Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at an international conference.

Saudi Arabia as a global mediator: From the Ukraine to Gaza war

Saudi Arabia’s importance as a global broker in diplomacy has been effectively growing. The New York Times’ recent headline read: “Thanks to Trump, Saudi Arabia gets a big week in international diplomacy”[i]. Indeed, Saudi Arabia hosted the first round of the US-Russia talks and expects to host a second summit with the goal of bringing the war in Ukraine to an end. This is in addition to having taken an active role in hosting peace talks in the context of the Gaza war. What are Riyadh’s ambitions and what are the key drivers of its diplomacy?

Ambitions and drivers of Saudi Arabia’s diplomacy

In the world of diplomacy, Riyadh has attracted the attention of the international community more prominently since 2023, with its normalisation of relations with Iran, peace talks with the Houthis, the reintegration of Syria into the Arab League, attempts to broker a ceasefire in Sudan, in addition to hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the Arab League Summit in Jeddah. Tobias Borck of RUSI explained that this “reflects a coming to the fore of what has long been the Kingdom’s preferred approach to foreign affairs. It highlights an evolution in how Saudi Arabia is positioning itself and operating on the regional and international stage, but without indicating a change in the country’s strategic direction.”[ii]

Mahmoud Jabari wrote for World Economic Forum that negotiations over the Ukraine war, with Saudi Arabia as a broker, demonstrate the delicate balancing act Riyadh must pursue in a complex, new geopolitical reality[iii]. This is based on a three-pronged strategy: the diversification of its economy away from the dependency on hydrocarbons, keeping its existing role as a vital energy supplier, and serving as a bridge between opposite global players.[iv] This was explicitly confirmed by Faisal Alibrahim, Saudi Minister of Economy and Planning, who said that “we want to be in the middle; our partnerships should remain strong with all stakeholders”[v]. Saudi Arabia’s more prominent diplomatic profile therefore stems from a combination of developments in the region’s power structure and the realization that guaranteeing its security and economic interests cannot be achieved without a more independent and proactive political stance.

Ukraine peace talks and Saudi Arabia’s opportunities

The US and Russia’s representatives met in Riyadh for over four hours to discuss ways to end the war in Ukraine. The negotiations did not include Ukraine as a party[vi]. Previous steps Riyadh took to facilitate mediation included a two-day peace summit on Ukraine with the participation of representatives from more than 40 states in August 2023, an offer of $400 million in aid to Ukraine[vii], assistance in prisoner swaps between Russia and Ukraine, and hosting Zelenskyy for the Arab League summit.[viii]

One of the facilitating factors behind the above is Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), who has good relations with both US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to Saudi expert Mohammed Al-Sulami[ix], MbS “championed a pragmatic and interest-oriented approach” Furthermore, Ali Shihabi explained that there is no other “place where the leader has such good personal relationship with both Trump and Putin”,[x] highlighting a unique opportunity the Kingdom has in raising its profile.

In 2017, Trump broke with tradition by selecting Saudi Arabia as a destination for his first foreign visit. Trump continued to maintain close business ties with the Kingdom, investing $2 billion in a firm chaired by his son-in-law Jared Kushner and declaring plans to build Trump towers in Saudi Arabia[xi]. Meanwhile, MbS maintained good ties with Putin, evidenced by their famous high-five at the G20 Summit in Argentina[xii]. Shortly after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the Saudi leadership declined the White House’s requests to speak with President Biden about raising oil prices[xiii], signalling a hedging policy between the West and Russia, and declaring a read line to doing favours to either side at the expense of the other.

As Faisal al-Shammeri in 2022 wrote for the Arab News following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom “has made clear its desire to pursue a balanced foreign policy that seeks stability, order, and equilibrium in its many commitments to global politics.”[xiv] This hedging/ balancing diplomacy has been a distinctive feature of Saudi diplomacy since the Ukraine war, and it has also created opportunities for the greater recognition of the Saudi leadership.

During Trump’s second term, this might extend to energy relations too. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the US and Russia pursued three main objectives: to repair staffing at their respective embassies in Moscow and Washington, to support mediations over Ukraine, and to develop closer relationships and economic collaboration[xv]. The US, Russia and Saudi Arabia are primary energy producers with significant influence over the global energy market. The Trump administration has already introduced tariffs[xvi] as part of its new economic plan, and possible further actions might follow in the energy market in collaboration with Russia and Saudi Arabia.

