On 17 July 2025, Qatar announced that its mediation efforts successfully reunited fourteen children – 11 Ukrainians and 3 Russians – with their families after they were separated due to the Russia-Ukraine war. This reunification represents the most recent diplomatic effort in a long series of negotiations led by Qatari diplomats since the war began, which resulted in the reunification of a total of 100 children with their families.[i] The latest stands out as a quiet but remarkable achievement in a conflict where direct talks between Moscow and Kyiv remain scarce.
Throughout the war, Qatar has moved steadily into a role few expected it to play. With traditional intermediaries largely absent, Doha has carved out space for itself, building on its ties with both Russia and Ukraine to act as a go‑between player. Qatar’s capacity to deliver tangible results has given the Gulf state a reputation as one of the few actors able to deliver, even during a stalemate.
While U.S. President Donald Trump has signaled interest in reopening dialogue with Moscow and direct peace talks between Russia and Ukraine are gradually gaining momentum[ii], those efforts are still tentative and hampered by a severe deficit of trust. This means that third-party intermediaries are poised to continue playing a crucial role in the ongoing conflict.
From Qatar’s early visits to quiet negotiations
Qatar’s involvement in the conflict began soon after the Russian offensive started. In March 2022, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al‑Thani, Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, visited Moscow to meet his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov.[iii] While the encounter did not formally designate Doha as a mediator, it likely laid the foundations for Qatari diplomacy.
Since then, Qatari diplomats maintained close contact with both Moscow and Kyiv, cultivating bilateral engagement when communication channels with most countries were closed on the issue. The pace of diplomatic interactions quickened in the summer of 2023. Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow that June, holding discussions on food security and energy cooperation.[iv] A month later, he also traveled to Kyiv for talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal.[v] Official readouts spoke of humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and joint working groups. What they did not mention was the sensitive issue of the repatriation of children.
Most likely, the omission was intentional, given the delicate nature of the matter. Notably, in July 2023, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights (UPCHR), Dmytro Lubinets, traveled to Doha to finalize the outlines of a family reunification programme spearheaded by Qatar.[vi] Around the same time, Maria Lvova‑Belova, Russia’s Commissioner for Children’s Rights, held discussions with Qatar’s ambassador in Moscow.[vii] The dual track was the beginning of a sustained Qatari role in family reunification negotiations. Since October 2023, Qatar has successfully contributed to finalizing ten separate repatriation agreements.
By July 2024, the Qatari mediation efforts had become visible enough for public acknowledgment. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, President Putin praised Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani directly, crediting Qatari mediation for making family reunifications possible.[viii]
A mediation style of its own
Qatar’s role has been less about dictating terms and more about keeping the machinery of diplomatic engagement running. Lists, documents, and draft agreements were passed through Qatari hands when Moscow and Kyiv could not, or would not, talk directly.
Notably, Doha also offered incentives to keep the process moving. Volunteering to cover the costs of repatriation was a prime example of the measures put forward by Doha to reduce procedural obstacles that could potentially hinder a breakthrough in negotiations.[ix]
Moreover, in April 2024, Qatar committed $3 million to Ukraine’s Ombudsman office. Among key humanitarian initiatives, these funds are aimed at setting up the complex humanitarian infrastructure necessary to run the reunification program, including the establishment and support of monitoring experts and regional offices to map abducted children and families.[x]
The same month, Qatar launched the Rehabilitation and Recovery Program in Doha, an initiative specifically designed to offer children and their families’ access to comprehensive medical care and psychosocial support following reunification, through short-term stays in the Qatari capital.[xi]
Why Qatar engages
For Doha, the motivation to mediate is multi-layered, with several independent factors contributing to it. In this regard, maintaining – and possibly expanding further – the country’s humanitarian credibility plays a significant part in Doha’s quest to consolidate its international standing in the field of mediation. This is because Qatar has spent years integrating humanitarian diplomacy in its foreign policy approach, cultivating a strong reputation as a generous donor to global relief efforts.[xii] Since 2020, Doha has allocated $4.8 billion in foreign aid, with roughly 90 percent going to the least developed countries.[xiii] The Qatar Fund for Development and Qatar Charity serve as the primary tools to implement the country’s humanitarian policy, which covers a broad area ranging from urgent emergency relief to healthcare and educational projects, as well as economic development.
