It is no secret that Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu much preferred Donald Trump in the recent US presidential election. During his prior term in the White House, there had perhaps been no greater pro-Israeli president in US history, known most notably for moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Trump’s initial appointments to his Cabinet and foreign policy apparatus this time around have only reinforced the notion that his administration will strongly support Israel while adopting hawkish policies toward Iran. In the wake of Trump’s re-election, right-wing members of Netanyahu’s cabinet feel especially encouraged, with Trump having already mentioned his support for Israel’s potential annexation of the West Bank and the destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Members of Israel’s government, however, should be careful what they wish for.
President Trump’s focus on the art of the deal in his hast administration, saw a transactional foreign policy taking root. This time around, President Trump will arguably focus on two things with regard to the Middle East. First will be an expansion of the Abraham Accords, the series of bilateral agreements signed in 2020 during his first term in office that normalized relations between Israel and a host of Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. In an ideal scenario, Trump and his administration would want to see an expanded Abraham Accords including the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. This is despite the fact that the Biden administration was reportedly on the precipice of accomplishing this just before the brutal October 7th Hamas attack on Israel, one of the main purposes of which was to disrupt momentum toward Saudi-Israeli normalization, but effectively, further marginalizing the Palestinian issue. If successful, Trump will be able to tout that he brought about a Saudi-Israeli agreement when Biden could not. The transformation of the Middle East, therefore, will have occurred on his watch, and no one else’s, finishing the job he started in his first term, against all odds.
To do this, however, will require more, not less, diplomatic pressure on Israel than Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition expects or wants, as the Saudis and others in the Arab world in the aftermath of the Gaza war will not move forward on normalization unless there is a viable pathway toward a two-state solution. The Saudi-led Arab Peace Initiative approved by the Arab League in 2002 and again in 2007 has been floated again as a possible template for that pathway. Recall, too, that Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner have also independently established as good of a relationship with the Kingdom as they have with Israel.
On Iran, again, Trump’s art of the deal approach may also take precedence over unwavering support for an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. With Iran having been weakened on several proxy fronts, most particularly with the devastating blows Israel has inflicted on Hamas and Hezbollah, it may be seen by the Trump administration as a propitious a time for a new Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (following up on the Obama nuclear deal with Iran) as the prospect of direct military action against Tehran’s nuclear bunkers, ports, and oil facilities, and the inevitable escalation that would follow, become less appealing. Trump is not against a deal with Iran per se. He has always said that he abrogated the JCPOA because he thought it was a bad deal and that he could negotiate a better one.
Iran, for its part, has been sending signals that it may be ready to reach a deal with Trump while at the same time embarking on a diplomatic barrage of sorts in the region, especially with the Gulf Arab states, implicitly letting everyone know that it still has leverage, including the ability to not only hit Israel but also Saudi targets. Again, Saudi influence in Washington may be just as important as Israeli clout when it comes to a decision on Iran. The fact that Elon Musk, Trump’s unofficial advisor these days on foreign policy, met with Iran’s ambassador to the UN in New York on November 15 only reinforces the notion that the president-elect is perhaps looking to strike a new deal. Israel has a history of wanting to finish off Middle East opponents only to be stopped in its tracks by (primarily) US diplomatic pressure. It could happen once again, at least in the eyes of the Israeli hawks.
Unfolding regional dynamics thus may facilitate a new nuclear deal on Iran, in which case Trump would once again be able to tout the fact that he came through when Biden could not, getting a better deal than even Obama. To be able to do these two things in a way that bests his two biggest Democratic rivals will be very attractive to Trump. So much so that Netanyahu and his right-wing allies may regret having not so quietly rooted for a Trump presidency.
