The question of Palestinian statehood has laid dormant at times, however, a wave of recent recognitions[i] by countries such as Spain, Ireland, Norway, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Malta has demonstrated that the issue moved back to the centre of global diplomacy again. Australia also formally pledged[ii] to recognize a state of Palestine ahead of the United Nations General Assembly. At the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), this “recognition wave”[iii] was framed less as a mere gesture and more as a bid to reset a failing diplomatic track, especially among several Western states that historically held back. Complicating this shift, the United States, backed by Netanyahu, has put forward a security-first plan that explicitly defers any discussion of near-term statehood, signalling a competing pathway that prioritizes sequencing over status.[iv] Crucially, the plan leaves basic design questions unanswered such as who sits on the interim governing body, what mandate an international stabilisation force would have, and who adjudicates compliance, all of which will determine whether “sequencing” is a bridge to sovereignty or a holding pattern.
These announcements underscore foreign countries’ growing impatience with the deepening humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and the stalled peace process between Palestinians and Israelis, more broadly speaking. They come after almost two years of war between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip, which gave way to a broader regional escalation, drawing in Hezbollah and other militant groups in the region, Iran, and—most recently—Qatar, with no decisive end to the fighting in sight. The war in Gaza brought about immense material destruction and loss of human life, but has not seen the return of dozens of hostages abducted by Hamas on 7 October 2023, one of the stated objectives of Israel’s military operation. Nearing the two-year anniversary of the 7 October attacks, Israel decided to consolidate military control over Gaza. In parallel with this, the government also rolled out plans for the construction of settlements near Jerusalem, further intertwining the issue of the war with questions about the viability of Palestinian sovereignty in practice in the future. This context[v] explains why some states now explicitly link recognition to accountability steps (e.g., arms-transfer restrictions or conditionality), arguing that words at the UNGA must be tied to enforcement if they are to shape realities on the ground.
The issue of recognition is thus caught between symbolism and substance[vi], law and politics, and hope and reality. Recognition signals solidarity with Palestinian aspirations for statehood, but comes with risks of emboldening the extremist stance of Hamas. At the same time, it does not in itself establish sovereignty, dismantle settlements, resolve intra-Palestinian political issues, or, most importantly, create peace between the conflicting sides. UN discussions underscored an emerging consensus on this point[vii]: recognition can widen diplomatic/legal options, but absent pressure and incentives for both parties, it will not, by itself, curb settlement expansion or alter military calculus. The new US plan makes this hierarchy explicit[viii]: ceasefire and security deliverables first, governance redesign second, status issues later. However, without a clearly identified, independent verifier for those deliverables, “security first” may become “status never.”
Recognition as response
The timing of recent international recognitions has been driven by the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and frustration at the perceived inability of the United States to constrain the scope of Israel’s military actions. The recent Israeli strike on Hamas leadership in Doha[ix], Qatar, has injected an additional layer of urgency and controversy into this debate. Beyond the immediate tactical goal of decapitating Hamas’s leadership, the attack represented a direct violation of Qatari sovereignty and a breach of international law. Rather than advancing security, such unilateral moves exposed Israel’s willingness to pursue short-term military objectives at the expense of what other regional and international actors would prefer for the building of long-term regional stability. It also highlighted a fundamental difference between how different actors view Doha’s hosting of senior Hamas brass, an opportunity for influence in continued negotiations.
The recognition of Palestinian statehood has, in the eyes of some international actors, become a way to counterbalance Israel’s use of force
After repeated rounds of failed negotiations between Hamas and Israel, the recognition of Palestinian statehood has, in the eyes of some international actors, become a way to counterbalance Israel’s use of force without direct intervention. In addition, images of mass displacement[x] and stories of widespread hunger in the Gaza Strip have generated mounting pressure on governments to act. This approach has solidified the joining of the issue of the war with the peace process. For many governments now shifting toward recognition, the move is about signalling disapproval of Israeli policies. They also perceive the recognition of Palestine as a prerequisite to restore credibility to the stagnant peace process.
