Rethinking the EU’s actorness in the Red Sea

In the wake of the Israel-Hamas war, Houhtis rebels in Yemen—supported by Iran and having proclaimed to support Palestinians’ plight—launched more than 40 attacks on commercial vessels navigating the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.[i] Due to these attacks, only half of the usual 70 ships that usually pass through the Red Sea daily actually cross the Suez Canal.[ii] Houthi missile attacks and other disruptive activities in the region go back years,[iii] but the approach to Iran and its destabilising activities via the Houthis has been lukewarm^[iv]. EUNAVFOR Operation ASPIDES—launched on 19^th February—has been the first EU initiative to break with this trend. The defensive operation has repelled 11 attacks by the Houthis and safely escorted dozens of ships towards the Suez Canal.[v] Notwithstanding, a more proactive security approach is necessary for the EU to protect international maritime trade and its own commercial interests in the long term.

Two regional strategies

Pinning hopes for sustained regional security on continued diplomatic negotiations with Iran, which do not contextualise Iran’s destabilising activities^[vi] adequately,^[vii] seems to be increasingly out of touch with the reality on the ground.^[viii] The EU’s short-sightedness is epitomised by its stance on Iran,^[ix] including EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph Borrell’s continued insistence on reviving the nuclear deal[x], in addition to Spain’s refusal to divert the EU’s anti-piracy naval mission, ATALANTA, in order to increase deterrence power. ASPIDES implicitly accepts that the use of force is, after all, necessary, as is the repelling of attacks by the French and Italian navies.

While Operation Prosperity Guardian—a United States-led military coalition formed in December 2023 in response to Houthi attacks, seems to prioritise the need to strike into Yemeni territory to undermine Houthis’ source of political power[xi]—the all-defensive EU mission aims to avoid intervening in the region to ward off Houthi attacks^[xii] as well as Iran’s gunboat diplomacy.^[xiii] The EU’s limited regional initiatives^[xiv] appear not to have produced any effective deterrent while its diplomatic relations with Gulf countries^[xv] did not lead to a political resolution. This degree of indecisiveness risks allowing the Houthis’ to strengthen their arsenal with Iran’s support^[xvi].

At the same time, the EU refuses to upgrade its the relations^[xvii] with Israel from an ad hoc economic and trade relationship to a fully-fledged diplomatic, political and security partnership so as not to alienate Iran. Divisions between NATO and EU members on how to treat Israel prevent a synchronised position and counter-action, ^[xviii] significantly limiting the EU’s actorness in the matter.

The two military operations entail the duality of aims and methods, and the dispersal of resources at the expense of potentially more effective, joint involvement. This displays the EU’s reluctance to respond to very tangible security challenges, undermining any perception of genuine deterrence.^[xix]

A common regional strategy

The EU should strive to support the US and its allies in mitigating the complex sources of risk that the coordination between militias in the region presents^[xx]. Designating the Houthis as a terrorist organisation would be the first step in this.^[xxi] Long-term planning for stability in the region would, however, also necessitate recognizing that the Houthis’ objectives as an increasingly independent political force in Yemen might ultimately succeed in establishing authority over the country, joining an explicitly anti-western axis of states and rogue militias in the region. The EU should change its rules of engagement that legitimise the Houthis’ political aspirations. Tying the all-defensive ASPIDES mission to the US-led Prosperity Guardian operation would also show commitment to the US that the EU is willing to take part in bearing the burden of upholding international security.

Returning to the negotiating table to build on already promising initiatives aimed at building a regional self-sustaining security infrastructure would indeed be a proactive approach. Frameworks such as the The EU should respond to calls to designate the Houthis as a terrorist organisation the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor deal^[xxii], and the International Maritime Security Construct^[xxiii] and the Abraham Accords should serve as a springboard for facilitating politico-economic and security cooperation between Western countries and Middle Eastern states. The already proposed “Arab NATO” plan^[xxiv], capable of creating tangible guarantees^[xxv] among regional partners, could be an effective way of deterring or resolving security threats in the long term.

By declaring support for the aspirations of the Abraham Accords agreements, the EU could participate in building a set of tools and mechanisms in the Middle East aimed at curbing terrorism and other security threats.^[xxvi] Falling short of building closer ties with Israel, paving the way towards this outcome would greatly benefit from at least engaging more closely with Gulf states. With regard to the question of Houthis in Yemen—but also with regard to broader, regional security threats—the EU should support the Saudi-backed and internationally recognised government of Yemen, and level sanctions targeting the Iranian and Houthis military industry, as well as Iranian support for a plethora of militant groups in the region^[xxvii]. It should cement deeper political ties with Gulf states as well as Israel if it hopes to be a part of joint regional initiatives also backed by the US.

The EU and its Western partners’ division over Iran, Israel, and the degree and means of involvement in Yemen^[xxviii] will continue to undermine the effectiveness of security operations and the restoration of smooth trade in the region. So long as the EU is structurally bound to defence-only missions, pinning their hopes on negotiations with Iran and the Houthis alone, the situation is unlikely to improve.

The Red Sea crisis is the consequence of a series of geopolitical events and policy decisions, including the collapse of the legitimate Yemeni government, the Houthis’ rebellion and civil war, Iran’s long-term regional destabilisation efforts via its proxies, and the continued lack of a broad coalition of Western countries, Gulf monarchies, Israel, and other willing partners united in ensuring stability in the region. Reactive and limited policies, and, indeed, inaction might soon prove to be an unsustainable approach for the EU.