On 26th July 2018, the Iranian Foreign Ministry launched a personal diatribe against then-Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the U.S. Prince Khaled bin Salman[i] in response to an article published by the ambassador in which he warned the Trump administration against falling for Iran’s top diplomat and chief nuclear negotiator, Mohammad Javad Zarif. At the time, Zarif promoted a narrative that Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was “disconnected from reality” and that the U.S. needed to bolster Iranian “moderates” so that they could take over power after his passing.[ii]
The Iranian response, which notably dismissed the allegation about the Ayatollah and Zarif as an attempt to erode “domestic cohesion,” came at a time when the U.S. was in the early stages of its “maximum pressure campaign,” following its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal—officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—in May 2018.
Iran’s sharp reaction to the Saudi Prince’s remarks coincided with a turning point in Iran-U.S. relations, as painstaking diplomatic efforts to engage the so-called “moderates” within the Iranian government were coming to an end and the country’s nuclear programme was beginning to deviate from the direction originally envisioned by the architects of the JCPOA. Although the Trump administration showed no interest in engaging with what came to be known as “The New York Gang”[iii]—a group of Iranian diplomats and officials working to patch up Iran-U.S. relations under President Hassan Rouhani—years of fierce factional politics, which had peaked during the negotiations leading up to the signing of the JCPOA, were already pushing Iran in the direction of nuclear escalation. While U.S. perceptions of Iran’s internal rivalries helped smooth the path for negotiations leading up to the JCPOA, internal rivalries in Iran significantly constrained the country’s prospects of transforming into a more compliant state. On the contrary, the overtures of Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif toward the Obama administration were met with mockery among their domestic rivals and distrust within Iran’s inner leadership circle. Pundits argue that domestic political jockeying and hardliner opposition significantly constrained the JCPOA’s durability.[iv] Some even suggest that the opponents of the JCPOA had both political and economic incentives to undermine the deal, particularly since Rouhani was viewed by some as a potential successor to Khamenei.[v] This article argues that factionalism in Iran, particularly surrounding the question of Khamenei’s succession, contributed to undermining the 2015 nuclear deal.
Rouhani’s political-nuclear vision: A critical moment that never came
Before the 2013 presidential election, Hassan Rouhani was hardly a popular figure, despite his long-standing role as a high-level security official. His overnight rise to the presidency was propelled by the political momentum that defined Iranian politics in the lead-up to the 2013 elections, particularly the unexpected disqualification of Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani[vi] and Ayatollah Khamenei’s earlier decision to de-escalate nuclear tensions with the West, which had reached a dangerous peak under hardliner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Soon after being elected president, Rouhani capitalized on Iran’s ongoing talks with the U.S. in Oman to advance both his patron, Hashemi Rafsanjani’s political agenda concerning Ayatollah Khamenei’s succession and his own nuclear vision for Iran, which, if realized, would have inevitably shaped Rafsanjani’s broader political strategy for the succession of Khamenei. In the final years of his life, Rafsanjani remained focused on the issue of succession, having grown disillusioned by his failure to moderate Khamenei’s policies both at home and abroad. His last political moves were almost all driven by a hope to strengthen his hand during the “critical moment” of Khamenei’s succession. “The only time the work of the Assembly of Experts becomes sensitive is when a new Supreme Leader is to be selected… For that critical moment, it is not necessary for me to be the chairman; it is enough to be a member of the Assembly of Experts,” he said in 2015 of his ability to influence succession deliberations at the body in charge of appointing a new supreme leader.[vii]
When Hashemi Rafsanjani made these remarks, Rouhani’s officials were in the midst of nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 in Vienna, privately pushing to include statements in the JCPOA intended to pave the way for future agreements on non-nuclear issues[viii] in the region, possibly without permission from the Supreme Leader. While Khamenei made it clear that the Iranian negotiators were authorized to negotiate only on the nuclear issue[ix], Rouhani and Zarif were insisting on making the JCPOA a stepping stone for more agreements with the West, according to then-EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini. “There is a reference—half of a sentence [in the JCPOA]—that says something like: this agreement could open the way, could put the basis for a different kind of engagement, a more constructive engagement in the region. And that sentence—here maybe I disclose a secret—was introduced on Iran’s request,” said a visibly frustrated Mogherini in late 2017,[x] amid President Trump’s push to abandon the nuclear deal. Following the signing of the JCPOA, Rouhani took a step further by calling for more JCPOA-style agreements to address other areas of contention with the West, notably Iran’s ballistic missile programme and its proxies in the Middle East. Khamenei and his hardline allies quickly lashed out at Rouhani, indicating that he was pushing for a strategic turnaround in Iranian foreign policy without getting Khamenei and his supporters on board.[xi]
