The Israeli military is scaling back operations in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the Rafah offensive, which started on 6th May, would be the last major operation.[i]
The Gaza war also reignited tensions from the previous war between Israel and Lebanese political party and militant group Hezbollah in 2006, which ended with a UN resolution drawing a border—the so-called Blue Line—that Hezbollah never accepted. Since 7th October, the two actors have regularly engaged in a dangerous tit-for-tat, testing each other’s red lines.
Following the killing in June of senior Hezbollah leader Taleb Sami Abdullah, Hezbollah released a drone footage flying directly over military sites and civilian areas in Israel[ii], accompanied by a statement by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah that “no place in the country is safe from our rockets”[iii], referring to Israel and Cyprus, which Hezbollah accuses to be supporting Israel (something which Cyprus denies).
Hezbollah said it will stop only if a ceasefire in Gaza is reached. But both Hamas and Israel continue to reject each other’s demands for a phased plan, recently approved by the UN Security Council[iv], that would result in a permanent ceasefire.
So far contained confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah has killed circa 95 Lebanese civilians, three journalists[v], and more than 300 Hezbollah fighters, and caused the displacement of 90,000 Lebanese civilians. Hezbollah’s rocket attacks have killed at least 17 soldiers and nine civilians[vi] and displaced more than 60,000 Israelis.
An all-out military escalation would be devastating. Hezbollah’s military capacity and ability to operate is far superior to 2006 and compared to Hamas’s in Gaza. Hezbollah claims to have 150,000 rockets and missiles[vii] which have the potential to put serious pressure on Israel’s Iron Dome, and between 45,000 and 100,000 fighters. This round is also estimated to last longer than in 2006, when hostilities ended after 33 days.
What is almost certain is that Lebanon would come out of this escalation shattered. Plagued by a deep economic crisis and hosting the largest number of refugees per capita, especially Syrians and Palestinians, the war will affect some of the most vulnerable people in the region.
Given Hezbollah and Iran’s relationships and presence in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, there is a high risk of a widening conflict. An Iraqi militia leader recently stated to target US interests in Iraq in the event of an Israel-Hezbollah confrontation. Other areas where Iran and Hezbollah have a presence or interests will be targeted. This includes Syria, where most people live in poverty. Many people would flee. Given the lack of better options in neighbouring areas, it is likely that they would try to go to Europe.
The US cannot stop Israel if it decides to escalate and it will stand with Israel if Hezbollah attacks first.
According to US officials an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah would be “catastrophic” and needs to be avoided at all costs. During a recent visit to Beirut, US Envoy Amos Hochstein reiterated that message, but also said it cannot stop Israel if it decides to escalate and that the US will stand with Israel if Hezbollah attacks first.[viii] Hochstein had not even left Beirut when the IDF’s Northern Command announced their approval of plans to engage in an operation against Hezbollah.[ix]
Israel has met little-to-no pushback from the West beyond rhetoric, even in the face of the worst civilian costs of the war in Gaza. It now has been given carte blanche by the US in this new phase too. Washington’s caveats that it wants escalation to be prevented at all costs mean very little when accompanied by an offer of unconditional support, especially after Israel’s negligence of certain international norms in protecting civilian life in Gaza.
Iran does not want a confrontation either. A direct war with Israel is likely to significantly damage Hezbollah, Tehran’s key ally in the region, and dire consequences on Iran’s own strategic interests across Syria, Iraq and Yemen. It also has the potential to jeopardise the Iran-Saudi track of rapprochement.
So far Hezbollah-Israel confrontation has brought all parties on the verge of escalation. In January the US launched dozens of air strikes in Syria and Iraq after a drone hit their Jordanian base Tower 22, killing three soldiers. In April Tehran launched its first-ever attack on Israeli soil[x] in response to April’s bombing by Israel of Iran’s consulate in Damascus, bringing all parties to the verge of a regional war. Thanks to US pressure on Israel, the response was limited to an Israeli airstrike on Iranian soil.
These events prove that the balance is thin, and Iran and the US could easily get dragged into a regional confrontation, despite both wanting to avoid such a scenario.
