Iraq’s Geopolitical Tightrope: Balancing Iran, Turkey, and US Pressures

Since October 7, Iran and its allies have leveraged the Gaza conflict to push for US troop withdrawal. Iranian-backed militias have carried out no fewer than 70 attacks on US forces in Iraq.[ix] Militia groups have received substantial support from Iran[x], including funding, weapons, and guidance from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps – Quds Force (IRGC-QF), though it remains unclear if Tehran has orchestrated their attacks on US troops. The escalation in rocket and other attacks on US military personnel by Iran and its Axis of Resistance partners has been met with periodic US retaliatory strikes.[xi]

Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani — whose efforts to balance Iraq’s relations with both Iran and Turkey are mirrored by his government’s attempts to navigate a balanced relationship between Iran and the US — has come under mounting domestic political pressure to distance himself from the US and its Western partners. The Israel-Hamas war and the US strikes in Iraq likely made it more politically difficult for Sudani to back the continued American military presence. In response to the pressure, the Iraqi and U.S. governments established the Higher Military Commission (HMC) in January 2024[xii] to assess Iraq’s future security requirements and adjust international security support accordingly.

In April, during his week-long visit to Washington, Sudani outlined a vision for a comprehensive “360-degree strategic partnership” with the US[xiii], anchored in the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) which encompasses cooperation in various fields. It is noteworthy that the Coordination Framework (CF), which comprises militia groups sanctioned by the US, while endorsing the visit, nonetheless demanded a more explicit commitment to the removal of American troops.[xiv] It is also telling that on the eve of Sudani’s visit to Washington, Iran launched over 300 armed drones and missiles at Israel[xv], many of which passed through Iraqi airspace, underscoring Iraq’s security vulnerabilities.

At the conclusion of Sudani’s visit, the joint statement[xvi] emphasized the commitment of both sides to continue working together on a shared vision for a comprehensive and effective partnership to pursue common objectives. The next month, the US joined with other members of the UN Security Council in unanimously approving a request by the Iraqi government to end the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) by 2025[xvii]—an outcome Iraq framed as an affirmation of the maturity and competence of its own governing institutions.[xviii]

Nevertheless, the dynamic between Iraq and United States is complicated by the financial networks and intelligence links that exist between Iraq and Iran. American officials have raised concerns about Iraqi banks funneling dollars to Iran[xix], helping the country evade sanctions. A belated crackdown by the US Treasury has exposed how Iran-backed militias and private banks have exploited access to US dollars[xx] to fund the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Kataib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), among others. Meanwhile, Sudani’s government has purged many key US-trusted Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) officers and replaced them with agents from Iran-backed militias, leading to what has been described as “Iran-backed state capture” of Iraq’s intelligence apparatus.[xxi]

As reported by Reuters, talks between Iraq and the US have led to a tentative agreement to withdraw American forces by the end of 2026[xxii], with plans to establish a new advisory relationship.[xxiii] The withdrawal plan reportedly includes a small residual force in Kurdistan to provide a security guarantee for Iraqi Kurds against the Iranian-backed militia groups.[xxiv] For Iran and its allies in Iraq’s government, the prospective departure of US troops is undoubtedly viewed as an opportunity to consolidate power.

President Masoud Pezeshkian’s September visit to Iraq coincided with the Sudani government’s progress on aligning with Iran’s goals[xxv], including negotiating the exit of US troops. The visit, amid rising regional tensions and fresh Western sanctions imposed on Iran[xxvi] for providing Russia with short-range missiles for use against Ukraine, underscored Tehran’s commitment to strengthening its strategic alliance with Iraq. It also underscored the tightrope the Sudani government walks in managing its complex ties with both Iran and the United States.

The Persistent Terrorist Threat

The US withdrawal of its remaining troops from Iraq is a priority for Prime Minister Sudani[xxvii], who in January was quoted as saying that the withdrawal of US troops is “crucial for Iraq’s security and stability.”[xxviii] However, just a year earlier, Sudani had expressed concern over the terrorist threat from Syria, where ISIS remains active, telling the Wall Street Journal that “we need the foreign forces.”[xxix] Sudani’s remarks invite the question: have the security threats facing Iraq truly diminished, and is the country adequately prepared to repel them?

Over the past 18 months, Iraq’s relations with both Iran and Turkey have improved, particularly regarding border security and the management of Kurdish affairs. In March 2023, Baghdad and Tehran reached agreement on border security focused primarily on disarming members of Iranian Kurdish dissident groups based in northern Iraq and preventing them from entering Iran from northern Iraq. A few months later, Iraq began relocating these groups to camps farther inland[xxx], in line with the security pact, though Tehran continued to demand that Baghdad extradite Iranian Kurdish leaders.[xxxi]

This past March, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made his first visit to Iraq in over a decade[xxxii], resulting in a “strategic framework agreement” centered on security, energy, water, and trade. Iraq’s National Security Council later acquiesced to Turkey’s longstanding demand to ban the PKK[xxxiii], though it stopped short of declaring the group a terrorist organization. The two countries also reached an agreement granting Turkish forces permission to carry out military operations against the PKK deep inside Iraqi territory in exchange for increased water flow from Turkey.[xxxiv]