This is a policy field in which Saudi Arabia has already achieved significant results. It has established itself as a key player, managing production levels to ensure stability in energy supplies while resisting external pressures. This has afforded the Kingdom a notable degree of independence in its energy policy, signifying its ability to act on behalf of its national interests without yielding to outside demands.[xvii]

Saudi Arabia’s actions do not exist in isolation from other states’ interests, of course, and an interesting dynamic after recent peace talks has been the intensification of competition with Gulf states and other Western powers. Following the latest meeting in Riyadh, France called an emergency meeting of the European Union and the UK to discuss the peace deal[xviii]. Meanwhile, Zelenskyy was in the UAE to sign a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (Cepa) deal to boost diplomatic and economic relations between Kyiv and Abu Dhabi.[xix] The Emirates also mediated prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine on a previous occasion.[xx] Emirati President Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) “thanked Zelenskyy for Ukraine’s cooperation, reinforcing the UAE’s position as a neutral humanitarian mediator.”[xxi] Involvement in the peace talks between Russia and Ukraine also highlights the “hidden rivalry of Saudi Arabia and the UAE”[xxii], as both countries consider the leadership roles they can play within the Arab world.

For Saudi Arabia, another benefit might be gaining an increased amount of leverage in future negotiations on the fate of the post-war Gaza Strip.[xxiii]

The Saudi role in peace negotiations over the Gaza War

Saudi Arabia has also hosted key regional leaders for high-stakes talks on the Gaza war. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi confirmed that Egypt was developing a “comprehensive” reconstruction strategy for the war-ravaged territory[xxiv], which culminated in the Cairo summit at the beginning of March. The meeting discussed joint attempts in support of the Palestinian cause, and developments in Gaza, in addition to other regional and global matters[xxv]. Egypt submitted its own proposal for the reconstruction of Gaza under a framework, which would assist the Palestinians to be remain in the territory.[xxvi] Secretary of State Rubio stated that the US was eager to hear new suggestions on Gaza from Arab governments, however, “right now the only plan …is the Trump plan.”[xxvii]

On the role of Saudi Arabia in this process, as Mutlaq al-Mutairi of King Saud University stated, the Kingdom is aiming to highlight the prominence of its role in any solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[xxviii] It wants “to emphasise that it stands behind Egypt and Jordan”, and it provides economic assistance too.[xxix] In January 2025, Qatar said that a Gaza ceasefire and hostage deal could be agreed “very soon”, with negotiations from Israel and Hamas beginning a “final stage” of indirect talks in Doha.[xxx] This indicated some competition between Qatar and Saudi Arabia too in championing the peace deal.

Saudi Arabia is emerging as a prominent broker involved in the most high-profile conflicts of the world. The key driver of this new approach is its balancing/hedging policy, especially between powers external to the region. The second driver is the role of its leadership in this process, and MbS in particular, whose good relations with Trump and Putin over the years also paved the way for pursuing certain opportunities arising from the current status quo. Among key objectives of the Kingdom are the desire to attain the leadership role of the Middle East’s new regional order and to project soft power both within and beyond the region. As for the Ukraine war and its potential conclusion, Riyadh might also reap economic benefits from being at the forefront of negotiations. The end of the war would also bring about another recalibration in the global energy sector. Similarly to other Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia aims to add to its prestige and soft power with ongoing mediation efforts with regard to both Ukraine and the Gaza Strip.

