Turkey Moves to Fill the Opening Left by Iran

In a new spike of competition in the Middle East and amid Iran’s retreat as a result of Israel’s military pressure Turkey emerges as a prominent power.

Turkey and Iran may not be primary geopolitical rivals but given their geographic position and regional military and economic ambitions, they are propelled to compete over large parts of the Middle East and the South Caucasus. Up until the 1630s, this geography was subject to intense military and economic rivalry[i] between the Ottomans and the Persians, rendering the currently unfolding competition a return to age-old dynamics.

The presently changing balance of power in the Middle East is increasingly at the Islamic Republic’s expense. A brief war between Iran and Israel[ii] served as a culmination of a major shift which has been unfolding since 2023. The weakening of Iran’s power and the consequently emerging vacuum have given way to Turkey’s resurgence as a more and more prominent actor in the region.

The war in the Gaza Strip and the ensuing battering of Iran’s allies – the ‘Axis of Resistance’ – by Israel and the United States undermined the Islamic Republic’s ability to project its power across the region. Indeed, although all major constituents of the Axis have been humbled through aerial or overland military campaigns[iii], it is the fall of the Assad dynasty in Syria that impacted Iran the most. The land connection to the Mediterranean that the Iranians so diligently built through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, since early 2000s has been shattered. Syria served a pivotal role – a veritable bridge – in this corridor. To put this into perspective, the last time Iran ever managed to reach the Mediterranean freely was in the early 7^th century, when the Sasanian shah Khusrow II waged an all-out war against the Eastern Roman Empire[iv] and even held sway over most of the eastern half of the sea briefly.

The loss of Syria and the land corridor means that the power vacuum which emerged is now being filled by others, with Turkey taking the most important role.[v] Ankara is now actively involved in the reconstruction efforts of Syria and has plans to build a series of military bases across the country.[vi] Syria is also seen by Ankara as a buffer state or territory for forward defense as well as projection of power deep into the rest of the Middle East.

Turkey’s influence is likewise on the rise in Iraq. Political and economic engagement with the Kurdish government[vii] in the north of the country as well as the central government in Baghdad has grown. Turkey has also advanced work on the Development Road which links the country to the Persian Gulf[viii] as a powerful alternative to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC[ix]), the corridor sponsored by the US, the EU, India and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf since 2023. The idea of the Development Road has been around for decades[x] but lacked efforts for actual implementation because of the unstable political situation in Iraq since 2003 and often Turkey’s focus elsewhere, for instance toward the Civil War in Syria. Iran, which, due to its geography, often prefers east-west connectivity regards the Development Road as a competing project that would deny its existing advantages.

In the South Caucasus, although not as prominent an arena of competition between Turkey and Iran as the Middle East, the two countries’ interests still clash. In this geography too, the balance of power is changing and not in Iran’s favour. Ankara has successfully inserted itself in the diplomatic front of peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey also works on opening the so-called Zangezur corridor[xi] between the two countries through Armenia’s southernmost province of Syunik.

The potential opening of the new route would allow Turkey to create a proper link from the Nakhchivan exclave to Azerbaijan. Ankara has already unveiled railway, road and pipeline projects to Nakhchivan[xii], which now await further extension eastward. For Iran, these are challenging developments given the fact that Azerbaijan has relied on transit via Iran’s northern territories[xiii] to reach Nakhchivan for decades. The potential opening of the Zangezur corridor would deprive Iran not only of lucrative transit fees but also a powerful geopolitical lever over Azerbaijan.

Relations between Turkey and Armenia are also expanding. Cut in the early 1990s as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, their bilateral ties are now set to improve given the progress on a peace treaty between Yerevan and Baku. Moreover, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s recent visit to Ankara[xiv] for a meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan further stimulated talks, heralding the restoration of diplomatic relations in the close future.

Normalization of ties would only enhance Turkey’s position in the South Caucasus and allow Ankara to look further east, toward Central Asia. Turkey’s outreach to Central Asian states began right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the combination of the potential opening of the Zangezur corridor and improved relations with Armenia would allow Turkey to establish what Iran fears most: a Turkic corridor spanning from Turkey itself to Turkmenistan, all along the Islamic Republic’s northern border.

Iran’s relative weakening and the advancement of Turkey’s regional position does not signify an irreversible development. Iran still has plenty of geopolitical levers to deploy to try to maintain its position in the Middle East and the South Caucasus. Its ‘Axis of Resistance’ is only humbled but not eliminated. The network of militarized non-state actors continues to exist and adjust to the new reality on the ground. And even in those countries where Turkey’s influence is on the rise, Tehran is still viewed as a potential partner. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq and potentially even Syria all see Iran as an actor important enough to balance against other major actors in the region. Restrictions on Turkey’s own capacity to implement its plans are also important to consider.

The region has traditionally eschewed exclusive influence exercised by one country. Indeed, Iran’s predominance in the Levant did not end well and there are hints that Arab states now prefer a balancing strategy between major actors. A true balance of power could arguably be a far more effective recipe for peace in the volatile region.