Israel’s announcements of its plans to go forward with its “East 1” or “E1” plan to settle a 12-square-kilometre area east of Jerusalem and establish military control over Gaza, however, contradict the territorial framework of a two-state solution[xi] envisioned by the 1993 Oslo Accords. Adding further pressure to leaders across Europe and Latin America, public sentiment[xii] now strongly advocates for protecting Palestinians, particularly among younger generations. The issue has become a cross-cutting domestic political flashpoint. European positions, however, remain uneven[xiii]: while some EU and Five Eyes countries moved toward recognition, others (notably Germany and Italy) stressed timing, security implications, and governance reforms—illustrating a widening Western split over sequencing.
This momentum has also been fuelled by a broader sense of disillusionment with the U.S.[xiv], which many believe has abdicated its role as a credible mediator. Washington has been either unwilling or unable to press the Netanyahu government to halt its military campaigns in Gaza, while its direct and indirect mediation efforts with Hamas proved ineffective in returning hostages to Israel and ending the war that way. Consequently, several states framed their recognitions as a “policy correction”[xv] designed to revive two-state parameters despite US/Israeli opposition—yet acknowledged that without Washington’s buy-in, implementation paths will remain constrained.
The case for recognition
Under the Montevideo Convention[xvi] of 1933, Palestine arguably fulfils the criteria of a state: it has a permanent population, territory, government, and capacity for external relations. In practice, however, its sovereignty is undermined by the fragmentation between its primary territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—further increased by settlement expansion in the West Bank—political fragmentation that corresponds with this split territorial basis as well as a lack of control over borders, airspace, and resources. Palestine’s international standing, however, is complex.
Since 1974, when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was granted observer status[xvii] at the United Nations, Palestine has been recognized as the representative of its people but not as a state. A key milestone came in 2012, when the UN General Assembly upgraded Palestine to “non-member observer state”[xviii] by Resolution 67/19. This status affirmed its right to self-determination, implicitly recognized the 1967 borders, including East Jerusalem, and allowed it access to international institutions such as the International Criminal Court. However, Palestine has not been given full UN membership, which requires Security Council approval[xix], as the United States, a permanent member of the Security Council, has blocked it along with close allies such as the United Kingdom and, at times, France. Washington has exercised its veto in key moments, most recently in April 2024[xx], when Palestine formally applied for membership. The U.S. justified its decision by arguing that recognition should come only through direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, warning that unilateral moves at the UN would undermine the peace process. This UNSC reality[xxi], recognized clearly in UNGA corridors, explains why the current momentum centres on bilateral recognitions and coalitions rather than institutional upgrades inside the UN system.
Over 147 countries[xxii] now bilaterally recognize Palestine, but without recognition from the U.S. and other major powers, its status remains contested. The result is a paradox: Palestine exists as a state in much of the Global South and in international law, but remains in political limbo within key global institutions.
Recognition of Palestinian statehood fulfils important functions that extend beyond symbolism. Supporters of recognition argue that it is about creating the necessary conditions[xxiii] for a lasting peace by affirming the Palestinians’ right to sovereignty and self-determination. They emphasize that recognition restores some balance to an asymmetric conflict[xxiv] in which Israel wields overwhelming military power. By affirming statehood, governments hope to keep alive the vision of a two-state solution, which risks being extinguished amid continued settlement expansion and the devastation in Gaza.
Absent intra-Palestinian reconciliation and security arrangements acceptable to Israel, the stabilising effects will remain limited.