Nonetheless, Qatar’s involvement in mediation diplomacy also has geopolitical and pragmatic origins. By acting as a trusted intermediary, Doha aims to strengthen its security in the international system, build political influence abroad, and consolidate the government’s reputation at home. Positioning itself as a reliable mediator allows Qatar to maintain solid working relationships and preferential diplomatic ties with both conflicting parties, as well as with the United States and European countries, which hold significant stakes in the conflict’s peaceful resolution. This is a delicate balancing act for larger powers, but a strategic niche for Doha, which seeks to offset the vulnerabilities inherent in its small state status by making itself vital to conflict resolution and cultivating strong relations with a wide range of countries. Indeed, each successful mediation not only enhances its international standing, but also builds political capital with countries that have a vested interest in de-escalating the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
A broader pattern
Notably, Qatar’s mediation diplomacy in the Russia-Ukraine war is not an isolated case, as Doha has increasingly played similar roles in the Middle East and beyond over the past 30 years. There is a consensus among scholars that the pursuit of prestige, security, and the burnishing of its global image have laid behind this activism.[xiv] Since the mid-1990s, Qatar has steadily made mediation a cornerstone of its foreign policy, even incorporating it as a moral principle in the 2003 Constitution.[xv]
By the late 2000s, Doha had built a reputation as a credible go‑between in conflicts spanning Sudan, Yemen, and Lebanon. A widespread perception of neutrality, extensive economic resources, and a leader‑centric mediation style gave Qatar unusual leverage, turning the small Gulf country into the mediator of choice in the Middle East. However, the very factors that helped Qatari mediation succeed also revealed its limits, since Doha’s diplomatic efforts frequently resulted in temporary ceasefires rather than lasting peace agreements.[xvi]
Despite its strong track record in conflict mediation, this reputation faltered in the 2010s, as the 2011 Arab Uprisings and the 2017–21 GCC rift exacerbated geopolitical tensions and disrupted mutual trust among regional actors, undermining the very foundations of third-party intermediation. Ultimately, the changed political environment led Doha to take a more cautious foreign policy approach, scaling back its diplomatic efforts.[xvii]
By the early 2020s, regional geopolitical conditions shifted again, this time taking a turn for the better. Qatar returned to the stage, most visibly by hosting the US‑Taliban talks that yielded the 2020 Doha Accord.[xviii] Yet, its style had evolved, reflecting Doha’s ability to adapt its foreign policy tools to a changing environment. Qatari mediation now appears less about the personal diplomacy of top leaders and more about coordinated action across ministries, albeit key government figures continue to play a significant role. Likewise, the reliance on lavish financial inducements has given way to more institutional, measured tactics, signs of a maturing diplomatic apparatus.[xix]
In the context of the ongoing Israel-Gaza war, Qatar has emerged as a key intermediary, leveraging its unique position to facilitate humanitarian arrangements and negotiate the release of hostages.[xx] Central to this role is Doha’s longstanding relationship with Hamas, whose political leadership has been based in Qatar since 2012.[xxi] While this relationship has drawn growing criticism, particularly from Israel and segments of the U.S. right-wing political community[xxii], it has granted Qatar rare access to the key figures in the group’s internal decision-making architecture, enabling it to act as a credible channel of communication in moments of acute crisis.[xxiii]
Notably, Qatar’s approach to mediation in Gaza reflects a broader pattern in its diplomatic posture: it engages primarily through discreet, issue-specific negotiations rather than comprehensive political settlements. In the case of Gaza, this has translated into facilitating time-bound ceasefire agreements, the opening of humanitarian corridors, and the coordination of hostage-prisoner exchanges, often in collaboration with U.S., Egyptian, and Israeli interlocutors.[xxiv] Notably, Qatar has maintained working relations with both the Israeli government and Western partners, positioning itself as a pragmatic facilitator capable of operating across conflict divides without formal alignment.
