Iran War Forces Kurdish Groups into the Spotlight

For Iraq’s Kurdish parties, joining a war against Iran would be a high-risk, low-reward endeavour. Between 2022 and 2024, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was repeatedly targeted by Iranian ballistic missiles and drone strikes. In 2024, Iran struck the residence of a prominent Kurdish businessman[xii] in Erbil, alleging it was a Mossad base. A similar attack occurred in 2022 against another businessman’s home[xiii], though an Iraqi government investigation later found no evidence to support Tehran’s claims.

Relations between the Kurdistan region and Iran have shown signs of thawing, particularly following President Nechirvan Barzani’s visit[xiv] to Tehran in 2024. Nevertheless, Iran-aligned Iraqi militias have continued to target the region’s critical infrastructure, including the Khor Mor gas field and Erbil International Airport. Since the outbreak of the war, multiple drone strikes have also been reported against the U.S. consulate, coalition forces’ bases in Erbil, and other sites in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.

For Iranian Kurdish groups, the prospect of joining the war against Tehran may seem more tempting, though no less perilous, particularly given the absence of a clear strategy from Washington. Iranian Kurds continue to face severe restrictions on basic cultural and political rights. The Kurdish language is heavily restricted[xv] in formal education, and several activists have been imprisoned for promoting instruction in their mother tongue. Kurds also experience disproportionately high execution[xvi] rates for various offenses. Chronic state neglect has left Kurdish areas among the most underdeveloped regions in Iran, with persistent unemployment and limited economic opportunities forcing many residents into precarious, low-wage labour. Political parties remain banned, and Iranian Kurdish groups operate in forced exile from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Their military bases, along with the civilian settlements in the town of Koye, have repeatedly been targeted[xvii] by ballistic missile and drone strikes by the Iranian regime.

Over the past two decades, the Iraq War and the campaign against ISIS have elevated Kurdish armed groups into some of Washington’s most effective local partners in the Middle East. In 2003, after the Turkish parliament denied[xviii] the U.S. permission to open a northern front through its territory, Washington turned to Iraqi Kurds as indispensable partners, with Peshmerga forces working closely with U.S. Special Forces against Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime.

Similarly, Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces played a critical role in reclaiming large swathes of territory in northern Iraq and northeast Syria from ISIS, serving as the boots on the ground while the U.S. provided airpower, training, and logistical support. In each case, the militant and political groups benefited from both regional and international support, including train-and-equip programmes, logistical assistance, intelligence sharing, and financial backing.

That said, unlike the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga or the Syrian Democratic Forces, Iranian Kurdish groups lack the training, heavy weaponry, and international support needed for sustained conventional warfare. Most Iranian Kurdish parties seek autonomy within a federal Iran rather than full secession, and they are unlikely to march on Tehran beyond liberating the Kurdish-majority areas along the Iran-Iraq border. It also remains unclear whether Washington would be willing to provide comparable military support – including deploying military advisors on the ground – if Iranian Kurdish groups were to assume a frontline role. Without substantial backing from the U.S. and a clearly defined strategic objective, such a move could expose the Kurdistan Region to severe retaliation from Iran.

Complicating matters further is the lack of coordination within the broader Iranian opposition. While Iranian Kurdish parties are arguably the most organized and militarized segment of the opposition to the Islamic Republic, they operate largely in isolation from other movements, including Azeri, Baluch, and Persian political factions.

This fragmentation stands in stark contrast to the Iraqi opposition prior to the 2003 Iraq War, when disparate actors coordinated under the umbrella of the Iraqi National Congress and broadly shared a vision for a post-Saddam political order. Elite cohesion[xix] proved critical not only for mobilizing external support but also for shaping postwar institutional arrangements that ultimately granted the Kurds significant autonomy within a federal Iraq. Although Iranian Kurdish groups have expressed openness to cooperating with other Iranian opposition movements, no meaningful cross-ethnic coalition has yet emerged.

The Kurdish authorities in Iraq therefore face a stark dilemma. Supporting their fellow Kurds in Iran may carry historic appeal, but direct involvement in a war with Tehran risks jeopardizing the hard-won stability and economic gains the region has achieved over the past two decades. The economy depends heavily on trade with both Iran and Turkey, the latter serving as the region’s gateway to global markets and its primary route for oil exports. Having cultivated a pragmatic relationship with its neighbors, Iraq’s Kurdish leadership may be reluctant to incur the severe economic and security costs that an open confrontation with Iran could bring.