They also argue that statehood provides a political horizon, undercutting despair and radicalization, empowering moderate leadership, bolstering institutions, and facilitating cooperation with neighbouring states. Moreover, recognition is increasingly seen as an investment in regional stability[xxv], addressing one of the most persistent sources of Middle Eastern conflict by offering a political foundation for peace. Still, officials cautioned that absent intra-Palestinian reconciliation and security arrangements acceptable to Israel, the stabilising effects will remain limited. This is precisely where an interim international authority, central to the US–Israel plan[xxvi], could either create institutional space for reform or, critics warn, postpone sovereignty indefinitely. Whether the interim authority governs as a trustee with hard powers or as a light-touch facilitator is not specified, and that distinction will shape whether recognition works as leverage or is neutralised by process.
Recent developments have demonstrated how this concept is translating into tangible diplomacy. This signals that recognition is being strategically tied to accountability rather than being deployed as an empty gesture. The Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution[xxvii], launched by Saudi Arabia and France with participation from over 100 countries, including European Union members and Arab League states, offers a structured diplomatic framework in which recognition is embedded as part of a 15-month action plan leading to a demilitarized, sovereign Palestinian state under UN supervision. These developments reflect a shift toward recognition as a pragmatic tool embedded within a broader strategy for meaningful change. The UNGA debate also highlighted complementary measures[xxviii] under discussion, from coordinated export controls to port-state enforcement, that could operationalize accountability, though consensus and follow-through remain uncertain. Whether this Franco-Saudi track can be harmonized with the US plan’s phases—rather than run in parallel or at cross-purposes—will largely determine if recognition functions as leverage or as a rhetorical cul-de-sac. Alignment will require concrete answers to the “who decides” problem[xxix]: which body certifies demilitarisation, who triggers Israeli withdrawal, and how Palestinian institutional readiness is judged.
Recognition and its discontents
Recognition, however, is not without its risks. On the international stage and legal scholars in the UK[xxx] have underscored that recognition should not contravene established international norms, suggesting that premature recognition could be legally inconsistent. Others highlight the danger of recognition being largely symbolic[xxxi]: unless paired with financial support, accountability mechanisms, and sustained a resolution for halting settlement expansion, recognition may lack substantive impact. Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has cautioned[xxxii] that recognizing a “state” on paper, which does not yet meaningfully function, risks creating the false appearance of progress, potentially masking unresolved issues and hardening existing extremist positions. This critique echoed a broader UNGA refrain: recognitions that are not matched with enforcement tools risk “hollowing out”[xxxiii] the two-state idea by normalizing a disconnect between diplomatic language and ground conditions.
One such unresolved issue is the enduring political fragmentation[xxxiv] between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which raises serious doubts about who would legitimately represent a recognized state. Critics argue that recognition under current conditions risks entrenching division rather than fostering unity. Similarly, several Western states have attached conditions such as institutional reform, elections, or even demilitarization before considering recognition, reflecting ongoing fears that premature statehood could empower Hamas beyond its reach in the Gaza Strip. The proposed “technocratic committee” for Gaza under an international board—another feature of the US outline[xxxv]—tries to bridge this representational gap, but leaves sovereignty questions open. Without clarity on how and when technocratic stewardship hands off to elected Palestinian institutions, recognition risks orbiting an interim that never ends.
In the view of Israel and other critics, recognition under the present climate would amount to rewarding Hamas’ terrorist attacks and legitimizing the most extreme form of Palestinian opposition to Israel.
This goes to the heart of Israel’s security concerns, which have highlighted the potential for spreading rather than mitigating radicalisation among Palestinians. In the view of Israel and other critics of this move, recognition under the present climate is dangerously counterproductive. They have repeatedly argued[xxxvi] that conferring statehood would amount to rewarding Hamas’ terrorist attacks on Israel and legitimizing the most extreme form of Palestinian opposition to Israel. In their view, such moves undermine deterrence, embolden militants, and weaken Israel’s capacity to insist on security guarantees as a precondition for peace. This is in alignment with some policymakers, who also argued that recognition should follow final-status negotiations rather than precede them, warning that early recognition could harden positions on both sides and diminish incentives for compromise. Some Israeli officials even floated counter-measures[xxxvii]—up to and including annexation steps—during the UN week, underscoring how recognition could trigger escalation rather than de-escalation absent parallel guardrails.
