After years of political paralysis and economic stagnation, Lebanon’s newly formed government under Prime Minister Nawaf Salam still finds itself in a precarious position, struggling to assert credibility within both its own borders and regionally speaking. The direct spill-over effects of the Iran-Israel war have weakened Lebanon’s position significantly. The country is known as a home base for Hezbollah, which has placed it at the frontlines in a regional confrontation with Israel, exposing it to immense vulnerabilities. An intriguing offer has been placed by the U.S. government on the table and at a critical time. Economic assistance for reconstruction in exchange for establishing complete state control over weapons within Lebanon’s borders by disarming Hezbollah by the end of the year.
The question of how feasible it is to comply with the offer and implement such a plan remains pertinent given Hezbollah’s deeply intertwined role within the Lebanese political institutional framework.[i] Five Shi’a ministers affiliated with Hezbollah and the Amal movement stormed out of the cabinet session where the plan was discussed, signalling immense dissatisfaction and deep political divisions within the government.
Hezbollah is Lebanon’s most powerful non-state actor, a key player within parliament and a direct link of Iranian influence in the country. It is also a powerful militia.[ii] Any measure taken to change the status quo with regard to weapons in Lebanon will have severe consequences on Hezbollah as well as the communities it is entrenched in[iii], potentially leading to hostilities. Hezbollah’s secretary general went as far as to warn about a civil war erupting.[iv]
Hezbollah’s entrenched power
The way Hezbollah is viewed in Lebanon and the region suggests a stark contradiction. At home, the party is deeply embedded in Lebanon’s political system. It has been able to shape government policies directly by controlling strategically important cabinet portfolios such as health and public works. In addition to securing 13 parliamentary seats through its 8th March coalition with Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement, it wields a great amount of influence. Nonetheless, in the eyes of the broader international community and Washington specifically, Hezbollah is a destabilising force in the region and a recognized terrorist organization.
Hezbollah’s organizational structure is unique as it functions as a ‘state within a state’ as Bilial Y. Saab highlighted.[v] Military and administrative structures in southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut that are beyond the reach of the state are controlled by Hezbollah. In 2008, Hezbollah’s armed intervention in Beirut side-lined government authority and led to the Doha Agreement, a deal that formalized the movement’s veto power and set the precedent for its dominant role in Lebanese politics.[vi] Ultimately, it was Iran’s financial and military support[vii] that locked this parallel power structure in place.[viii] Hezbollah grew into the cornerstone of Tehran’s ‘Axis of Resistance,’ effectively outsourcing much of Iran’s struggle against Israel. Inside Lebanon, however, that same role came to be seen as a direct challenge to the country’s sovereignty, aggravating long-standing sectarian rifts.[ix]
Legitimacy was fostered through an extensive network of public services such as schools, hospitals and welfare programs, mainly funded by Iran, and leading to the surpassing of Hezbollah’s role in politics. In a war-torn country where economic conditions seem to be deteriorating further, having a movement that positions itself as a provider of basic services makes it indispensable to the Shi’a community, further reinforcing sectarian identity and affiliations.[x]
Lebanon’s experience with its 1975–1990 civil war remains a point of warning. Fuelled by sectarian rivalries, it shattered the country until the Taif Agreement[xi] imposed a revised albeit fragile power-sharing system. It is also worth mentioning that The Taif Agreement altered Lebanon’s political structure by introducing a more active role for Muslim participation in parliament in addition to strengthening the authority of the parliamentary speaker, a Shi’a representative. These alterations unequivocally acknowledged the power of groups like Hezbollah, which was already gaining importance at the time. However, the deal failed to capture the full weight of Hezbollah’s support base, the country’s third biggest religious group. To force Hezbollah’s disarmament without national consensus would risk reopening those same fractures – and potentially reawakening the spectre of civil conflict. Crucially, such consensus must begin within the Shi’a community itself. Any path forward would require a sustained public awareness campaign and political guarantees, assuring Shi’a citizens that their interests will be safeguarded. Disarmament must not be framed as a punishment of Hezbollah’s supporters, but rather as a necessary step for Lebanon’s collective security and stability.