Europe, too, risks to get dragged into an unwanted war. Nasrallah expressed concern that Israel might use Cypriot bases to hit Hezbollah targets, something which Nicosia has denied. But EU foreign affairs spokesperson Peter Stano[xi] and Greek foreign minister Giorgos Gerapetritis pointed out that if Cyprus receives a direct threat, the EU as a whole has a duty to respond.[xii]
Rather than Cypriot direct involvement, Hezbollah is probably more worried about British bases that still exist on the island due to the UK’s colonial past[xiii], and which have been used during the Iraq and Libya wars and anti-Daesh campaigns.
For its part, Cyprus would most likely be the frontline of a new wave of Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian refugees. According to the UNHCR, the number of Syrian refugees arriving in Cyprus already has risen from 30 percent in 2023 to 83 percent this year.[xiv]
Besides bringing all parties dangerously close to war, these events are also spoiling ongoing negotiations around the Blue Line, which was never fully recognised by Hezbollah. These are spearheaded by Hochstein. France too came up with a proposal consisting of a three-step plan culminating in a Hezbollah withdrawal 10 km from the border.[xv] The proposal did not bear any success. The US and France were not acting together in these efforts, but have since joined forces to defuse tensions.
Israel is starting to realise a war with Hezbollah would have a huge human and economic toll.
A growing number of US officials also seems resigned to the potential of an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah.[xvi] But, as former Israeli defense officials argue[xvii], this can and should be avoided. Israel is starting to realise a war with Hezbollah would have a huge human and economic toll. Hezbollah realises the unpopularity of escalation among Lebanese citizens.
The West should engage in these efforts in a constructive manner based on a pragmatic view that the imperative of preventing a regional war is currently stronger than any wider ambition to counter Iran’s growing influence and networks.
But the US, France and the rest of the EU should provide reassurances to Hezbollah. Hezbollah is very unlikely to retract from the southern border if what follows is a buffer zone for the Israelis. The West should guarantee to Hezbollah that if it were to agree to pull back from the demarcation line under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and in exchange for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, this will mean an end of Israel’s attacks.
Nasrallah stated he is not willing to negotiate until a ceasefire is reached. But if the US and Europe offer wider guarantees, for instance a pathway to recognise a Palestinian state and financial support to Lebanon’s security, perhaps this could incentivize Hezbollah to yield.
The EU and the US should use channels of communication with Tehran to ask the upcoming new Iranian leadership to keep Hezbollah in check to avoid any missteps. The West should engage in these efforts in a constructive manner based on a pragmatic view that the imperative of preventing a regional war is currently stronger than any wider ambition to counter Iran’s growing influence and networks. Iran and its allies will not accept to be part of any track that is aimed at undermining them.
It is a joint EU-US effort that has the most potential to succeed. Nevertheless, Europeans should not join the US who is trying to tie negotiations with demands over Lebanon’s next president.[xviii] In addition to this, it would be counterproductive for European countries to promise iron-clad support for Israel, should an escalation unfold, like the US did.
The more the focus moves away from the Gaza Strip, the more negotiations are doomed to fail and likelihood of an escalation to increase. The end of the Rafah operation does not mean the end of Israel’s military campaign in response to the attacks committed by Hamas on 7th October 2023. Netanyahu has vowed to continue to “mow the lawn” in Gaza to eradicate Hamas.[xix] While the Blue Line dialogue needs to continue, European and US joint efforts need to also focus on securing a ceasefire in Gaza immediately.
[i] Gritten, D. and Plummer, R. (2024). “Netanyahu: Israeli forces will move to Lebanon border as Rafah winds down”, BBC News, 24 June 2024, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cpvvvkxpxwno.
[ii] Qiblawi, T., Salem, M, Murphy, P.P. et al. (2024). “Hezbollah leaders threatens Cyprus as tensions with Israel ramp up”, CNN World, 20 June 2024, retrieved from: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/06/18/middleeast/hezbollah-drone-video-israel-haifa-intl-latam/index.html.
[iii] Pacchiani, G. (2024). “Nasrallah says ‘no place’ in Israel would be safe in war, threatens to target Cyprus”, The Times of Israel, 19 June 2024, retrieved from: https://www.timesofisrael.com/nasrallah-says-no-place-in-israel-would-be-safe-in-war-threatens-to-target-cyprus/.
[iv] Faguy, A. and Berg, R. (2024). “UN Security Council backs US Gaza ceasefire resolution”, BBC News, 10 June 2024, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cw448x7lxggo.
