The fall of the Assad dynasty coupled with the weakening of Iran has undermined Russia’s standing in the Middle East. Yet Moscow still retains enough tools to successfully reposition itself as seen in trade, investments, and political contacts it has developed with regional states.
Russia’s position in the Middle East is changing. All began with the war in Ukraine when Moscow was sanctioned by the West, and sought to redirect its trade and investment toward Asia and the Middle East, with notable benefits. Moscow’s relations with Iran have evolved to near strategic alignment, and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) has emerged as a powerful commercial route linking major Russian cities with the Persian Gulf and India further afield.
Yet, as the war in Ukraine grinds on into its fourth year, the demand on Russia’s military industrial complex has been high, and Moscow’s attention shifted more toward the wider Black Sea region. Perhaps this was one of the reasons why the fall of the Assad dynasty was so unexpected for Moscow. When the Syrian rebels’ lightning offensive accelerated in early December 2024 the Russian media portrayed the opposition as terrorists, but had to adjust the rhetoric in just a week when former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled the country, leaving the rebels behind as de-facto rulers.
Since then, the issue of Russian military and naval bases on Syria’s Mediterranean coast has remained unresolved. Negotiations seem to be progressing but with little results, despite Russian delegations visiting Damascus and even a phone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the new Syrian leadership having taken place.[i] Whether Russia manages to retain its military presence in Syria, the operational scope of its base is unlikely to match its Assad-era activism.
The loss of Syria stripped Moscow not only of one of its key allies in the Middle East, but also severed the link between Russia and the African continent, where Russian mercenaries have been actively engaged in both the economic and security spheres. For its operations in Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Mali, Russia often depended on access to its bases in Tartus and Khmeimim. The influence Russia held in Syria was also critical for balancing against Turkey, Moscow’s competitor in the region, and kept Iran’s ambitions in check. It also allowed Russia to position itself as a significant actor in the eyes of influential Arab states of the Persian Gulf who, fearing Iran’s overbearing ambitions, could rely on Moscow to serve as their own geopolitical balancer.
Simultaneously with the fall of Assad came Israel’s attacks on other members of Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ and the Islamic Republic itself. Russia has been actively engaged with separate members of the Axis from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen. Various media reports suggested that military contacts abounded, especially with the Houthis.[ii] The destabilization of Iran’s posture, however, represents the most consequential development for Russia’s own position in the Middle East.
Indeed, since the war in Ukraine broke out, Moscow’s reliance on Tehran has increased and manifested in growing military cooperation and general political alignment. The January signing of the comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement[iii] has further highlighted the strategic overlap between the two countries. Moreover, Iran’s bourgeoning nuclear program provided Russia with a certain geopolitical cushion–the Kremlin used its role in the UN in addition to its bilateral relations with Tehran as measures to pressure the West. Thus, a weakened Iran at the mercy of the US and Israel could also mean the irreversible loss of its nuclear capabilities, stripping Russia of its important leverage in its relations with Western powers.
The way forward for Russia in the Middle East
Russia’s posture in the Middle East has been transformed–its major partners and allies have been humbled. It is now very much in a transitory stage, adjusting to new challenges and opportunities on the ground. Despite the apparent setbacks, Russia’s position in the Middle East is far from being in decline, nonetheless. Moscow’s cooperation with the Arab world remains strong and has in fact increased over the past few years.
Engagement with Oman is evident following a meeting between President Putin and Sultan of Oman Haytham bin Tarek Al Said. The two sides also signed a memorandum of understanding in the transportation sector.[iv] Moscow has also expanded ties with Sudan, signalling the possibility of setting up a naval base in the region. Russia has special ties with the rulers of Qatar and the UAE. The former has vital economic interest in Russia[v] while the latter played a central role in facilitating the exchange of prisoners of war between Russia and Ukraine[vi] in the context of their ongoing war. Furthermore, emphasizing the deepening of ties, Russia will host the first Russia-Arab summit in October.[vii] Russia also remains an attractive source of weaponry across the Middle East[viii], even though its ability to export was severely constrained given the demands of the war in Ukraine.