Having fiercely advocated for détente with the West, Rouhani has long been accused by his rivals of “betraying” the ideals of the “Revolution.” Nevertheless, he had a strategic endgame in mind that was supposed to drastically transform Iran’s political landscape. Rouhani believed that the Japanese model in maintaining nuclear capabilities and peaceful relations with the West was in the best interests of Iran.[xii] More importantly, he seemed to believe that improving Iran’s relations with the West—and reaping the resulting economic benefits—would strengthen his own prospects of succeeding Khamenei, or at least ensure that a like-minded ally would assume the country’s top leadership position. This political undertone cast a long shadow over the JCPOA, with the leadership succession emerging as the ultimate prize tied to the deal’s success. It is no wonder that in 2016, when Rouhani was calling for more JCPOA-style deals with the West, the Guardian Council banned Seyed Hassan Khomeini, another protégé of Hashemi Rafsanjani, from running for a seat at the Assembly of Experts. A grandson of the first Supreme Leader with ties to the reformists, Hassan Khomenei was widely seen at the time as one of the potential successors to Khamenei. His disqualification was meant to serve as a pushback against anyone proposing changes to the clerical government following the nuclear deal.[xiii]
In a sense, the disqualification of Hassan Khomenei was an early response from Khamenei to the Rouhani-Hashemi multi-phased political agenda of which the JCPOA seemed to be only a small part. In the ensuing years, Khamenei vehemently purged reformists, contributing to the ultimate death of the JCPOA through barring any meaningful engagement with the three European signatories to the deal—France, Germany, and the UK—collectively known as the E3.[xiv]
The election of Donald Trump as U.S. President in 2016 further strengthened his mission to discredit proponents of engagement with the West, thereby reducing their chances of influencing the succession process. The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the deal in May 2018, along with its re-imposition of sanctions, substantially eroded the JCPOA’s economic benefits and undermined the foundations on which Rouhani had relied. Meanwhile, Khamenei remained largely passive toward European diplomatic efforts, particularly those led by France,[xv] to salvage the agreement. Ironically, President Trump kept referring to the “spirit” of the JCPOA—the implicit promise by Rouhani officials in the JCPOA to engage in follow-up, non-nuclear negotiations with the West–before quitting the deal.[xvi]
Throughout his second term, Rouhani was unable to pursue such negotiations, primarily due to Khamenei’s veto. Instead, he and Zarif scrambled to keep the JCPOA from collapsing entirely, only to be met with Khamenei’s passivity and Trump’s indifference. In many ways, the collapse of the JCPOA fulfilled what the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had sought from the very beginning: the termination of the deal and the discrediting—though not the outright elimination—of its domestic proponents.[xvii] The IRGC, wielding immense influence in Iran, had a vested interest in blocking any rivals from gaining popularity or legitimacy ahead of the anticipated succession crisis—particularly as Hashemi Rafsanjani had begun broaching the issue early on.
In early 2017, as Trump was preparing to torpedo the JCPOA, Hashemi Rafsanjani died in Tehran, without witnessing the “critical moment” of Khamenei’s succession that he had long anticipated. With his death, Rouhani and his New York Gang lost their biggest supporter vis-à-vis Khamenei and the IRGC.
The lost golden opportunity
The election of Joe Biden in 2020 presented a rare window of opportunity for Iran to revive the JCPOA and roll back Trump’s sanctions. However, it also marked the beginning of Iran’s substantial rollback of its commitments under the JCPOA, possibly with the purpose of building leverage in the expected talks with the U.S. Nevertheless, as more rounds of talks were held and progress was made[xviii], Iran’s internal factionalism impeded any nuclear breakthrough. “They [the Western parties] agreed to all our demands. Everything was ready. Then I said in the government, if they [internal rivals] let us, we would finish today—only one signature remained, to be signed by Iran’s chief negotiator, Mr. Araghchi. They [internal rivals] wouldn’t allow it so that Rouhani would be seen as unsuccessful,” Hassan Rouhani lamented after Iran lost the “golden opportunity” of the Biden administration.[xix]
Conclusion
Iran failed to revive the deal even after Rouhani was no longer in office, ultimately prompting the E3 to trigger the snapback mechanism on 28th August 2025[xx], a process that could lead to the restoration of all international sanctions on Iran.