The weakness of the Palestinian Authority and its leading Fatah faction in the West Bank is another source of concern for a state of Palestine under the current political conditions. Several extremist Palestinian elements exist within the West Bank too, which the PA has not been able to contain. Issues of corruption have also been raised as a point of criticism about the PA’s model of governance. This is why a number of European statements paired recognition talk with demands for institutional reform and credible succession/election roadmaps to ensure a viable interlocutor post-recognition. Here, too, the interim-authority concept enshrined in the US–Netanyahu 20-point proposal[xxxviii] is double-edged: it may buy time for PA reform and elections, or it may entrench a trusteeship that delays Palestinian agency over core state functions. Design specifics—who appoints, who recalls, and what triggers handover—will decide which way this cuts.
Virtue signalling or genuine foreign policy?
A key tension lies in whether recognition can translate into empowerment[xxxix], and, importantly, the empowerment of whom. Recognition of a state of Palestine comes at a time when the war in the Gaza Strip still wages on, as Israel consolidates military control and expands settlement activity in the West Bank. It also comes after almost two years of war that drew in a number of extremist militias in the region, raising serious questions about whether the current conditions are conducive for the proliferation of extremist rather than moderate elements. This risks recent diplomatic moves appearing as detached from realities on the ground. Critics warn it could create the illusion of progress while entrenching the status quo. UNGA interventions repeatedly returned to a practical test[xl]: will recognitions be tied to concrete measures (e.g., arms embargo discussions, end-use audits, and border/settlement conditionality) that can move behaviours, or will they remain statements of intent?
While recognition of Palestinian statehood carries strong symbolic weight, it also unfolds against a backdrop of profound political and social tensions. In Israel itself, mass protests have erupted, with demonstrators demanding an end to the Gaza war[xli] and the safe return of hostages. Their message is that military victory and hostage recovery cannot coexist, and they accuse Netanyahu of privileging political survival over peace. This rising domestic dissent underscores a large portion of Israelis’ desire for a political solution, rather than a perpetual cycle of military engagement.
Internationally, recognition has provoked sharp reactions. The recent diplomatic rift between Australia and Israel illustrates this dynamic: Canberra’s decision to recognize Palestine prompted Netanyahu to denounce Australian Prime Minister Albanese[xlii], sparking condemnation from Australian Jewish groups who urged their government for diplomacy instead of potentially inflammatory moves. The fundamental difference between the two sides’ understanding of what should come first persists for now. More broadly, the UNGA showcased a widening transatlantic/EU split: some capitals see recognition as a prerequisite to revive talks while others insist on sequencing it after verifiable security and governance benchmarks, highlighting that the immediate battle is as much about how to recognize as it is about whether to recognize. In sum, the new US–Israel roadmap sharpens the central policy question: can recognition be engineered as leverage inside a phased security process, or will a security-first doctrine permanently displace recognition to the horizon?
[i] Ibish, H. (2025). ‘Western Nations Are Taking a Key Step Toward a Two-State Solution’, The Atlantic, 20 August 2025, retrieved from: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/08/palestinian-state-west-recognition/683930/.
[ii] Lam, L. (2025). ‘Australia to recognize Palestinian state in September’, BBC News, 11 August 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvg33351n61o.
[iii] Irish, J. and Nichols, M. (2025). ‘World leaders rally behind Palestinian statehood at UN, defying US and Israel’, Reuters, 23 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/world-summit-meet-two-state-solution-support-grows-palestinian-state-2025-09-22/.
[iv] Bateman, T. (2025). ‘Trump’s Gaza plan is a significant step – but faces fundamental obstacles’, BBC News, 30 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cy4r1xjy90ko.
[v] Schaer, C. (2025). ‘What will recognizing Palestine as a state actually achieve?’, DW, 21 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/en/what-will-recognizing-palestine-as-a-state-actually-achieve/a-74047802.
