George Liska was absolutely right when he stated, “It’s impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances: the two often merge in all but names”[i]. Alliance dynamics lie at the heart of Middle East politics, as they have not only shaped the region’s geopolitical map but have also been shaped by it. Realist, constructivist, and socio-economic theorists each offer different perspectives; Realists view alliances primarily through the lens of power politics and the struggle for security, focusing on concepts like balancing power and balancing threat perception. Constructivists, by contrast, emphasize domestic variables, social structures, and identity. Similarly, scholars in the socio-economic tradition highlight the importance of domestic concerns and economic well-being.[ii]However, none of these classical paradigms alone can fully explain the complex nature and significance of alliances in the MENA region. Therefore, alliances should be analyzed through a multilayered theoretical approach, where high politics (security and power) interact with low politics (economic and domestic issues) in a dynamic and variable framework.
In this context, Syria represents a compelling case that illustrates how the interaction between different political dynamics influences alliances during war and peace time. A closer look at the Syrian scene reveals that alliances can either contribute to instability—exacerbating threats within an anarchic structure—or help foster a more stable and coherent regional order.
Alliances in Wartime Syria
Throughout the Syrian conflict, regional alliances were shaped primarily by efforts to contain perceived threats. However, because these alliances were grounded in shifting and often conflicting interests, they have also contributed to further destabilization within an already volatile security environment. For almost 14 years of war, alliances fluctuated rapidly and dramatically. Despite this fluidity, three major blocs came to dominate the conflict’s landscape. These are:
The Shiite Axis of Iran, Hezbollah and Assad
This alliance already existed before the Syrian war began and was deeply embedded in the Assads’ era. Prior to 2011, the alliance also included Hamas and was commonly referred to as Jabhat al-Muqawama w al-Mumana’a (the Resistance and Passive Resistance Front), and was dubbed by the West as the “Axis of Evil.” Hamas’s involvement significantly downplayed the sectarian nature of the alliance, framing it instead under a broader umbrella of anti-Western, anti-Israel, and pro-Palestinian movement.
However, with the onset of the Syrian uprising, Hamas refused to side with the Assad regime and opted to leave Damascus. This shift contributed to the alliance being increasingly perceived—and internally reinforced—as a Shiite coalition. Although the bloc was originally formed to counter external threats with the overarching goal of the regime’s survival, the shared sectarian identity of its primary actors—and their strategic manipulation of identity politics—has been largely responsible for the sectarianization of the Syrian conflict. From the very beginning of the uprising, even before it evolved into a full-scale civil war, sectarian symbols and narratives began to play a crucial role in shaping public perceptions. These dynamics not only reproduced everyday sectarianism but also helped frame the alliance as ideologically driven.
The Sunni Bloc, Erdogan and the Militant Opposition
This alliance can be seen as part of a broader regional struggle against the Shiite axis. However, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s motivations appear to be primarily driven by realpolitik—specifically, the desire to contain Kurdish influence and to elevate Turkey’s regional standing in the post–Arab Spring era. Nevertheless, religious identities and socio-structural factors have played a significant role in strengthening the alliance over the years and contributed to efforts aimed at overthrowing Assad.
Turkey, Russia, and Iran’s Complex Alliance
This trilateral alliance presents an excellent case for neorealist theorists. It illustrates how states can cooperate pragmatically to manage security dilemmas and balance mutual threats, even amid divergent interests. Unlike the Sunni bloc or the Shiite axis, the alliance of Turkey, Russia and Iran does not operate by instrumentalizing sectarian identity to assert power. Instead, it is grounded in strategic interests and the pursuit of influence. It formally emerged in 2017 with the Astana Summit, where Russia initiated more structured cooperation with Turkey and Iran. Despite backing opposing armed groups in the Syrian conflict, the three states found common ground.
For Russian President Vladimir Putin, the alliance serves several objectives: strengthening Russia’s influence in Syria, bringing various military actors under a Russian-led diplomatic framework, gaining legitimacy in the eyes of both Syrians and the international community, and marginalizing U.S. influence in the region. For Turkey, the alliance offers leverage against Kurdish forces, enhancing its role as a regional player. For Iran, it provides diplomatic recognition.
One of the most significant achievements of this alliance was the tentative ceasefire in Idlib province, brokered in March 2020. Despite some violations, the ceasefire held for nearly a year—demonstrating that cooperation, even among rival powers, can contribute to the de-escalation of conflict in the short term. However, this cooperation framework remains highly conditional and interest-driven. If any of the parties’ strategic goals in northern Syria shift, the alliance could easily unravel; as we have seen on 8th December 2024, when various rebel groups, with the support of Turkey, advanced toward Damascus, Russia did not intervene on behalf of the regime. Instead, all it offered Assad was a flight to Moscow.
Post-Assad Syria’s New Alliances
The dramatic and rapid fall of the Assad house triggered a seismic shift not only in the Syrian landscape but also across regional and international arenas, reshaping alliances. However, it was the broader geopolitical context—including the Russia–Ukraine war and the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon—that played a critical role in driving these shifts. Russia and Iran, the main actors supporting the Assad regime, suffered significant setbacks due to these ongoing wars. Hezbollah, Iran’s key proxy in Lebanon, was severely weakened. As a result, the Assad–Hezbollah–Iran alliance—which had been instrumental in keeping the regime afloat—effectively collapsed. Meanwhile, Russia’s military support for Assad diminished, strained by its war in Ukraine and a growing interest in using Syria as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the West.
