Oman, Middle East - Circa July 2019: Shallow focus showing the Straight of Hormuz sensitive waterway located in the Persian gulf. Neighbouring, out of focus areas including Iran and Saudi are visible.

Great Powers in Alaska and the “Middlegame” of GCC States in the Ukraine war

Great powers have conducted their approach towards Ukraine akin to a chess game since 2014. The Alaska Summit, held between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on 15 August, will be remembered either as the moment of “check” or even “checkmate” for Ukraine and its Western supporters (including NATO, the UK and EU leaders). It is clear that over the last three years of the war, old-fashioned Realist ways of thinking influenced geopolitics the most, albeit combined with a new, special place for the GCC states.

Key strategic moves have been driven by concerns over territories, security guarantees, and economic and military considerations, that is, classic measurements of power from the Realist point of view.

Historical narratives pertaining to territories are especially characteristic of one of the founders of IR Realist theory, Hans Morgenthau’s writings, which measured power through “elements of national power”, termed “power resources” or “capabilities”, such as geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, and national character.[i] Through this lens, power is viewed through the tangible resources behind it, with military power, the size of territories and population, resource endowment, and economic capabilities at the forefront.

The outbreak of the Ukraine war confirms this logic. The first stage of the conflict started on the issue of the Crimean Peninsula, when the territory was annexed by Russia in 2014, and itself has Realist thinking and historical narratives behind it. Crimea’s historical connections to Russia go back to the 18th century, as the result of Catherine the Great’s move to integrate it into the Russian Empire. The importance of the land was highlighted in the Crimean War of 1853-56 too, as Russia fought with the ailing Ottoman Empire, which was in turn supported by France and Britain. A large proportion of ethnic Russians continued to live within this Ukrainian territory.[ii] Following the annexation of the peninsula, Russia built its Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol, strengthening its strategic reach in the region and further demonstrating how Realist principles defined its move.

Translating the language of chess into that of realpolitik, the Alaska Summit—which took place on 16th August—has not resulted in a ceasefire deal, but both President Putin and President Trump have cited progress.[iii] In the immediate aftermath of the summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and seven leaders of Europe met with Trump in Washington[iv]. A week later, Zelenskyy vowed to “push Russia to peace”.[v]

It was a symbolic gesture to host the Summit in Alaska. The territory was under the control of Russia after Czar Peter the Great sent explorer Vitus Bering to the coast in 1725. The U.S. purchased the land from Russia in 1867 under Czar Alexander the Second.[vi] Prior to the meeting, President Trump suggested that the summit would discuss a “swapping of territories” between Ukraine and Russia as the part of the deal to end the conflict.[vii] In the following weeks, President Putin made clear his demands to end the war with two “Nos” and one “Yes”: No to NATO admittance and Western troops stationed in Ukraine, and the handover of Ukraine’s Donbas region to Russia.[viii]

The Summit also involved discussing the economic dynamics of war, as Russia would like to end the current sanctions regime against it. Russia aims to dominate the Arctic as it would assist it to open shipping routes as the Arctic ice cap shrinks. President Putin ordered the government to present guidelines for well-recognized companies to return to the Russian market.[ix] He also suggested to President Trump to launch joint ventures with the U.S. in the critical minerals and rare earth metals (REMs) fields. President Trump was also open to working together with Russia on mineral deposits in Alaska. President Putin also proposed joint investments in the development of oil and gas fields in the Arctic. As clear results of the Alaska Summit, Putin has signed a decree permitting ExxonMobil to return to the Sakhalin-1 oil project. This would allow the largest U.S. oil company, to re-enter the venture with a 30% stake. According to the latest reports, Russia and the U.S. are now in discussion about potential collaboration on natural gas projects in both the Arctic zone and Alaska (US). Moreover, restarting collaboration with the U.S. is also key for Russia’s LNG diversification strategy in the Arctic (e.g. through Novatek, which has built a liquification plant and exported LNG, but its Arctic LNG-2 enlargement has been stymied by sanctions because of the Ukraine war).

Gulf mediations as instrumental in the “middlegame” of the Ukraine war

The involvement of small and middle powers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in mediations with regard to the Russia-Ukraine war represents the “middlegame” of the conflict, to continue the metaphor of chess.