[vi][vi] Zreiq, J. (2025). ‘The Politics of Recognition and the Erasure of Palestine: How the West Uses Recognition to Manage Palestine and Demand Israel’s Legitimacy’, Institute for Palestine Studies, 11 July 2025, retrieved from: https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1657567.
[vii] Harb, A. (2025). ‘Gaza and Palestine were dominant themes at UN. Will it make a difference?’ Al Jazeera, 29 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/29/gaza-and-palestine-were-dominant-themes-at-un-will-it-make-a-difference.
[viii] Smith, D. (2025). ‘Trump and Netanyahu to Hamas: accept Gaza peace plan or face consequences’, The Guardian, 29 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/29/trump-netanyahu-gaza-peace-plan.
[ix] Chowdhury, M. et al. (2025). ‘Israel targets Hamas leadership in Qatar strike’, CNN World, 10 September 2025, retrieved from: https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-qatar-attack-09-09-25.
[x] Hamzawy, A. and Muasher, M. (2025). ‘Is the Tide Turning on Palestinian Statehood?’, Carnegie Endowment, 4 August 2025, retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/08/gaza-starvation-palestine-statehood?lang=en.
[xi] Ibish (2025). ‘Western Nations Are Taking a Key Step Toward a Two-State Solution’.
[xii] Henley, J. (2025). ‘Public support for Israel in western Europe at lowest ever recorded by YouGov’, The Guardian, 3 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/03/public-support-for-israel-in-western-europe-lowest-ever-recorded-yougov.
[xiii] Schaer (2025). ‘What will recognizing Palestine as a state actually achieve?’.
[xiv][xiv] Harb, A. (2025). ‘Trump response to Israel’s Qatar attack undermines US credibility: Analysts’, Al Jazeera, 11 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/11/trump-response-to-israels-qatar-attack-undermines-us-credibility-analysts.
[xv] Wu, A. (2025). ‘The Changing Map of Palestinian Recognition’, The New York Times, 22 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/30/world/middleeast/palestinian-state-recognition-maps.html.
[xvi] Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933). ‘Convention on Rights and Duties of States’, retrieved from: https://www.ilsa.org/Jessup/Jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf.
[xvii] United Nations (2024). ‘Palestine’s current status’, 18 April 2024, retrieved from: https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/04/1148351.
[xviii] Better World Campaign (2024). ‘Frequently Asked Questions: Palestine, the UN, and the U.S.’, 5 August 2024, retrieved from: https://betterworldcampaign.org/blog/frequently-asked-questions-palestine-the-un-and-the-us.
[xix] United Nations (2024). ‘Security Council Fails to Recommend Full United Nations Membership for State of Palestine, Owing to Veto Cast by United States’, 18 April 2024, retrieved from: https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15670.doc.htm.
[xx] Ibid.
[xxi] Harb (2025). ‘Gaza and Palestine were dominant themes at UN. Will it make a difference?’.
[xxii] Al Jazeera (2025). ‘Mapping which countries recognize Palestine in 2025’, 10 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/10/mapping-which-countries-recognise-palestine-in-2025.
[xxiii][xxiii] Biswas, B. (2025). ‘Recognizing a Palestine State: What’s New—and What’s Not’, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, retrieved from: https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/recognizing-a-palestine-state-whats-new-and-whats-not/.
[xxiv] Iqtait, A. (2025). ‘Recognizing a Palestinian State Is Not Policy on Its Own’, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 11 August 2025, retrieved from: https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/recognizing-a-palestinian-state-is-not-a-policy-on-its-own/.
[xxv] Arab News (2025). ‘Two-state solution ‘key to regional stability,’ Saudi FM tells UN conference’, 28 July 2025, retrieved from: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2609779/middle-east.