Consequently, a new alliance began to emerge shortly after Assad’s collapse.
Saudi-Turkish alliance: Toward Constructive Cooperation
Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey have emerged as pivotal actors in Syria’s post-Assad landscape. Turkey played a critical role in bringing an end to the Assad era, politically and militarily, from the very beginning of the uprising that later escalated into a bloody conflict. It lobbied for international political support, and helped to form the Syrian National Army (SNA), composed of fighters from various groups. The SNA along with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led what was termed as “operation oppression deterrence”, which resulted in the collapse of Assad regime in less than two weeks . While Saudi Arabia is now instrumental in shaping post-Assad Syria’s future. Although these two countries previously supported different factions in Syria and had varying interests, their collaboration has become evident since December. Following Assad’s fall, both countries started working together to bolster the new leadership in Damascus through diplomatic and economic support. This strategic partnership between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, despite their past differences, underscores a shared interest in stabilizing and rebuilding Syria.
Trump’s America and the Historic Return to the MENA Region
Hunted by the legacy of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the American approach toward the Syrian conflict has remained largely consistent under different administrations of Presidents Obama, Biden, and Trump’s first term: avoiding direct involvement in Syria’s complex quagmire while focusing, in coordination with NATO and the Kurdish ally Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on the fight against ISIS. Such rhetoric has, over time, created space for both Russia and Turkey to assert their influence in Syria. However, this policy took a dramatic and unexpected turn in May when President Donald Trump announced the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria—some of which date back to 1979.[iii]
While speaking in Riyadh, Trump not only surprised Syrians, but reportedly caught members of his own cabinet off guard. He declared that the decision was made at the request of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), stating it is time to give Syria “a chance at greatness”.[iv]
The very next day, Trump met with Syrian interim president Ahamd Al-Sharaa—a former Jihadist who, less than six months ago, had a $10 million U.S. bounty on his head, and who, ironically, was arrested by American forces in Iraq twenty years ago in May 2005 for his ties to al-Qaeda.
Al-Sharaa met with Trump in the presence of MBS, while President Erdoğan joined the meeting virtually. But the question remains: Why now? And what are the implications for the United States, Syria, and the broader region? Lifting the sanctions all at once is not merely a gesture toward MBS, nor is it solely driven by economic interests. It represents a strategic move to legitimize Syria’s new leadership and reassert American influence in the region. The decision signals Washington’s intent to serve as a stabilizing force—not through military intervention, but through diplomacy and economic engagement. Trump underscored this point as he concluded his speech:
“With the help of the people of the Middle East and the people in this room, partners throughout the region, the golden age of the Middle East can proceed right alongside of us, will work together, we will be together, we will succeed together, we will win together, and we will always be friends.”[v]
The Trump administration had previously demanded the Syrian government to address key issues such as combating ISIS, expelling foreign fighters, and normalizing relations with Israel. However, none of these appear to have been set as preconditions for legitimizing al-Sharaa or for lifting sanctions. And thus, President Trump, as The Economist aptly put it, became “the unlikely Syrian hero”.[vi] Lifting sanctions will certainly have far-reaching effects—economically, socially, and politically. It could aid Syria’s reconstruction, reinforce the U.S. as a major player in the country, and potentially restore credibility that was lost during the war, especially following Obama’s unfulfilled commitments to certain red lines crossed by the Assad regime.
Conclusion
The American-British invasion of Iraq in 2003 had disastrous implications for Iraq and the broader region, contributed to sectarianization, radicalization, and polarization—particularly the emergence of a Shiite bloc versus a Sunni bloc, along with the radicalization of some Sunni groups into jihadist movements. These alliances, driven by sectarian and geopolitical rivalries, contributed to prolonged instability in the region.
Today, however, the resolution of the Syrian conflict in 2024 may signal a turning point. It appears to be profoundly transforming regional dynamics. Alliances are beginning to shift toward stabilization, and major powers seem more inclined to cooperate rather than confront one another. This could mark the beginning of a new regional order—one that offers a chance for a more peaceful and prosperous future for the region and its people.
In the midst of this geopolitical transformation, Syria may seem like a small piece of the puzzle. But for Syrians—who have endured five decades of authoritarian rule and 14 years of devastating war—this moment could be an opportunity to finally breathe. It is a critical time for leadership to seize the momentum and invest in genuine state-building and reconciliation.
[i] Liska, G. (1962). ‘Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, Baltimore, Md. Johns Hopkins University’, 3.
[ii] See Rayan, C.R. (2019). ‘Shifting theories and Shifting Alliances in the Middle East’, in POMPES Shifting Global Politics and the Middle East, March 2019.
[iii] A detailed list of sanction is available at https://www.state.gov/syria-sanctions/.
[iv] See Salhani, J. (2025). ‘Trump’s decision to lift Syria sanctions fuels dreams of economic revival’, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/5/16/trumps-decision-to-lift-syria-sanctions-fuels-dreams-of-economic-revival.
[v] Full speech is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5RINobmDCwU.
[vi] See ‘Trump’s decision to lift sanctions is a triumph for Syria’s president’, 14 May 2025, retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/05/14/trumps-decision-to-lift-sanctions-is-a-triumph-for-syrias-president.