In August 2025, the Lebanese government launched the first initiative of its kind in decades by retrieving weapons from Palestinian refugee camps.[xii] These camps, long outside full state control, had become semi-autonomous spaces where Palestinian factions stockpiled arms – justified as tools of resistance against Israel. Over time, rival groups, militias, and political movements maintained arsenals inside the camps, creating zones of insecurity beyond the reach of Lebanese law. While the initial handovers in isolated camps marked a symbolic breakthrough and initial step, they cannot be taken as proof that Hezbollah affiliates would comply with the same ease. Unlike the camp factions, Hezbollah wields not only weaponry but also political leverage and social legitimacy.
The military and security reality
What the LAF lacks is the ability and legitimacy to function as a credible source of deterrence.
Thousands of militants, some of whom have been trained in combat in Syria are under Hezbollah’s command. Its military strength includes a wide range of advanced weaponry, some more superior than those of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)[xiii], including rockets, tanks and anti-tank ammunition.
Since 2006, over $3 billion worth of aid has been given to the LAF[xiv] as it is viewed by the U.S. as a counterweight to Hezbollah’s power. Despite all this military support, their capabilities and experience remain limited when it comes to asymmetric warfare, advanced air defence and heavy armour operations. However, transferring ‘resistance’ responsibilities to the Lebanese Armed Forces would not have the same deterrent impact that Hezbollah has. Israel has no interest in attacking the LAF; in fact, during the civil war, it periodically aided government-affiliated armed organizations to counterbalance the Palestinian fedayeen. What the LAF lacks is the ability and legitimacy to function as a credible source of deterrence, a position Hezbollah has established over decades thanks to its weapons, military experience, and ingrained networks.
Iran’s supply of weapons and financial support to Hezbollah[xv] has already been constrained by the strain of its own confrontation with Israel. Yet the challenge today appears to go beyond resources. Recent visits by senior Iranian officials to Hezbollah’s offices in Lebanon exposed signs of a rift: Tehran offered little backing when Israel struck Hezbollah, and in turn, Hezbollah withheld support during Iran’s 12-Day War. These moments shed light on a vital point, a wedge in what was once considered a seamless alliance. Simultaneously, the decrease in support increases the strategic importance of Hezbollah’s self-sufficiency in weapons production. Israel’s continued occupation of Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shouba Hills, along with its invasions in 1982 and 2000, have long been taken by Hezbollah as justification for keeping its weapons and maintaining the image of having a greater monopoly on weapons within Lebanon – portraying itself as Lebanon’s final line of defence. In reality, it is Hezbollah’s declared war against Israel that has drawn these confrontations, not an inherent Israeli interest in targeting the Shi’a community. Moreover, the presence of UNIFIL was meant to act as a buffer, limiting further Israeli incursions and offering Lebanon an alternative security framework outside Hezbollah’s arsenal.[xvi]
The question of the void
American officials argue that disarming Hezbollah would put an end to Israeli incursions into Lebanon – one of the promises tied to their request. Yet Lebanon’s history tells a more complicated story: Israel’s military actions have often been driven by broader objectives such as deterrence. To assume that Lebanon would automatically be safe once Hezbollah is disarmed is less a guarantee than a hopeful projection.
It was not advanced weaponry but rather Hezbollah’s unconventional resistance that drove Israel to withdraw back in the 2000’s. Disarming Hezbollah may be framed as a way to prevent the rise of smaller, unregulated groups, but Lebanon’s history suggests otherwise. In the absence of a strong state, removing a dominant actor often creates vacuums that competing militias and external powers rush to fill, exacerbating instability rather than resolving it.
Militancy aside, the more significant debate concerns Hezbollah’s extensive social service networks. These programs – ranging from healthcare and schools to reconstruction aid – have been a lifeline for many Lebanese communities, particularly where the state has failed to deliver and meet the needs of the people. Disarming Hezbollah does not necessarily mean that its social welfare system would vanish, but it does raise questions regarding whether services could be sustained or integrated into state institutions without the group’s broader organizational structure and sources of influence.
Hezbollah is a key ally for Iran, and Tehran would not simply accept its disarmament despite its weakened stance. Israel might see a weakened Hezbollah as a chance to reassert its dominance along the border. Meanwhile, Western and Gulf powers would likely compete for influence, potentially turning Lebanon back into a battleground instead of a stabilizing it. The real danger lies in miscalculations. Disarmament could be mistaken for a restoration of sovereignty, despite the reality that Lebanon’s vulnerability would only deepen. Without a state capable of assuming Hezbollah’s roles in deterrence and essential services, Lebanon risks sliding further into conflict rather than stability. The real challenge, ultimately, is not preserving militias but a more radical approach that strengthens the Lebanese state’s own institutions – primarily Lebanon’s security forces. In order to attain a level of credibility too, the U.S. and other allies must determine how to provide material and organizational assistance to the Lebanese government and bolster its ability to govern and protect.