[v] Committee to Protect Journalists (2024). “Journalist casualties in the Israel-Gaza war”, 18 June 2024, retrieved from: https://cpj.org/2024/07/journalist-casualties-in-the-israel-gaza-conflict/.
[vi] Alma Research and Education Center (2024). “The Northern Arena and the Shiite Axis”, 24 June 2024, retrieved from: https://israel-alma.org/2024/06/24/the-northern-arena-and-the-shiite-axis-weekly-review-of-key-events-and-data-june-17-to-june-23/.
[vii] Reuters (2024). “Lebanon’s Hezbollah: What weapons does it have?”, 20 June 2024, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-what-weapons-does-it-have-2023-10-30/.
[viii] Ravid, B. (2024). “U.S. warned Hezbollah it can’t hold Israel back if escalation continues”, Axios, 24 June 2024, retrieved from: https://www.axios.com/2024/06/25/us-warned-hezbollah-israel-escalation.
[ix] MEMO (2024). “IDF approves plan to attack Lebanon as Biden’s envoy meets Netanyahu after Beirut talks”, 19 June 2024, retrieved from: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240619-idf-approves-plan-to-attack-lebanon-as-bidens-envoy-meets-netanyahu-after-beirut-talks/.
[x] McKernan, B., Graham-Harrison, E., Borger, J. and Beaumont, P. (2024). “Iran launches hundreds of drones and cruise missiles at Israel in unprecedented attack”, The Guardian, 14 April 2024, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/13/israel-under-fire-as-iran-launches-extensive-drone-strikes.
[xi] European Commission Representation in Cyprus (2024). “European Commission statement on threats made against EU member state Cyprus”, 20 June 2024, retrieved from: https://cyprus.representation.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-statement-threats-made-against-eu-member-state-cyprus-2024-06-20_en.
[xii] Ekathimerini (2024). “Greek FM says Hezbollah’s Cyprus threat ‘absolutely unacceptable’, 24 June 2024, retrieved from: https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1242316/greek-fm-says-hezbollahs-cyprus-threat-absolutely-unacceptable/.
[xiii] UK Parliament (2008). “Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus”, retrieved from: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaff/147/14723.htm.
[xiv] Rose, S. and Atallah, N.M. (2024). “Prague to lead safety mission to Syria as refugees pressed to return”, The National, 24 June 2024, retrieved from: https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/europe/2024/06/24/czech-mission-to-syria-seeks-deal-on-cyprus-push-for-refugee-returns/.
[xv] Bassam, L., Gebeily, M. and Irish, J. (2024). “Exclusive: France proposes Hezbollah withdrawal, border talks for Israel-Lebanon truce”, Reuters, 12 February 2024, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/france-proposes-hezbollah-withdrawal-border-talks-israel-lebanon-truce-2024-02-12/.
[xvi] Toosi, N., Banco, E. and Seligman, L. (2024). “US to Hezbollah: don’t count on us to stop an Israeli attack”, Politico, 24 June 2024, retrieved from: https://www.politico.com/news/2024/06/24/us-hezbollah-israel-attack-conflict-00164761.
[xvii] Arnaout, A. (2024). “Israel’s war with Lebanon ‘not inevitable’, says ex-official”, AA, 27 June 2024, retrieved from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-s-war-with-lebanon-not-inevitable-says-ex-official/3259809.
[xviii] Al Akhbar (2024). “French diplomat: Hochstein links the presidency to the south”, 3 May 2024, retrieved from: https://www.al-akhbar.com/Politics/381543/%D8%AF%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%87%D9%88%D9%83%D8%B4%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88.
[xix] Da Silva, C., Segev, Y. and Raffa, Al. (2024). “Intense fighting in Gaza to soon end and focus shifting to Hezbollah, Netanyahy says”, Aol, 24 June 2024, retrieved from: https://www.aol.com/intense-phase-israels-war-hamas-085522107.html?guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAACEVf81L8uDTk9xZFQdFt_AFtkqfUMvR9GJyQNRYFsM3249xfNNfWOXAJGlNODoi7a7U_QidVfEpWpdRqv9cxFREV391i_lYm8tjdLQE_9mk69v9bJteurQXPGNJAH_Us90Img89yRFBmG3FivBg1D2i9ki5Lz7lmQRa2QgJso9W&guccounter=2.