Russia is repositioning itself in other parts of the MENA region too. As part of its push to maintain influence in the Mediterranean, Moscow has been active in the Maghreb. Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia are important for Russia as they can serve as a potential launchpad for power projection into the Sahel region and the rest of Africa. Russia appreciates the region’s economic potential and regards it as a tool to mitigate its commercial and investment shift away from the EU toward the countries of the Global South.
The importance of the Maghreb has increased for Russia following the fall of the Assad dynasty. Uncertainties around the continuity of Russian military presence in Syria pushed Moscow to look elsewhere. Libya has been regarded as one of the candidates where the relocation of Russian navy and troops could take place. Other Maghreb countries are wary of Russian military presence and are far more capable of limiting Russian power projection. They prefer multi-alignment by nourishing relations with China, the US, the EU and others. Morocco, for one, has been a staunch ally of the West.
Algeria and Libya have been more central to Russia’s Mediterranean ambitions. Russia’s relations with Algeria are primarily transactional. Political ties are expansive and the country actively buys Russian weaponry and is dependent on Russian grains. Yet, when it comes to potential deeper military cooperation, Algeria has constantly refused to grant rights to Russia to open a naval base in Oran.
Libya finds itself in a weaker position domestically, and Moscow therefore has greater room for manoeuvre here. The Libyan civil war drew Russia in and positioned it in a much favourable situation. Economic and military cooperation with the eastern-based Libyan government and its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, brought benefits. For instance, Russian forces continue to maintain access to key oil facilities and even some military bases in various parts of the country, which fall under Haftar’s control.
But this does not mean that Russia is only cooperating with the eastern-based Libyan government. In fact, over the past year Moscow reached out to the Tripoli-based government too. Russia has a diplomatic presence in Tripoli and has sought active commercial ties in the West of the country. Even though Haftar’s rule might soon be coming to an end (due to the leader’s advanced age), Russia is expected to pursue good ties with his likely successor, Saddam, the field marshal’s son.
Looking ahead, following the fall of the Assad dynasty, Moscow is working on reconstituting its position in the Middle East. It has been mostly successful given local countries’ push for multi-alignment which provides enough space for Russia to penetrate the region. Indeed, Middle Eastern countries seek alternatives to the US and pull in others for striking a delicate balance in foreign ties. Russia, then, is not out, especially amid early signs that the war in Ukraine might end with much more favourable conditions for Moscow than previously anticipated.
[i] Reuters (2025). ‘Russia’s Putin holds phone call with Syria’s Sharaa’, 12 February 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-putin-holds-phone-call-with-syrias-sharaa-2025-02-12/.
[ii] Suleymanov, R. (2025). ‘What does Russia Seek to Gain From the Conflict in Yemen?’, Carnegie Politika, 3 June 2025, retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/05/russia-interest-yemen-conflict?lang=en.
[iii] Al Jazeera (2025). ‘Russia and Iran presidents sign partnership treaty in Moscow’, 17 January 2025, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/17/russia-and-iran-presidents-sign-partnership-treaty-in-moscow.
[iv] Muscat Daily (2025). ‘Oman and Russia sign 11 pacts to boost trade, bilateral ties’, 22 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.muscatdaily.com/2025/04/22/oman-and-russia-sign-11-pacts-to-boost-trade-bilateral-ties/.
[v] Reuters (2025). ‘Russia and Qatar sign 2 billion euro investment deal’, 17 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/russia-qatar-sign-2-billion-euro-investment-deal-2025-04-17/.
[vi] Reuters (2025). ‘Russia and Ukraine exchange 205 prisoners of war each’, 6 May 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-exchange-205-prisoners-war-each-2025-05-06/.
[vii] Arab News (2025). ‘Putin to host first Russia-Arab summit in October, Russian agencies report’, 17 May 2025, retrieved from: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2601073/middle-east.
[viii] Borshchevskaya, A. Tavares, M. (2025). ‘Russia’s Defense Ties in the Middle East Poised to Rebound’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/russias-defense-ties-middle-east-poised-rebound.
