“All men are intellectuals […] but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals”, says Antonio Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks. [i] Almost a century later, Gramsci’s analysis of the role of intellectuals remains foundational to contemporary academic debates on the intelligentsia and the function of intellectuals within state and society.
Any attempt to define the term “intellectual” is far from straightforward and remains a contested concept across different disciplines. The term is shaped by evolving historical and political contexts. In his seminal work, Representations of the Intellectual[ii], Edward Said notes that the intellectual realm could be understood as the domain of knowledge-production, and that the intellectual is not merely a producer of knowledge, but a representative of “a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public.” [iii] This role, Said emphasizes, carries a critical edge, requiring “a willingness to raise uncomfortable questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma, and to maintain a stance of independence from both governmental authority and corporate interests.”[iv]
Intellectuals have played key roles in movements for national liberation and social justice, providing essential theoretical frameworks, shaping political consciousness, and even assuming positions of leadership. Whether in legitimizing or challenging dominant ideas and authorities, intellectuals have been central actors in ideological transformation during revolutions and counterrevolutions alike.
This role might be more significant and more challenging in post-conflict contexts, however. One good example can be found in Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of Yugoslavia, where intellectuals were instrumental in re-articulating ideologies and crafting new national narratives amidst the birth of new nation-states. Nevertheless, the influence and function of intellectuals vary according to factors such as the nature of political authority, the dynamics of conflict, and broader socio-historical context.
Syria’s intellectuals and the quest for influence
Throughout Syria’s history many intellectuals consistently challenged prevailing dogmas and contributed to knowledge-production. One early and notable figure is the medieval philosopher Abu al-Ala al-Ma’arri, from Idlib in north-western Syria. In the 11th century, al-Ma’arri boldly challenged religious, social, and political authorities, promoting secularist and rationalist ideas with his famous statement: “There is no Imam but the mind, who guides by day and night”.[v]
In his two, groundbreaking works, Risalat al-Ghufran (“The Epistle of Forgiveness”) and Luzūm mā lā yalzam (“The Necessity of What Is Unnecessary”), al-Ma’arri articulated a philosophy grounded in scepticism, reason, and social critique. As he wrote:
Oh! let them in the marshes grope, or ride
Their jaded myths along the mountain-side;
Come up with me, O Brother, to the heights
Where Reason is the prophet and the guide.[vi]
A millennium later, his legacy remains contested. In 2013, jihadist groups in Idlib desecrated his tomb and defaced his statue.[vii] This is an ironic fate for a thinker who arguably enjoyed more intellectual freedom under the Abbasid caliphate than many have in modern Syria. The act of ‘speaking truth to power’, as al-Ma’arri once did, has become even more perilous in the contemporary Syrian context.
Hereafter, intellectuals have experienced a far more repressive landscape, shaped by authoritarianism, religious extremism, and violent conflicts.
During both the years of the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate, Syrian intellectuals played crucial roles in shaping debates on identity, religion, and political reform. The late Ottoman period witnessed the flourishing of Nahda (Arab Awakening), a movement of cultural and intellectual revival spanning the 19th and early 20th centuries. Figures such as Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Francis Marrash, and Nasib Arida embodied this intellectual awakening.[viii]
These thinkers, while ideologically diverse, contributed significantly to the articulation of Arab nationalism, secularism, and socio-political reform. As Albert Hourani rightly notes, Nahda intellectuals, “set apart from those among whom they were living by education and experience, nevertheless could express the needs of their society, and to some extent at least, their ideas served as forces in the process of change.”[ix]
During the French Mandate (1920–1946), the intellectual discourse continued to engage with anti-colonial narratives but was limited to elite circles. Intellectuals largely operated from a position of political and social detachment, creating a gap between their vision and the broader population.
Thinkers like Michel Aflaq, Constantin Zureiq, Sati’ al-Husri, and Akram al-Hourani articulated ideologies such as Arabism, Syrianism, and Ba’athism. Yet their ideas were often shaped more by European intellectual currents than by the lived realities of local communities, further contributing to a disconnection between intellectuals and grassroots movements.
"During Hafez al-Assad’s tenure, intellectual expression was not only restricted but weaponized as an extension of state power."
Later figures such as Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, Michel Kilo, Mohammad al-Maghut, Burhan Ghalioun, and Yassin al-Haj Saleh emerged within this tradition. However, under the Ba’ath Party – particularly during Hafez al-Assad’s tenure – intellectual expression was not only restricted but weaponized as an extension of state power. Syria became what was dubbed as mamlakat al-samt (“the Kingdom of Silence”), where dissent was brutally suppressed and critical thought criminalized. Intellectuals were either imprisoned or exiled.
Some hopes for liberalization were briefly raised when Bashar al-Assad’s inherited power in 2000. A short-lived Damascus Spring was marked by the release of political prisoners and the formation of intellectual salons. The “Statement of the 99,” [x] a manifesto signed by 99 prominent intellectuals, calling for political reforms and civil rights. Yet this window closed rapidly and violently, as the regime clamped down once again on independent thought.
Exactly twenty years ago, in October 2005, the Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change [xi] – a statement signed by intellectuals – attempted to build a broad coalition across ideological divides, offering a theoretical framework for democratic transition. Nonetheless, its impact remained limited, largely due to its top-down nature and continued isolation from grassroots mobilization.
The 2011 revolution: When “Kingdom of Silence” spoke out
"A new generation of intellectuals emerged from the revolution, [whose] legitimacy was grounded not in academic credentials or institutional affiliations, but in their participation, sacrifice, and closeness to the street."