[xxvi] Spetalnick, M., Hunnicutt, T. and Al-Mughrabi, N. (2025). ‘Trump secures Netanyahu’s agreement to Gaza deal but Hamas support in question’, Reuters, 30 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-forces-advance-ahead-trump-netanyahu-gaza-war-talks-2025-09-29/.
[xxvii][xxvii] Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024). ‘The First Meeting of the Global Alliance fot eh Implementation of the Two-State Solution Continues its Work with the Participation of the Deputy Minister for Multilateral International Affairs, Senior Officials, and International Organizations’, 31 October 2024, retrieved from: https://www.mofa.gov.sa/en/ministry/news/Pages/-The-First-Meeting-of-the-Global-Coalition-for-the-Implementation-of-the-Two-State-Solution-Continues-its-Work-with-the-Par.aspx.
[xxviii] Wertheimer, T. and McGarvey, E. (2025). ‘Netanyahu calls Palestinian recognition “disgraceful”, as dozens walk out of UN speech’, BBC News, 26 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/cdxqe17njggt.
[xxix] Harb, A. (2025). ‘5 unanswered questions about Trump’s Gaza plan’, The Business Standard, 1 October 2025, retrieved from: https://www.tbsnews.net/features/panorama/5-unanswered-questions-about-trumps-gaza-plan-1250391.
[xxx] McKiernan, J. and Zeffman, H. (2025). ‘Minister says lawyers missing the point on Palestinian recognition’, BBC News, 31 July 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c78z69x61e6o.
[xxxi] Courty, A. (2025). ‘What will recognition of Palestinian statehood actually change?’, ABC, 11 August 2025, retrieved from: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-08-11/recognition-of-palestinian-statehood-gaining-momentum/105594476.
[xxxii] Eccles, M. (2025). ‘Early recognition of Palestine could be “counterproductive,” Italy’s Meloni says’, Politico, 26 July 2025, retrieved from: https://www.politico.eu/article/early-recognition-palestine-counterproductive-giorgia-meloni/.
[xxxiii] Schaer (2025). ‘What will recognizing Palestine as a state actually achieve?’.
[xxxiv] Jahshan, K.E. (2023). ‘The Persistent Illusion of Palestinian Reconciliation’, Arab Center Washington DC, 7 August 2023, retrieved from: https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-persistent-illusion-of-palestinian-reconciliation/.
[xxxv] Salhani, J. (2025). ‘What is the Trump plan for Gaza and will it work?’ Al Jazeera, 29 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/29/what-is-the-trump-plan-for-gaza-and-will-it-work.
[xxxvi] The Times of Israel (2025). ‘As more nations say they may recognize Palestine, hostages’ families pan move as “shameful”’, 30 July 2025, retrieved from: https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-more-nations-say-they-may-recognize-palestine-hostages-families-pan-move-as-shameful/.
[xxxvii] BBC News (2025). ‘Netanyahu calls Palestinian recognition “disgraceful”, as dozens walk out of UN speech’, BBC News, 26 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/cdxqe17njggt.
[xxxviii] Harb, A. (2025). ‘Five unanswered questions about Trump’s Gaza plan’, Al Jazeera, 29 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/29/five-unanswered-questions-about-trumps-gaza-plan.
[xxxix] Adams, P. (2025). ‘What does recognizing a Palestinian state mean? BBC News, 30 July 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvgp5z1vvj5o.
[xl] Harb (2025). ‘Gaza and Palestine were dominant themes at UN. Will it make a difference?’.
[xli] Shalev, T. and Karni, D. (2025). ‘Protesters in Israel demand hostage deal in one of the largest demonstrations since Gaza conflict began’, CNN World, 18 August 2025, retrieved from: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/17/middleeast/israel-protests-hostage-deal-gaza-intl.
[xlii] MSN (2025). ‘Which countries recognize Palestine as a state?’, 4 October 2025, retrieved from: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/netanyahu-calls-australia-s-pm-weak-over-palestinian-state-recognition/ss-AA1Jvx7U#image=4.