This approach has also been visible beyond the Middle East. In Latin America, Qatar has played a behind-the-scenes role in facilitating indirect communication and prisoner swaps between the U.S. and Venezuela, which maintain no formal diplomatic relations. Through this channel, Doha has enabled the exchange of detainees and helped manage sensitive messages between Washington and Caracas, reinforcing its profile as a trusted intermediary.[xxv] Similarly, in Central Africa, Qatar has brokered preliminary talks between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the M23 rebel group, offering a neutral venue and diplomatic support for dialogue in a protracted regional conflict shaped by overlapping security and political interests.[xxvi] These cases, while geographically and politically distinct, reflect a consistent Qatari strategy.
Another example of Qatar’s distinct diplomatic posture was the country’s calibrated positioning during the escalation between Israel, Iran, and the U.S. in mid-June 2025. On the one hand, Qatar has a decades-long defense relationship with the U.S. and hosts the Al Udeid Air Base – which is the largest U.S. military installation in the region, home to over 10,000 soldiers, and a key node in Washington’s force projection across the Middle East.[xxvii] On the other hand, it simultaneously maintains longstanding political and economic ties with Tehran,[xxviii] with which it shares the massive South Pars/North Field gas field. This duality, often viewed as a balancing act, has become one of Doha’s primary diplomatic assets.
During the recent flare-up of tensions brought about by the 12-day Iran-Israel war and the U.S. Operation Midnight Hammer on Iranian nuclear sites, Qatar maintained open communication channels with Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran, positioning itself as a potential crisis manager and de-escalatory conduit. Although operating far from the spotlight, Doha was instrumental in facilitating a ceasefire deal between Iran and Israel.[xxix] Qatar’s capacity to engage both sides without breaching trust reflects the credibility it has cultivated through decades of principled neutrality and transactional diplomacy. This positioning is illustrative of a broader pattern in Qatari foreign policy: a deliberate strategy of strategic ambiguity that enables it to mediate high-stakes conflicts while maintaining essential partnerships with adversarial actors.
Looking ahead
As the Russia‑Ukraine war drags on, the prospects for a comprehensive settlement remain uncertain. Despite several rounds of direct negotiations having been held between Moscow and Kyiv, recurring deadlocks continue to obstruct the attainment of a broader, durable peace deal between the two sides. This is why smaller agreements, such as those negotiated by Doha, matter greatly. Each family reunification keeps a measure of dialogue alive, contributes to small wins, and highlights that mediation can lead to mutually beneficial outcomes. For now, Qatar shows little sign of stepping back. Its combination of solid diplomatic ties with both conflicting parties, persistence, and carefully targeted incentives continues to make it one of the few credible mediators left standing. In a conflict defined by stalemate, that role carries weight, not only for the families it directly affects, but also for the small Gulf state that shapes diplomacy far beyond its size.
[i] Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2025). ‘Qatar announces the success of a new stage of its mediation mission to reunite children with their families in Ukraine and Russia’, 17 July 2025, retrieved from: https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2025/07/17/qatar-announces-the-success-of-a-new-stage-of-its-mediation-mission-to-reunite-children-with-their-families-in-ukraine-and-russia.
[ii] Al Jazeera (2025). ‘Russia and US conclude marathon Ukraine war talks in Saudi Arabia’s Riyadh,’ 24 March 2025, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/24/us-to-meet-ukraine-officials-after-talks-with-russian-team; Arhirova, H., Wilks, A., and Cook, L. (2025). ‘Russia-Ukraine peace talks end after less than 2 hours with deal to swap POWs but no ceasefire,’ The Associated Press, 17 May 2025, retrieved from: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-turkey-peace-talks-9a75e2069cea6c73d1276a9e53e7d6e5.