[i] The New York Times (2025). “Thanks to Trump, Saudi Arabia gets a Big Week in International Diplomacy”, retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/20/world/middleeast/trump-saudi-arabia-diplomacy.html.
[iii] World Economic Forum (2025). “Saudi Arabia’s balancing act: peace talks, a new economy and straddling the energy transition”, 24 February 2025, retrieved from: https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/02/saudi-arabia-economy-diplomacy-energy/.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Ibid.
[vi] Firstpost (2025). “Question mark over Trump-Putin meet and other takeaways from US, Russia talks in Saudi Arabia”, 18 February 2025, retrieved from: https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/us-russia-talks-key-takeaways-saudi-arabia-donald-trump-vladimir-putin-meet-ukraine-war-13864509.html.
[vii] Salem, M. (2025). “Why is Saudi Arabia hosting talks between the US and Russia?”, 17 February 2025, retrieved from: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/17/middleeast/saudi-riyadh-us-russia-talks-analysis-intl-latam/index.html.
[viii] AP (2025). “Russia and US agree to work toward ending Ukraine war in a remarkable diplomatic shift”, 18 February 2025, retrieved from: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-riyadh-talks-trump-putin-rubio-0c3beebfef5839e9d509ff58239a6bc5.
[ix] Al-Sulami, M. (2024). “Foreign policy shift makes Kingdom a pivotal global player”, 28 October 2024, retrieved from: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2577100.
[x] Salem, M. (2025). “Why is Saudi Arabia hosting talks between the US and Russia?”, 17 February 2025, retrieved from: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/17/middleeast/saudi-riyadh-us-russia-talks-analysis-intl-latam/index.html.
[xi] Ibid.
[xii] Galeeva, D. (2024). “Economic factors driving Saudi-Russian relations”, 3 April 2024, retrieved from: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2487426.
[xiii] Mordock, J. (2022). “Saudi Arabia, UAE leaders. Decline calls from Biden amid surging oil prices”, 9 March 2022, retrieved from:  https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/mar/9/saudi-arabia-uae-leaders-decline-calls-biden-amid-/.
[xiv] Al-Shammeri, F. (2022). “Saudi Arabia’s balanced foreign policy”, 16 December 2022, retrieved from: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2216841/saudi-arabia’s-balanced-foreign-policy.
[xv] Ibid.
[xvi]BBC News (2025). “What are tariffs and why is Trump using them?”, 3 February 2025, retrieved from:  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cn93e12rypgo.
[xvii] Al-Sulami, M. (2024). “Foreign policy shift makes Kingdom a pivotal global player”, 28 October 2024, retrieved from: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2577100.
[xviii] Lee, M. and Litvinova, D. (2025). “Russia and US agree to work toward ending Ukraine war in a remarkable diplomatic shift”, 18 February 2025, retrieved from: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-riyadh-talks-trump-putin-rubio-0c3beebfef5839e9d509ff58239a6bc5.
[xix] Van Zyl, G. (2025). “UAE, Ukraine sign CEPA deal during Zelensky’s Abu Dhabi visit”, 18 February 2025, retrieved from: https://gulfbusiness.com/uae-ukraines-volodymyr-zelensky-abu-dhabi/.
[xx] Ibid.
[xxi] Ibid.
[xxii] Reisinezhad, A. and Bushehri, M. (2024). “The Hidden Rivalry of Saudi Arabia and the UAE”, FP, 25 January 2024, retrieved from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/25/the-hidden-rivalry-of-saudi-arabia-and-the-uae/.
[xxiii] Salem, M. (2025). “Why is Saudi Arabia hosting talks between the US and Russia?”, 17 February 2025, retrieved from: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/17/middleeast/saudi-riyadh-us-russia-talks-analysis-intl-latam/index.html.
[xxiv] Al-Maswari, M. (2025). “Saudi Arabia to host key regional leaders for high-stakes talks on Gaza”, Albawaba, 20 February 2025, retrieved from: https://www.albawaba.com/news/saudi-arabia-host-key-regional-leaders-1600177.
[xxv] Arab News (2025). “Saudi Crown prince discusses Gaza with leaders from Gulf, Jordan, Egypt”, 22 February 2025,retrived from: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2591161/saudi-arabia.
[xxvi] Al-Tabei, H. (2025). “Saudi Arabia to host Arab summit on Trump’s Gaza plan”, 14 February 2025, retrieved from: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/02/saudi-arabia-host-arab-summit-trumps-gaza-plan.
[xxvii] Ibid.
[xxviii] Ibid.
[xxix] Ibid.
[xxx] Abualouf, R. and Gritten, D. (2025). “Gaza ceasefire deal close as talks enter ‘final stages’, Qatar says”, BBC News, 13 January 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cd0jgnvkdyno.

Similar Articles

Published by the Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum (MENAF) in Cambridge, England.

ISSN 2634-3940 (Print)

Categories

Top Posts

Search the site for posts and pages