Iran’s domestic politics—particularly the intertwining of Khamenei’s succession with high-stakes nuclear negotiations—contributed to setting the country on a path of confrontation with the West. The architects of the 2015 nuclear deal regarded it, at least in part, as a pathway to consolidating their future grip on power, prompting their powerful domestic rivals to scramble in defence of their status and privileges. These dynamics reduced decades of negotiations with Iran to little more than endless “talks for talks.” While this trend gradually fostered disappointment and frustration across many Western capitals, it contributed to the erosion of the political legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and its ruling class in the eyes of its own people, as internal rivalries weakened Iran’s capacity to alleviate economic pressures. At the end of the day, Rouhani had campaigned on a platform of improving Iran’s relations with the West and removing economic sanctions. Domestically, he presented the 2015 nuclear deal primarily as an economic achievement, in sharp contrast to its actual nature as an arms control agreement. Further chipping away at the legitimacy of the regime were Rouhani’s rivals who built their public messaging strategies against him on the economic failure of the JCPOA. They repeatedly accused the Rouhani administration of incompetence and ineptitude, further alienating large segments of the Iranian population that once had pinned their hopes on it.
In the West, however, the nuclear deal was primarily regarded as a security agreement. These divergent perceptions significantly deepened misunderstandings between Iran and the E3 after the U.S. withdrawal, as Iran argued that the exit stripped the deal of its economic substance while Europeans continued to view it as delivering on its security dividends—namely, restricting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Domestically, hardliners weaponized this misalignment to discredit Rouhani and his supporters, portraying them as naïve and inept.
In the meantime, Iran’s economic decline continued unabated, with the World Bank estimating that poverty affected more than one-third of Iranians, and projections indicating it could rise to 20 percent by 2025–2026.[xxi] Rouhani’s second term was marked by several waves of nationwide protests, where demonstrators chanted, “Reformists, Principlists, the game is over!”[xxii] Public disenchantment with the Islamic Republic culminated in the massive Woman, Life, Freedom protests that swept the country in 2022. Years of crippling sanctions, compounded by corruption and mismanagement, have exacted a severe toll on Iran’s economy, leaving the entire ruling class implicated as culpable.
Fierce factionalism concerning the succession of Khamenei severely undermined the domestic political legitimacy of the Islamic Republic, weakening its ability to make difficult decisions both at home and abroad. Once tied to high hopes of normalization, the collapse of the JCPOA has left the Islamic Republic politically and economically bankrupt—just as the critical moment of Khamenei’s succession looms on the horizon, amid intensified conflict with Israel and the West. The 12-day war between Iran and Israel, which transformed succession discussions from abstract speculation about the distant future into an urgent contingency plan for regime survival, appears to have produced one key change in leadership succession: the softening of Khamenei’s alleged opposition to his son Mojtaba succeeding him. According to a Reuters report, a three-member committee appointed by Khamenei selected Mojtaba as one of two key frontrunners for the top job.[xxiii] The other candidate is Hassan Khomeini, whose name could serve as a cover to justify the selection of a hereditary supreme leader. If true, the selection of Mojtaba—recently touted as the Iranian version of Mohammad bin Salman—[xxiv]would likely end the ambitions of regime moderates eyeing the top job in the theocracy.
[i] Deutsche Welle (2018). “Iran calls allegation by Saudi Ambassador to Washington regarding Zarif ‘absurd’”, DW, 26 July 2018, retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/fa-ir/iran/a-44829151.
[ii] Bin Salman, K. (2018). “Why Iran’s malign behavior must be confronted–– not appeased”, Arab News, 23 July 2018, retrieved from: https://www.arabnews.com/node/1343571.
[iii] Afshar, H. (2013). “Will Zarif Be Iran’s Next Nuclear Negotiator?”, IranWire, 7 August 2013, retrieved from: https://iranwire.com/en/politics/60064/.
[iv] Nader, A., Scotten, A. G. & Hoobler, J. (2017). “Iranian Domestic Challenges to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, Rand Corporation, 10 May 2017, retrieved from: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE218.html.
[v] Vaez, A. (2018). “Trump’s unintended allies in Iran: the hardliners”, Crisis Group, 28 June 2018, retrieved from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/iran-united-states/trumps-unintended-allies-iran-hardliners.
[vi] Amwaj Media (2021). “Ex-spy chief claims elimination of Rafsanjani from Iran’s 2013 elections”, Amwaj Media, 15 June 2018, retrieved from: https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/the-controversial-revelation-about-the-disqialificaiton-of-rafsanjani-in-2013-rac.
