The Shadow of the “Trigger Mechanism” over Iran

The trigger mechanism is a pressure tool from the European troika to return Iran to the negotiating table. Important factors have prevented renewed talks between Iran and the United States, including Tehran’s emphasis on continuing enrichment inside Iran, the U.S. and Israel’s insistence on zero uranium enrichment and the transfer of 408.6 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium outside Iran, as well as Iran’s opposition to the broader agenda of negotiations on missile capabilities and proxy groups in the Middle East. Israel’s 12-day war with Iran, as well as the United States’ attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, have exacerbated the climate of distrust between Tehran and Washington.

The attack on Iran took place in the middle of indirect negotiations between Iran and the United States. In this regard, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said that “they should explain why they attacked us in the middle of negotiations. They have to ensure that they are not going to repeat that (during future talks)”.[xi] In these circumstances, the “Trigger Mechanism” serves as a “Sword of Damocles” by the JCPOA’s European troika. In fact, Western parties hope that as economic problems intensify, Iran will be forced to return to the negotiating table and a new agreement will be reached between Iran and the United States.

After Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran was subject to unilateral U.S. sanctions. Sanctions on shipping and aviation were also imposed against Iran by the European Union, in the context of Tehran’s support for Moscow in the latter’s war in Ukraine. But reviving the trigger mechanism would put Iran back under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and Security Council sanctions. The return of Security Council sanctions could have a negative impact on Iran’s foreign trade with other non-Western countries, especially in the Middle East and Asia, and could reduce the volume of Iranian oil exports to China too. In such circumstances, a decline in the value of the rial against foreign currencies, especially the U.S. dollar, could lead to increased inflation, reduced purchasing power, and an increase in the budget deficit.

According to aforementioned threats and challenges, Iran has voiced strong opposition to the trigger mechanism, viewing it as “illegal” and “illegitimate”. In this regard, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, in response to the French Foreign Minister’s threat to activate the trigger mechanism, said: “From our perspective, this action would be equivalent to a military attack”.[xii] However, Iran continues to try to convince the European troika not to activate the trigger mechanism. In this regard, Iran and the European countries resumed negotiations on 25 July in Istanbul. The meeting was held at the level of deputy foreign ministers.[xiii]

It seems that these negotiations failed to bring about adequate results as the European troika told the United Nations on 13 August that they are prepared to reinstate sanctions on Iran, according to a joint letter.[xiv] Undoubtedly, Iran has a very difficult path ahead. On the one hand, relations between Tehran and the European JCPOA signatories have considerably deteriorated. Although Massimo Aparo, Deputy Director General of the IAEA and Head of the Department of Safeguards visited Iran on 11 August to discuss continuing cooperation between Iran and the agency,[xv] there is no clear sign of an agreement between Iran and the European troika to prevent the trigger mechanism at the end of August.

It seems that if the trigger mechanism is implemented, one of the most likely reactions from Iran could be to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Senior Iranian officials have warned against such a decision. For example, Amir Saeed Irvani, the Islamic Republic’s ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations, threatened the Security Council in a letter on 11 June that Tehran would withdraw from the NPT if the snapback mechanism is activated.[xvi]

The dangerous consequences of withdrawing from the NPT, could be intensifying the policy of “nuclear ambiguity” and even finalizing Iran’s withdrawal from the IAEA. If the fragile ceasefire between Iran and Israel continues, the European troika does not activate the trigger mechanism, and Iran and the United States reach an agreement, Iran could return to the status quo preceding the Israeli attacks.

The experience of the JCPOA indicates that reaching an agreement is possible in an atmosphere free of tension and threats, and based on mutual interests. Therefore, in a situation of uncertainty and extreme vulnerability, the coming months are very sensitive, and any decision to “escalate” or “de-escalate” the situation will depend on the actions and reactions of the parties involved. Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s minister of foreign affairs (2013-2021) who played a key role in negotiating the JCPOA agreement in 2015, in his recent article in Foreign Policy titled “The Time for a Paradigm Shift Is Now”, argued that “The United States and Europe — and not just Iran — have an existential interest to encourage the paradigm shift. By opting for war even as negotiations were underway, they have practically slammed the door on diplomacy. The onus is now on them to change course if they expect Iranian reciprocation. Iran, too, has much to gain — and immense hardship to avert — by engaging in a multidimensional, forward-looking, results-oriented dialogue. The path forward may include the formation of a regional network for nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation, coupled with a possible U.S.-Iran non-aggression pact”.[xvii]