The 2011 revolution in Syria took many by surprise, including the regime, the intellectuals, and ordinary Syrians. Inspired by the Arab Spring, young Syrians – primarily in their twenties – rose up demanding freedom, dignity, and justice. What began as peaceful demonstrations quickly evolved into one of the most violent and complex conflicts of the 21st century.
In the early phase of the revolution (2011–14), just prior to the full militarization of the conflict and Russian military intervention, Syrian intellectuals found a rare opportunity to reclaim their space and re-engage with political discourse. For the first time in decades, they could reconnect with grassroots movements and participate in shaping public debates.
A new generation of intellectuals emerged from the revolution, which included activists, journalists, writers, and artists. Their legitimacy was grounded not in academic credentials or institutional affiliations, but in their participation, sacrifice, and closeness to the street. This immediacy granted them a unique authority and credibility among the broader population, long alienated from the traditional intelligentsia.
These intellectuals can be broadly categorized into two camps. First, the Old Guard, comprising mainly long-standing opposition figures from Arab nationalist, Marxist, and leftist traditions. This group was instrumental in earlier oppositional movements such as the Damascus Declaration. However, their influence in the revolution was often limited by ideological rigidity and detachment from the new generation.
Second, the New Guard, consisting predominantly of younger, secular, and frequently non-partisan activists. This group was influenced by digital culture, civic organization, and transnational solidarity. Their approach emphasized pluralism, non-violence, and grassroots mobilization over ideological orthodoxy.
However, the revolution’s trajectory shifted dramatically. The regime’s violent crackdown, rising sectarianism, and the birth of Islamist counter-revolutionary forces curtailed the space for intellectual engagement. Many intellectuals, from both the Old Guard and the New Guard, were forced into exile. Although they continued their work from abroad, their ability to influence developments on the ground in Syria diminished significantly.
Despite these challenges, the early years of the revolution left an indelible mark and, moreover, represented a turning point for Syria’s intellectuals.
Post-Assad Syria: A new space for intellectuals?
The dramatic fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 opened a window of opportunities for Syrian intellectuals to reclaim their roles. Shortly after the fall of Assad, figures from both the old and new guards re-emerged, launching independent publications, re-establishing forums for debate, and attempting to make philosophical and political discourse more accessible to the wider public in Syria. Yet this post-conflict moment brought with it its own dilemmas and polarization. Some intellectuals aligned themselves with the new political establishment, taking roles as advisors, technocrats, or media figures. While some viewed this pragmatically – as an opportunity to rebuild the state from within – others criticized it as co-optation and a surrender of critical independence.
In such a fragile and highly polarized context, which is also marked by security concerns and deep social divisions, intellectuals face a formidable challenge. As Edward Said concludes, the role of the intellectual demands not only intellectual rigour, but moral courage and a personal risk. “The hardest aspect of being an intellectual is to represent what you profess through your work and interventions, without hardening into an institution or a kind of automaton acting at the behest of a system or method”.[xii]
"The new generation of intellectuals has the opportunity and responsibility of fostering inclusive models of political thought that are close to the reality and the nature of society."
At this historic juncture, Syria’s New Guard may play a significant role in knowledge production, and this role should be embedded in the process of state-building. Unlike their predecessors, who often imposed rigid ideological frameworks, the new generation of intellectuals has the opportunity and responsibility of fostering inclusive models of political thought that are close to the reality and the nature of society. They must also attempt to avoid replicating the errors of the past, such as importing theoretical paradigms, or applying ideological templates detached from local realities. Instead, the task is to generate knowledge from within Syrian society, rooted in its specific historical, cultural, and social context. This can extend to reimagining key concepts like secularism not as a Western import but as a locally grounded framework for coexistence. In addition, national identity can be framed as civic belonging, rather than ethnic or religious homogeneity. These debates are not new, but the context is unprecedented. For the first time in almost six decades, Syrians are engaged in an open conversation about their state, society, and shared future.
Herein, although the New Guard emerged in a revolutionary context, yet today, their work is one of evolution. Society – and intellectuals within it – bear a profound and risky responsibility to shape this evolution.
[i] Gramsci, A. (1971). The Prison Notebooks: Selections, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, New York: International Publishers, p. 9.
[ii] Said, E.W. (1996). Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures, New York: Vintage Books.
[iii] Ibid, p. 11.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Al-Maʿarri. “The Luzumiyat of Abu’l-Ala, LXXII,” trans. Ameen Rihani, Poets.org, retrieved from: https://poets.org/poem/luzumiyat-abul-ala-lxxii.
[vi] Ibid.
[vii] Tharoor, K. and Maruf, M. (2016). “Museum of Lost Objects: The unacceptable poet,” BBC News, March 2016, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35745962.
[viii] Rifai, O. (2022). “Social Theory: Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi,” SEPAD, 25 August 2022, retrieved from: https://www.sepad.org.uk/announcement/social-theory-abd-al-rahman-al-kawakibi.
[ix] Hourani, A. (1962). Arabic Thoughts in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939, London: Oxford University Press, p. vii.
[x] Al-Azm, S.J. (2000). “Statement by 99 Syrian Intellectuals: Al-Hayat, 27 September 2000,” published online by Cambridge University Press, 5 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/occidentalism-conspiracy-and-taboo/statement-by-99-syrian-intellectuals-alhayat-27-september-2000/5B25069C19C46666E3F3F509CE9BBDCA.
[xi] Full document available at: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/documents-on-democracy-6/.
[xii] Said (1996). Representations of the Intellectual, p. 121.