[vii] Shahram Rafizadeh (2015). “Hashemi: It’s not necessary for me to be the chairman of Experts at the critical moment’, 10 March 2015, retrieved from: https://www.radiofarda.com/a/f8-newspapers/26891302.html.
[viii] The Diplomatic Service of the European Union (2017). “Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the European Parliament plenary session on the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA)”, The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 12 December 2017, retrieved from: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/37259_en.
[ix] Khamenei’s Office (2015). ‘Leader’s Speech at the Holy Shrine of Imam Ridha (a.s.)”, website of Khamenei’s Office, 21 March 2015, retrieved from: https://english.khamenei.ir/news/2025/Leader-s-Speech-at-the-Holy-Shrine-of-Imam-Ridha-a-s.
[x] The Diplomatic Service of the European Union (2017). “Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the European Parliament plenary session on the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA)”, The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 12 December 2017, retrieved from: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/37259_en.
[xi] BBC Persian (2016), “The JCPOA II and III debate and criticism of Hassan Rouhani”, BBC Persian, 26 March 2016, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2016/03/160326_rouhani_barjam2.
[xii] Ensaf News (2021). “What was Japan’s nuclear strategy proposal to Rouhani?”, Ensaf News, 3 December 2021, retrieved from: https://ensafnews.com/318275/%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%B4%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-%DA%98%D8%A7%D9%BE%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86/.
|xiii] The Guardian (2016). “Reformer Hassan Khomeini barred from Iran clerical body ballot”, The Guardian, 26 January 2016, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/26/iran-reformer-hassan-khomeini-barred-assembly-experts-ballot.
[xiv] Wintour, P. (2020). “Purge of reformists in Iran election could doom nuclear deal, say diplomats”, The Guardian, 9 February 2020, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/09/purge-of-reformists-in-iran-election-could-doom-nuclear-deal-say-diplomats.
[xv] Bell, M., Vandoorne, S. & Master, J. (2018). “Macron and other European leaders pledge to salvage Iran deal”, CNN, 9 May 2018, retrieved from: https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/09/europe/iran-deal-macron-rouhani-intl.
[xvi] Reuters (2017). “Trump says Iran is violating ‘spirit’ of Iran nuclear deal”, Reuters, 14 September 2017, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/article/world/trump-says-iran-is-violating-spirit-of-iran-nuclear-deal-idUSKCN1BP2UZ/.
[xvii] Naji, K. (2021). “Iran’s Zarif criticizes Revolutionary Guards’ influence in leaked tape”, BBC, 26 April 2021, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-56889412.
[xviii] Motamedi, M. (2021). “Vienna talks on Iran’s nuclear deal conclude hopeful opening week”, Al Jazeera, 9 April 2021, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/9/vienna-talks-on-irans-nuclear-deal-conclude-hopeful-first-week.
[xix] Rouhani Hassan, (2025). “Dr. Rouhani: Let’s make use of the opportunity to negotiate / They didn’t allow an agreement so that Rouhani would be seen as unsuccessful! / In April 2021, only Araghchi’s signature remained for the agreement to be finalized”, Rouhani Hassan, 3 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.rouhanihassan.com/Fa/Video/115481/%D8%AF%DA%A9%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AF!-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%86-%DB%B1%DB%B4%DB%B0%DB%B0-%D9%81%D9%82%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%DA%86%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF.
[xx] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, (2025). “E3 joint statement on Iran: Initiation of the snapback process”, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 28 August 2025, retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/e3-joint-statement-on-iran-initiation-of-the-snapback-process.
[xxi] World Bank. (2025). “Islamic Republic of Iran Poverty and Equity Brief: April 2025 (English)”, World Bank Group, 30 April 2025, retrieved from: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099640404212584734.
[xxii] Azizi, H. & Veen, E. V. (2023). “Protests in Iran in comparative perspective: A revolutionary state in trouble”, Clingendael, March 2023, retrieved from: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/Protests_in_Iran.pdf.
[xxiii] Hafezi, P. (2025). “Succession plans for Iran’s Khamenei hit top gear”, Reuters, 23 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/succession-plans-irans-khamenei-hit-top-gear-2025-06-23/.
[xxiv] Sinaiee, M. (2025). “Succession debate flares after critic’s apparent backing of Khamenei’s son”, Iran International, 11 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.iranintl.com/en/202506115365
