Russia’s strategic policies towards the Middle East can be characterised as largely relying on military intervention or presence, especially since 2015 when Moscow became involved in in the Syrian war. The Ukraine crisis has contributed to new approaches, including the need to seek alternative partners to overcome Western sanctions, and this has driven a strategy of economic statecraft towards regional players[i]. Recent events in the region, especially the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, have presented another turning point, signalling a shift towards diplomacy in Russia’s policy.
Since October 7, 2023, when Hamas and several other Palestinian nationalist groups launched coordinated armed incursions into Israel, Russia, which had previously balanced relations between Israelis and Palestinians, has changed its approach. Russian President Vladimir Putin started to make antisemitic comments, which he is not recorded as having done before, and began criticising Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu more starkly[ii]. Russia also moved swiftly to renew its relations with Hamas and other Palestinian political factions[iii]. The Kremlin has made attempts to mediate in the conflict, though not from a neutral standpoint. In June 2024, Putin condemned the fighting in Gaza as a “total destruction of the civilian population”, and suggested that Moscow could be a useful mediator in ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict[iv]. “Russia is trying to contribute to finding peace, as can the US, but the key role should be [left to] countries in the region”, Putin suggested, “including Turkey”[v]. Russia’s diplomatic approach can be understood as an attempt to exploit the US’ divisive domestic debate over Israel’s offensive in Gaza in order to “aggravate political tensions in the US, and tarnish Washington’s global image (to portray Washington as fuelling the violence)”[vi].
After the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, The Russian foreign office position was to “strongly condemn yet another political assassination committed by Israel. This military action is fraught with even greater dramatic consequences for Lebanon and the entire Middle East. […] Thus, it [Israel] bears full responsibility for the subsequent escalation”[vii], according to the Russians. Within a few days, the killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was seen as another “turning point”[viii]. As explained in an interview with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet on 1 November 2024, “[..] Russia has condemned Israel for killing political leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as high-ranking Iranian military officials” [ix]. Yet, Russia still stresses its desire for a diplomatic solution, believing that “the way to normalise the situation lies in halting the bloodshed and creating conditions for a political resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict based on universal international legal principles. This includes the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders”[x].
The adjustment of Russia’s strategies
Russia has had to find an alternative military partner, shifting its focus from the Middle East.
The wars in Gaza and Lebanon have contributed to reshaping Russia’s relations with its allies and partners, particularly with Iran, which has been one of its key military allies. Fiona Hill for Brookings explained[xi] that Russia is now engaged with Iran in two different conflicts, Ukraine and Israel/Gaza. “Obviously, this is in quite different ways, but the Russia/Iran relationship greatly complicates the situation in the Middle East, Israel, and Gaza, and the battlefield in Ukraine”. However, since escalation reached Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militia, and Iran itself, it seems there are new factors determining the partnership, as Iran must focus on its own political objectives and security concerns. Perhaps, it is not surprising that Russia has had to find an alternative military partner, shifting its focus from the Middle East. Reportedly, recently a “small number” of North Korean troops have been deployed to Russia’s Kursk region, as 12,000 have been trained at five grounds in eastern Russia, including 500 officers and three generals[xii].
Furthermore, the recent BRICS Summit, which took place on 22 October in Kazan, has expressed the aim to bring Middle Eastern actors into diplomatic efforts and finding a place for a “global majority”[xiii] in which Russia aims to have a leading role. The Kremlin has cast BRICS as a counterbalance to the Western-dominated global order and redoubled its efforts to court countries of the Global South since sending troops into Ukraine in February 2022. The recent summit has been seen as furthering efforts to build multipolarity in international relations. For example, as Putin stated: “This approach is especially relevant in the current conditions when truly radical changes are underway across the globe, including the shaping of a multipolar world”[xiv]. “A summit of the BRICS bloc of developing economies that the Kremlin hopes to turn into a rallying point for defying what some see as the Western liberal order. […] also offers a power way to demonstrate the failure of United States-led efforts to isolate Russia on the international stage over the 2022 invasion of Ukraine”[xv].
A Russian Middle East Strategy leading through global diplomacy?
The [BRICS] summit was an effective tool to further Russia’s diplomatic efforts with its Middle Eastern counterparts.