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, GCC countries have emerged as reliable and crucial players for all sides involved. Recently, the United Arab Emirates assisted new exchanges of prisoners of war between Ukraine and Russia. These involved 84 Ukrainians and 84 Russians. In total, the number of exchanged captives that the UAE helped exchange exceeded 4,300.[x] UAE mediation efforts began in January 2024[xi], and a mere month later, Abu Dhabi concluded the exchange of 200 prisoners. Qatar hosted talks centred around humanitarian issues in Ukraine, with Doha facilitating the re-unification of families.[xii] Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has been engaged in mediation by offering Jeddah as a venue for summits with the participation of 40 states to end the war in 2023 and again in 2025.

Scholars have coined various names for these initiatives, which do not fit neatly into Realist frameworks of analysis, from niche diplomacy to soft power and state-branding initiatives. For example, Amal Abdullah Al Hadabi of the UAE-based think tank FARAS explained that the UAE’s successful efforts are linked to global trust in the wisdom of its authorities; constructive and positive relations binding the UAE with nations globally; and the adaptability of Emirati diplomacy to effectively tackle different complex matters.[xiii] Meanwhile, Anna L. Jacobs explains the role of the GCC countries in mediations as demonstrating their increasing international global reach and the advantages of hedging and balancing policies.[xiv] Relying on the concept of niche diplomacy in their mediation efforts in the Ukraine war, Mazzucco and Alexander suggest that Qatar and the UAE applied mediations for different purposes: to deal with humanitarian matters, increase global positioning, boost domestic legitimacy and develop more pragmatic geopolitical interests at the same time.[xv]

Mazzucco analysed Qatar’s mediation efforts towards the Ukraine war, and argued that for Doha, the motivation had a multi-layered purpose, with different independent factors, involving pragmatic considerations and Qatar’s geopolitical reach.[xvi] To be specific, Doha’s goal is to boost its place in the field of global security, develop political impact and boost its state-branding initiative. This is a strategic niche with the goal to deal with the vulnerabilities attributed to its status as a small state. These views link liberalist and constructivist traditions of the IR theory to the present analysis.

Nonetheless, it seems that the Ukraine war has assisted the emergence of another milestone for the status of GCC states in international politics, showing their distinctive feature and capabilities. In addition to great powers and their “opening” acts, moves and countermoves and eventual stalemate, Gulf countries emerged as fundamental in the “middlegame” of the war over the last three years. This reflects the theoretical propositions of Siniša Vuković, who highlighted that mediation activities are conducted on both interstate (between states) and intrastate (between groups challenging their power and governments) levels.[xvii] Vuković suggested that peace-building has relied on three basic factors, including exogenous geo-political shifts, changes in conflict dynamics and bargaining for cooperation.

Towards the “endgame”?

By getting involved in conflict resolution and peace building, GCC countries have been able to project their soft power and develop their state branding. In addition, they have benefited by emerging as fundamental forces in bringing exogenous geopolitical shifts about in the political, economic, and security fields. They effected change in conflict dynamics and bargained for cooperation where none had previously existed. Politically speaking, GCC states presented themselves as reliable actors for all sides, and they were able to maintain trust throughout the dialogue, which facilitated prisoner swaps during the conflict.

In addition to this, The GCC’s economic power has been deployed to reshape international energy dynamics and contribute to the stabilization of markets in a proactive way. Gulf countries have been instrumental in keeping Russian energy output stable within the OPEC and OPEC+ configurations over the last three years, in addition to emerging as alternative sources of energy for European countries who banned oil and gas imports from Moscow. The Ukraine war contributed to the emergence of a new energy order, with greater complexity and variation in supply chains, fuel types, and geopolitical alliances.[xviii]

These dynamics elevated GCC states to the level of great power politics. Emerging as key actors to shifting geopolitical dynamics, the position of GCC states should be reconsidered in Realist thinking. They demonstrated that small states can develop their own specific and influential agendas, where power can be something more specific, opportunistic and versatile than its traditional measures alone would suggest. This indicates the importance of developing the Realist thinking in International Relations by conceptualizing mediation efforts not solely from the perspective of liberalist or constructivist IR theory (e.g. balancing, hedging policies, soft power and branding), but as part of a previously neglected “middlegame” of great power dynamics.

