Iran’s Military Exercises, Nuclear Negotiations and the Regional Order

Beginning on 13^th June, Israel conducted airstrikes in Iran, targeting nuclear sites and assassinating the regime’s top military brass. Iran retaliated by firing KheibarShekan, Khorramshahr, Sejjil and Fatah missiles, which successfully penetrated Israeli air defences and hit their targets.[xvi] Iran also targeted the Israeli military, in addition to technological, economic and energy infrastructure.[xvii] Joining in on the war, President Trump ordered US attacks on Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan on 21 June, using the US’s largest bunker busters for the first time.[xviii] Trump has claimed that Iran’s nuclear capabilities were completely destroyed as a result. On 23^rd June, Iran responded to the unprecedented attacks on its soil with missile strikes on the US’s Al Udeid airbase in Qatar.

At the time of publication, a fragile ceasefire is in effect between Iran and Israel, apparently negotiated by President Trump, following Iran’s attacks on the Al Udeid base.

Iran has been hailed as the master of asymmetric warfare and proxy strategy. Its recent military exercises combined with the attacks on its soil might nonetheless indicate a shift in the regime’s military thinking. Based on previous reports, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei asked the defence apparatus to upgrade the reach of Iranian missiles–a move that was interpreted as Iran’s potential ambition to develop long range or even intercontinental ballistic missiles further.[xix] Similarly, Khamenei’s advisor and the former parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani also warned that in case of an attack, Iran might opt for nuclear weapons.[xx]

Despite President Trump’s claims of an overwhelming military success, it is unclear whether the regime managed to transport its enriched uranium stockpiles away from the primary sites attacked. The intelligence report also suggests that strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites did not dismantle its nuclear program.[xxi] In addition to this, even if such stockpiles have been destroyed, Iran’s know-how and, arguably, its determination to develop nuclear weapons cannot be fully eliminated. The Ayatollah’s hiding and the transition of the regime’s remaining leaders to non-digital means of communication suggest that Iran might opt for a level of secrecy and opaque operations never seen before. Leaving the proxy route behind, Iran might focus on developing military self-reliance and self-sufficiency with full steam.

The ceasefire notwithstanding, Iran might not return to the negotiating table either. While the counterstrike on the US base in Qatar was largely performative, it provided a semblance of retaliation in the eyes of the Iranian public. Agreeing to renewed negotiations with the US after the latter violated Iran’s sovereignty with its strikes would directly undermine this posture. Indirect negotiations (e.g. via Omani mediation) could still take place, but the US’s credibility as a party to the talks has mostly been undermined. In addition to this, military regrouping and rearmament could be pursued even in parallel with negotiations.

The latter point applies to Iran’s proxies too. The statement of Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Sheikh Naim Qassem, of supporting Iran against Israel could potentially be a signal of re-opening a front in the conflict at a later time.[xxii] Similarly, the Houthis of Yemen have threatened to attack US warships in the Red Sea.[xxiii]

Iran seems to be stepping into a new and uncertain chapter in its strategic thinking. With unprecedented attacks on its nuclear facilities, a weakening of its proxy network, and the emergence of advanced homegrown military technologies, it looks like Tehran is shifting away from depending on non-state actors. Instead, it is embracing a strategy focused on conventional deterrence and self-reliance in technology. The near future of the Middle East may not be dictated by diplomacy or efforts to ease tensions, but rather by displays of power and calculated defiance.