandate or legitimacy.

During Iran’s 2009 Green Movement, the Bloody November protests, the Mahsa Amini demonstrations and the current protests, the slogan “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, My Life for Iran”[x] echoed through Iran’s streets. Admittedly, the phrase expresses opposition to the Islamic Republic, but it reveals something much deeper about the psyche of the Iranian people. The slogan does not suggest Iranian indifference to Gaza or regional conflicts, nor support for Israel, but it reflects the Iranian people’s desire for the government to look inwards and to prioritise domestic matters before pursuing its regional ambitions. Seeking foreign alliances before a transition therefore carries inherent risks, hardening suspicions of and emboldening the current regime’s claims that protests are part of a wider western ploy to subjugate Iran to external influence. President Trump has already made clear that the U.S. is considering “very strong options” in Iran[xi], with reports indicating that this may manifest in cyberattacks, sanctions, or even military strikes.

Whilst some may interpret these warnings as U.S. benevolence, for many within Iran, they reinforce historical trauma and anxieties surrounding foreign intervention. After all, U.S. and British-backed forces staged a coup in 1953 against democratically-elected Mohammad Mossadegh. Similarly, the U.S.’ recent capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and renewed interest in Greenland’s strategic resources, reinforce a perception that U.S. power prioritises leverage.

In this context, a weakening or post-Islamic Republic Iran is not viewed merely as a humanitarian concern, but a geopolitical opportunity for the U.S. Only Venezuela and Saudi Arabia possess larger oil reserves than Iran[xii], and greater U.S. influence over a future Iranian government could potentially shape sanctions enforcement and regional energy flows. Whether this is Washington’s primary objective or not far exceeds the scope of this piece. However, for many Iranians this possibility alone is sufficient to cast suspicion on any opposition figure perceived to be aligned with U.S. power. For Pahlavi this would mean having at least some of his domestic support eroded before he has even had an opportunity to consolidate it.

The Middle East’s history offers a cautionary lens. Several western-backed leaders returning from exile have repeatedly failed to consolidate authority at home. The U.S.-backed Ahmed Chalabi in Iraq was touted to be the democratic alternative the country needed, yet Iraq still spiralled into further instability. Likewise, Syrian opposition leaders during the civil war, recognised abroad, were widely dismissed on the ground as foreign proxies, corroborating that foreign recognition does not serve as a substitute for domestic legitimacy. Considering that Iran’s population has been shaped by deep nationalist memory, despite the “Pahlavi will return”[xiii] chants today, it would seem that they too may perceive a Pahlavi-led Iran to be politically problematic in the long-term.

On the surface, there seems to be a contradiction and paradox to this claim. After all, Pahlavi’s posse claims high domestic support, cited at 80-85%.[xiv] GAMAAN suggests that this figure is closer to 35%[xv], which is still very respectable. However, Pahlavi’s support is not as important as the question whether or not his return would provide Iran with stability.

For Iran, the monarchy of old is symbolic of a time of order, but it does not offer a blueprint for how the country is to develop durable stability and legitimacy. As outside observers, the central analytical error is failing to capture the nuance between exhaustion and readiness, nostalgia and genuine support, and foreign-aligned strategy and authentic Iranian self-determination. For Reza Pahlavi, legitimacy cannot be imported, but must be carefully nurtured at home so as not to be discredited and undermined as a foreign proxy. Hence, the question is not whether Iran’s regime changes, but whether this change repeats the vicious cycle of its history by allowing authority to be moulded from abroad rather than being contested and legitimised by Iranians themselves.