[i] Morgenthau, Hans J. (1985) Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace”, (New York: Knopf).
[ii] Anna Loren (2025) “Crimea: What to know about peninsula at centre of Trump-Zelensky standoff”, Independent, retrieved from: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/criema-who-owns-it-russia-ukraine-history-trump-b2738591.html.
[iii] Holland, S., Osborn, A. and Balmforth, T. (2025). “Trump tells Zelensky that Putin wants more of Ukraine, urges Kyiv make a deal”, Reuters, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-tells-zelenskiy-that-putin-wants-more-ukraine-urges-kyiv-make-deal-2025-08-16/.
[iv] Mpoke Biig, M. (2025). “What’s Next for Ukraine After All That Diplomacy?”, retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/25/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-whats-next-summits.html.
[v] Rai, A. and Banatvala S. (2025). “Ukraine-Russia war latest: Zelensky says US and Ukrainian officials will meet to prepare for possible Putin summit”, retrieved from: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-trump-zelensky-putin-independence-day-live-b2813457.html.
[vi] Megan Forrester, (2025) “Trump-Putin summit in Alaska holds a ‘historical significance’, experts say” retrieved from: https://abcnews.go.com/US/us-purchased-alaska-russia-back-1867-centuries-trump/story?id=124626499.
[vii] Shane Croucher, (2025) “Russia reacts to Trump’s “swapping of territories”, comment”:, retrieved from: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russia-reacts-to-trumps-swapping-of-territories-comment/ar-AA1KrpHD.
[viii] McFall, C. (2025). “Putin issues formal demands to end Ukraine war after meeting Trump: report”, MSN, retrieved from: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-issues-formal-demands-to-end-ukraine-war-after-meeting-trump-report/ar-AA1KYe6u?apiversion=v2&noservercache=1&domshim=1&renderwebcomponents=1&wcseo=1&batchservertelemetry=1&noservertelemetry=1.
[ix] Aris, B. (2025). “Putin says Russia and US discuss joint energy projects in Alaska, Arctic”, Intellinews, retrieved from: https://www.intellinews.com/putin-says-russia-and-us-discuss-joint-energy-projects-in-alaska-arctic-397615//.
[x] Emirates 24/7 (2025). “UAE mediation efforts succeed with new exchange of 168 captives between Russia and Ukraine”, retrieved from: https://www.emirates247.com/world/uae-mediation-efforts-succeed-with-new-exchange-of-168-captives-between-russia-and-ukraine-2025-08-15-1.740663.
[xi] Khaleej Times (2024). “UAE mediates exchange of 200 captives of war between Russia and Ukraine”, retrieved from: https://www.khaleejtimes.com/uae/uae-mediates-exchange-of-200-captives-of-war-between-russia-and-ukraine.
[xii] Al Jazeera (2024). “Qatar hails mediation ‘milestone’ as it hosts freed Ukrainian, Russian kids”, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/25/qatar-hails-mediation-milestone-as-it-hosts-freed-ukrainian-russian-kids.
[xiii] FARAS (2024). “Emirati diplomacy driving efforts to ease conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza”, retrieved from: https://futureuae.com/en-US/Mainpage/Item/8990/emirati-diplomacy-driving-efforts-to-eas-conflicts-in-ukrain-and-gaza.
[xiv] Jacobs, A.L. (2025). “Gulf Mediation in the Ukraine Crisis”, retrieved from: https://agsi.org/analysis/gulf-mediation-in-the-ukraine-crisis.
[xv] Mazzucco, L. J.M. and Alexander, K.P. (2025). “Small –State Niche Diplomacy at Work: The mediation of the UAE and Qatar in the Russia-Ukraine war”, The International Spectator, Retrieved from:  https: doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2025.25363535.
[xvi] Mazzucco, L.J.M. (2025). “Qatar’s Expanding Mediation in the Russia-Ukraine War”, Manara Magazine, retrieved from: https://manaramagazine.org/2025/08/qatars-expanding-mediation-in-the-war/.
[xvii] Vuković, S. (2016). International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management: Challenges of cooperation and coordination, Abingdon: Routledge.
[xviii] Dourian, K. (2025). “The Gulf in the New Energy Order”, retrieved from: https://agsi.org/analysis/the-gulf-in-the-new-energy-order/.

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