The BRICS Summit also expressed concerns over the ongoing war in the Middle East, stressing diplomatic solutions: “We express alarm over the situation in Southern Lebanon. We condemn the loss of civilian lives and the immense damage to civilian infrastructure resulting from attacks by Israel in residential areas in Lebanon and call for immediate cessation of military acts”[xvi]. 2024, the year that Russia chairs BRICS, has also became an effective part of its search for diplomatic solutions and advances, particularly since the new so-called BRICS+ format has involved newcomers joining the organisation, many of which are key Middle Eastern actors. BRICS already included Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, while Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are new signatories, spreading the global reach and influence of the group. Turkey, Malaysia and Azerbaijan have formally applied to become members[xvii]. As Valerie Hopkins and David Pierson of the New York Times stated, “President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, who arrived in the Russian city of Kazan on Wednesday, was the only leader of a NATO country to take part in the meetings…”[xviii], alarming Western observers.
The Summit was an effective tool to further Russia’s diplomatic efforts with its Middle Eastern counterparts. For example, Vladimir Putin met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, hailing “truly friendly” ties between Moscow and Tehran and noting that they should be further cemented by a “comprehensive strategic partnership treaty” to be signed during Pezeshkian’s planned trip to Moscow[xix]. Also, during the dinner for the delegations, Putin met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, who praised the ‘dynamic development’ of Moscow-Cairo relationships recently[xx]. The President of the UAE Mohamed bin Zayed shared that “This marks the UAE’s first participation in the summit as a full member of the BRICS group […]. Also, the UAE supports multilateral cooperation that fosters peace and development while strengthening collective action to address global challenges …”[xxi]. Another Gulf player, Saudi Arabia, was represented by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, on behalf of King Salman. Saudi Arabia has not officially joined the bloc, but participates in its activities as an invited nation[xxii]. For Saudi Arabia, the BRICS Summit has also become an important platform to share its position over events taking place in the Middle East with members of the Global South. “Turning to developments in the Middle East, Prince Faisal condemned Israel’s ongoing military actions in Gaza, warning that the continued escalation threatened both regional and international security”[xxiii]. The Saudi representative stressed peace efforts, such as its recent proposal for an International Alliance to conduct the two-State Solution initiative (based on 1967 borders and founding a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital)[xxiv]. Acknowledging it as a useful platform, the Saudi Foreign Minister praised BRICS states for their solidary over the Palestinian cause[xxv].
BRICS+ could shape a new world order, but it lacks shared values and a unified identity.
As an outcome of the Summit, Putin stated that a transformation towards “a multipolar world order”, had started, and that an “irreversible process” was underway[xxvi]. The Western world seems somewhat to acknowledge these new realities, with some reservations. Anthoni van Nieuwkerk believes “BRICS+ could shape a new world order, but it lacks shared values and a unified identity”[xxvii]. Meanwhile, Stewart Patrick for Carnegie stated that “With the addition of new members in BRICS+ (with mostly countries/representatives from the Middle East), the group of emerging powers will be more globally representative – but also face more internal divisions”[xxviii]. The BRICS Summit has also been seen as a challenger to Western-led international fora. “As the fortunes of the G7, G8 and G20 have waxed and waned over the past decade and a half, the BRICS coalition has depended on its efforts to challenge Western hegemony by pressing for global governance reform, creating parallel multilateral institutions to compete with established ones, contesting the role of the dollar, and seeking to reduce US leverage over the sinews of the world economy”[xxix].
Conclusion
To sum up, it appears that recent events in the Middle East and the ongoing war in Ukraine have contributed to Russia’s increasing reliance on diplomatic efforts, as the a to the Middle East. Soft power has proved an effective instrument despite the war in Ukraine, and was accompanied by certain shifts in military allies from the Middle East (Iran) to Asia (North Korea). Regional players aiming to continue balancing relations with the West, and the Western active approach towards the war in Gaza and Lebanon, have challenged Russia’s standing in the Middle East, which it has been developing since 2015. Russia’s efforts and focus have turned towards developing the “global majority” concept, with its own leading place within an emerging bloc, and treating with other countries as part of this approach, rather than building “pointed” policies with specific Middle Eastern countries. Russia’s standing might be degraded in the middle run, at least in terms of the previous regional order, where Russia might have been expected to fill the vacuum left by retreating Western presence in the region, but the demands of the Ukraine war has reduced its capacity. It remains to be seen whether its more diffused diplomatic efforts will foster greater rewards in the longer term.
[i] Galeeva, D. (2024) “Economic Statecraft and its Role in Russia-UAE Relations”, Gulf International Forum, retrieved from: https://gulfif.org/economic-statecraft-and-its-role-in-russia-uae-relations/
[ii] Hill, F. and Huggard, K. (2024) “What is Russia’s role in the Israel-Gaza crisis?”, Brookings, 31 January 2024, retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-russias-role-in-the-israel-gaza-crisis/
[iii]Ibid.
