Can the West Circumvent the Iranian Regime’s Ultimate Monopoly of the Internet?

Although Iran is not the only state to exercise this tactic of internet blackouts to control dissent, the economic sanctions placed on the country by the US, and more broadly the West, actually put the regime in a privileged position to enforce a more successful internet shutdown than other countries. Due to the sanctions preventing[x] Western tech companies from investing in the country’s digital infrastructure, the Iranian state effectively possesses a sole monopoly on digital information services. Unlike other countries, which rely on Western tech institutions, and the transnational nature of digital infrastructure, the centralised control afforded to the Iranian regime amplifies the effects of government enforced internet blackouts and undermines the power of the West in the region. As a result, the Iranian regime is able to completely remove international internet traffic from the equation by creating an effectively isolated ‘national internet.’[xi]

During the civil protests in Iran in 2019, initiated as a response to public outrage against rising prices of gasoline, approximately[xii] 1,500 protesters were killed by government forces and a further 4,000 were injured. In order to undermine international visibility and information transmission, the Iranian regime enacted an enforced internet blackout across regions of the country for a period of 4-6 days[xiii]. In a similar fashion, in late September of 2022, there were  reports[xiv] of mobile internet access being shut down across the country, as well as restricted access to Instagram and WhatsApp as a government response to the ongoing civil protests. (Other social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter were already banned by the regime.)

Beyond this, the Iranian regime is currently in the process of enacting a new bill [xv] which would extend the state’s powers in restricting internet access by criminalising VPNs and transferring the control of the internet from the civil government to the armed forces. This attempted militarisation of the internet, in congruence with the isolated nature of the Iranian digital infrastructure, puts the population at the complete mercy of the regime.

Circumventing the Regime’s Internet Monopoly

On 24 September, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced[xvi] a relaxation on sanctions to help facilitate the introduction of Western tech into Iran in an attempt to alleviate the digital isolation enforced by the regime. This paved the way for the introduction[xvii] of non-state actor Elon Musk’s Starlink technology into the fold. Starlink technology utilises low-orbiting satellites which interact with rooftop receivers to provide an alternative internet to the state-governed provider. In theory, this would allow the Iranian people to access internet from outside of the regime’s strict controls and enable the dissemination of information both into and out of the country. Although reports[xviii] have surfaced of smugglers attempting to integrate the compact rooftop receivers into Iran, the main problem facing the successful implementation of this is the dangers posed by the regime’s strict surveillance. In order for this method to succeed, the on-the-ground technology would need to remain undetected. This would prove an extremely difficult and complex operation, which many reports[xix] deem highly unlikely to succeed, especially through a civilian operation.

While Starlink was recently successfully implemented in Ukraine[xx] to bypass similar Russian controls in the ongoing conflict, the skyrocketing prices[xxi] of Starlink’s providers in war-torn Ukraine suggest the limitations to the long-term relief that this solution actually provides for economically downtrodden nations. The question then arises: Even if Starlink’s rooftop receivers are able to be successfully smuggled into Iran, is it a viable solution for such an economically destitute population? If the reports from Ukraine are any indication, the answer is no. Furthermore, the political circumstances surrounding Ukraine and Iran, and the states’ subsequent reception of such technology, are very different. Whilst Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky welcomed[xxii] the introduction of Starlink technology to alleviate the internet suppression enforced upon Ukrainians by Putin, the Iranian regime will apply force and actively sabotage on-the-ground implementation of rooftop receptors in Iran. This factor, along with the problem of cost, should not be underestimated.