Conclusion: Reality or illusion?
Real stability will not be achieved by forcing Hezbollah to disarm; rather, it is contingent on creating a state that is more legitimate and capable than at present.
Disarming Hezbollah may seem a quick route to peace, but it is more of an illusion. Hezbollah today is not only a militia, but a political party, a social welfare provider and a military force more powerful than that of the state of Lebanon. While fault lines are already showing, to take it apart overnight would shatter the fragile balance of power in the country.
The Lebanese cabinet’s approval of an army disarmament plan already resulted in mass walkouts and scathing denunciations by Hezbollah. Prime Minister Salam may demand that only the state carry arms, but rhetoric is no substitute for the ability to act. And it seems all the more impracticable now that they press it in their due time, with Lebanon enduring extreme economic pressure, barricaded in political stalemate and battered nearly daily by Israeli strikes.
To make aid contingent on the impossible is to gamble with Lebanon’s survival: at best it fosters paralysis; at worst, civil strife. Real stability will not be achieved by forcing Hezbollah to disarm; rather, it is contingent on creating a state that is more legitimate and capable than at present, and most importantly, which serves as a force of deterrence. Until then, visions of a Lebanon without Hezbollah are not peace plans – they are promises likely to fall short.
[i] Khatib, L. (2025). “Hezbollah’s State Capture in Lebanon”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 36 (4): 637–658, retrieved from: https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/pre-prints/content-jcpo24108.
[ii] Le Monde (2024). “Hezbollah’s Expansive Arsenal and the Limits of the LAF”, Le Monde, 14 June 2024.
[iii] Khatib, L. (2021). “How Hezbollah Holds Sway Over the Lebanese State”, Chatham House, retrieved from: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/2021-06-30-how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-the-lebanese-state-khatib.pdf.
[iv] Knipp, K. (2025). “Lebanon’s Hezbollah rejects disarmament, warns of civil war”, DW, 22 August 2025, retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/en/lebanons-hezbollah-rejects-disarmament-warns-of-civil-war/a-73730563.
[v] Saab, B.Y. (2019). Hezbollah and the Politics of Lebanon. London: Routledge.
[vi] Atlantic Council (2021). “History and Future of Hezbollah Disarmament”, retrieved from: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/history-and-future-of-hezbollah-disarmament/.
[vii] Jumaa, F.A. (2025). “The Impact of Iran’s Support for Armed Militias on Political Divisions in States: The Cases of Lebanon and Iraq”, Journal of Ecohumanism, 19 January 2025, retrieved from: https://ecohumanism.co.uk/joe/ecohumanism/article/view/5936.
[viii] Ricard, P. and Sallon, H. (2024). “Post-ceasefire, strengthening Lebanon’s army remains a challenge”, Le Monde, 29 November 2024, retrieved from: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/11/29/post-ceasefire-strengthening-lebanon-s-army-remains-a-challenge_6734608_4.html.
[ix] Jumaa, F.A. 2023. “The Impact of Iran’s Support for Armed Militias on Political Divisions in States”.
[x] Cammett, M. (2014). Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
[xi] The Taif Agreement. Accord 24. Conciliation Resources. Accessed 12 September 2025: https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Accord24_TheTaifAgreement.pdf.
[xii] Reuters (2025). “Lebanon says it is beginning disarmament of Palestinian factions in refugee camps”, 21 August 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-says-it-is-beginning-disarmament-palestinian-factions-refugee-camps-2025-08-21/.
[xiii] Abdel-Baqui, O. (2023). “Lebanon’s Military Can Barely Fight, Even After $3 Billion from the U.S.”, Wall Street Journal, 31 October 2023, retrieved from: https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-military-can-barely-fighteven-after-3-billion-from-the-u-s-a1d24969.
[xiv] Wall Street Journal (2023). “Lebanon’s Military Can Barely Fight, Even After $3 Billion from the U.S.”
[xv] Jumaa, F.A. 2023. “The Impact of Iran’s Support for Armed Militias on Political Divisions in States”.
[xvi] United Nations (2025). “Unifil, Lebanon”, retrieved from: https://www.un.org/en/ccoi/unifil-lebanon\.