[iv] The Times of Israel (2024), “Putin says Gaza conflict not a war but ‘total destruction of civilian population’”, 6 June 2024, retrieved from: https://www.timesofisrael.com/putin-says-gaza-conflict-not-a-war-but-total-destruction-of-civilian-population/
[v] Ibid.
[vi] De Luce, D. (2024) “Russia is trying to exploit America’s divisions over the war in Gaza”, 1 May 2024, retried from: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/russia-trying-exploit-americas-divisions-war-gaza-rcna149759
[vii] Mid.ru (2024), “Foreign Ministry’s statement regarding the assassination of Secretary-General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah”, 28 September 2024, retrieved from: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1972590/?TSPD_101_R0=08765fb817ab20004e568b2702dd45710394cb05a088e05b620ad22e3bbd8fe4cf14da57f8e1fc7a088f31afd814300087356f3245c9fc680b066a640bf9781969ec1c4c87774ac3886a57f4c7386eba55ba81efec73b1f87e9e12f97a8b6084
[viii] Magdy, S., Franekl, J. and Krauss, J. (2024) “Isreal fights a seemingly endless war in Gaza’s most devastated region”, 1 November 2024, retrieved from: https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-northern-gaza-displacement-aid-20628253b26a2bdcf3c844850f20da38
[ix] Mid.ru (2024) Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, November 1, 2024”, 01 November 2024, retrieved from: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1978685/?lang=en
[x]Ibid.
[xi] Hill, F. and Huggard, K. (2024) “What is Russia’s role in the Israel-Gaza crisis?”, Brookings, 31 January 2024, retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-russias-role-in-the-israel-gaza-crisis/
[xii] Dunlop, W.G. (2024) “US, S. Korea Call for North to Withdraw Troops from Russia”, 30 October 2024, retrieved from: https://www.barrons.com/news/us-s-korea-call-for-north-to-withdraw-troops-from-russia-5d75b903
[xiii] Associated Press (2024) “Putin hosts BRICS summit and Global South leaders with financial cooperation and expansion on agenda”, 23 October 2024, retrieved from: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/putin-hosts-brics-summit-and-global-south-leaders-with-financial-cooperation-and-expansion-on-agenda
[xiv] Ibid.
[xv] Al Jazeera (2024) “Russia’s Putin welcomes world leaders for three-day BRICS summit”, 22 October 2024, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/22/russias-putin-welcomes-world-leaders-for-three-day-brics-summit
[xvi] Reuters (2024) “BRICS summit: Key takeaways from the Kazan declaration”, 24 October 2024, retrieved from:
https://www.reuters.com/world/factobox-main-points-brics-declaration-2024-10-23/
[xvii] AP (2024) “Putin hosts Global South leaders at BRICS summit meant to counterbalance Western clout”, 23 October 2024, retrieved from: https://apnews.com/article/russia-brics-summit-china-india-ukraine-war-39e90fce8443b922f4d224c65c2ec932
[xviii] Hopkins, V. and Pierson, D. (2024) “At Putin-Hosted Summit, One Guest Stood Out: Erdogan”, 23 October 2024, retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/23/world/europe/putin-brics-summit-russia-nato-turkey.html
[xix] Associated Press (2024) “Putin hosts BRICS summit and Global South leaders with financial cooperation and expansion on agenda”, 23 October 2024, retrieved from: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/putin-hosts-brics-summit-and-global-south-leaders-with-financial-cooperation-and-expansion-on-agenda
[xx] Ibid.
[xxi] Gulf News (2024) “Watch: UAE President attends BRICS Summit inaugurated by Russian President in Kazan”, 23 October 2024, retrieved from: https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/watch-uae-president-attends-brics-summit-inaugurated-by-russian-president-in-kazan-1.104457707
[xxii] Arab News (2024) “Saudi foreign minister commits to BRICS cooperation at Kazan summit”, 24 October 2024, retrieved from: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2576648/saudi-arabia
[xxiii] Ibid.
[xxiv] Ibid.
[xxv] Ibid.
[xxvi] Hopkins, V. and Pierson, D. (2024) “At Putin-Hosted Summit, One Guest Stood Out: Erdogan”, 23 October 2024, retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/23/world/europe/putin-brics-summit-russia-nato-turkey.html
[xxvii] Rubiera, C. L. (2024) “Brics+ could shape a new world order, but it lacks shared values and a unified identity”, 29 October 2024, retrieved from: https://theconversation.com/brics-could-shape-a-new-world-order-but-it-lacks-shared-values-and-a-unified-identity-242308
[xxviii] Carnegie (2024) “BRICS Expansion, the G20, and the Future of World Order”, 9 October 2024, retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/brics-summit-emerging-middle-powers-g7-g20?lang=en
[xxix] Ibid.
