Why were the UAE and Saudi Arabia not at the Gaza summit’s table in Cairo?

The absence of the two Gulf states at the “emergency summit” may be the most significant thing about it.

On the morning after the Cairo “emergency summit” on Gaza, regional press was awash with positive reporting on the summit and the Arab League’s signing of an Egyptian plan for reconstruction, notable in Saudi and Emirati press.

Saudi’s Al Arabiya reported “categorical Arab rejection” of US President Donald Trump’s plan[i], while state-owned UAE newspaper Al-Ittihad described the meeting as “a unified Arab position to support Palestinian steadfastness”.[ii]

Why, then, did the two countries’ leaders fail to embody this unity by turning up for the conference? The answer seems to be three-fold: diplomatic relations with their US allies, issues with regional actors (including Hamas), and of course, money.

The Trump factor

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ) are two of Trump’s closest allies in the region, a longstanding relationship that precedes his first term, to at least the 1990s, especially with Saudi Arabia.

In the past, Saudi princes have bought superyachts and hotels from the president when he was less flush, and Trump has long owned significant real estate in the UAE.

The latter was one of the first Arab countries to sign the Abraham Accords at the end of Trump’s first term, normalising relations with Israel, a country they now rely on for a range of products, not least the highly-advanced spyware Pegasus.

The second time around, Trump’s first call after taking office was to the Saudi crown prince and he quickly announced a $20-billion investment in the US by Emirati businessmen.[iii] However, soon after the US leader told reporters at Davos that he was demanding Saudi Arabia “round up” its planned $600bn US investment, and lower oil prices.[iv]

Everyone knows the president is unpredictable, now with his possible green-lighting of the transfer of Palestinians out of Gaza into fragile surrounding states, Saudi and Emirati leaders may have seen it as wise not to personally partake in a conference symbolically designed to refute the plans of a man who does not take kindly to criticism, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy learned during his White House visit.[v]

Compound this with the possible attendance of Algeria and even the Palestinian Authority, and the invitation to Cairo looked even more unsavoury.

Regional tensions continue

Before the meeting even took place, tensions spilled out from behind closed doors into the public realm over the controversy surrounding a “mini summit” held on 21 February in Riyadh[vi], consisting only of Gulf Cooperation Council member states, alongside Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and King Abdullah of Jordan.

Algeria, which has long seen itself as the natural second home of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and Palestinian Authority and has been advocating for Palestinians on the UN Security Council angrily announced that President Abdelmadjid Tebboune would skip the summit, accusing Gulf countries – along with Egypt and Jordan – of making “the Palestinian cause … the exclusive right of a select few.”[vii]

Considering the timeline of the mini-summit and Egypt publishing its plan for Gaza, it seems likely that the Cairo summit was always going to serve more as a symbolic ratification of Arab unity that a serious discussion of Gaza’s future, which was confirmed privately by senior Arab diplomats and Saudi analysts with insider knowledge.

And then there is Hamas. While the 100-page draft document agreed on in Cairo sets out details of how the Gaza Strip can be physically rebuilt without the displacement of its people, there is very little of substance on who exactly will provide security and governance going forward or what will happen to Hamas.

Militia groups across Iran’s “axis of resistance” are generally made up of military and political wings. Hamas is no different. Their political bureau was until recently based in Doha, when they were reportedly kicked out due to US pressure.

Even those close to the Trump administration suggest that the continuation of a Hamas “politburo” outside of the Palestinian Territories would be palatable, but only if all military leaders disarm and be exiled from the territory. Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s policies are in line with this view – both have tried to crack down on what they see as Islamic extremism, notably from the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Hamas originates.

Especially when the US administration seems so uncompromising on Hamas, the two Gulf states were therefore hesitant to have their leaders present to endorse a plan that does not sufficiently deal with Hamas.

Money, money, money

Politics aside, the one thing that everyone can agree on is that rebuilding the Gaza Strip, where over 70% of buildings have been either destroyed or damaged, will cost money, and a lot of it: according to the Cairo plan, at least $53 bn.

However, the Cairo plan again returns to vagaries on who will provide these funds. The suggestion is that a large chunk would come from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. That would work out to around 3.5% of the combined GDPs of the two countries and is a drop in the ocean compared to Trump’s demand for $1 trillion of investment from Saudi Arabia.

Yet, the $53 bn for Gaza may not be seen as an investment, especially if the two cannot guarantee the disarmament of Hamas. Right or wrong, in their eyes, once they spent the billions on reconstruction, a new conflict between Hamas and an emboldened Israel could reduce it once again to rubble.

The two states are also staring down the barrel of low oil prices: around $70 per barrel – the lowest it has been since the unprecedented price collapse during the COVID-19 pandemic.

There are, in short, a panoply of reasons – political and economic – that two of the most important countries in the region chose to stay away from Cairo.

Formulating a plan to counter Trump’s controversial suggestions remains a significant milestone. Equally, the Cairo proposals are highly detailed in comparison to a seemingly spitballed plan by a US president less known for his attention to detail.

Nonetheless, the problem with Cairo was less about what was said, than what was not.