[iii] Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2022). ‘Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Meets Russian Foreign Minister,’ 14 March 2022, retrieved from: https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/1443/08/11/deputy-prime-minister-and-minister-of-foreign-affairs-meets-russian-foreign-minister.
[iv] President of Russia (2023). ‘Meeting with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani,’ 22 June 2023, retrieved from: http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/71485.
[v] President of Ukraine (2023). ‘President of Ukraine had a Meeting with the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar,’ 28 July 2023, retrieved from: https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrayini-proviv-zustrich-iz-premyer-ministrom-mini-84569.
[vi] Ombudsman Ukraine (2024), ‘Cross-pollinated. Russia’s Systemic Policy of Destroying Children’s Ukrainian Identity,’ 16 July 2024, retrieved from: https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/storage/app/media/uploaded-files/Special%20Report%20_CROSS-POLLINATED_.pdf.
[vii] Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights (2023), ‘Activities of the Russian Federation Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova to Protect Children during a Special Military Operation. Issue#2,’ 13 October 2023, retrieved from: https://deti.gov.ru/uploads/magic/ru-RU/Document-0-259-src-1697376467.3807.pdf.
[viii] President of Russia (2024). ‘Meeting with Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani’, 4 July 2024, retrieved from: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74468.
[ix] Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights (2024). ‘The Bulletin. Activities of the Russian Federation Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova to Protect Children during a Special Military Operation. Issue#3,’ 19 July 2024, retrieved from: https://deti.gov.ru/uploads/magic/ru-RU/Document-0-308-src-1718870725.6647.pdf.
[x] Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024). ‘Qatar Announces $3 Million Commitment to Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner Office for Human Rights,’ 26 April 2024, retrieved from: https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2024/04/25/qatar-announces–3-million-commitment-to-ukrainian-parliament-commissioner-office-for-human-rights.
[xi] Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024). Qatar announces the Arrival of 20 Russian and Ukrainian Families in Doha to Receive Comprehensive Care and Support as Part of its Ongoing Mediation Efforts to Reunite Separated Families,’ 20 April 2024, retrieved from: https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2024/04/20/qatar-announces-the-arrival-of-20-russian-and-ukrainian-families-in-doha-to-receive-comprehensive-care-and-support-as-part-of-its-ongoing-mediation-efforts-to-reunite-separated-families.
[xii] Elkahlout, G. and Hedaya, M. (2024). ‘Examining Qatari humanitarian diplomacy: key features, challenges and prospects,’ Third World Quarterly, vol. 45, no. 12, pp. 1813-1831, retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2024.2379345.
[xiii] Qatar Tribune (2025). ‘Qatar provides $4.8 billion in foreign aid to LDCs: NPC,’ 17 July 2025, retrieved from: https://www.qatar-tribune.com/article/185453/front/qatar-provides-48-billion-in-foreign-aid-to-ldcs-npc.
[xiv] Ulrichsen, K.C. (2014). Qatar and the Arab Spring. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[xv] Qatar’s Government Communication Office. ‘The Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar,’ retrieved from: https://www.gco.gov.qa/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/permanent_constitution_state_qatar_en.pdf.
[xvi] Kamrava, M. (2011). ‘Mediation and Qatar Foreign Policy,’ Middle East Journal, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 539-556, retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.3751/65.4.11.
[xvii] Barakat, S. (2014). ‘Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement,’ Brookings Doha Centre Analysis Paper, 10 November 2014, retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-PDF-English.pdf.
[xviii] Karataş, I. (2021). ‘Qatar’s Return to Mediation Diplomacy: What Changed?,’ Al Sharq Strategic Research, 21 June 2021, retrieved from: https://research.sharqforum.org/2022/06/21/return-to-mediation-diplomacy/.
[xix] Milton, S., Elkahlout, G., and Tariq, S. (2023). ‘Qatar’s Evolving Role in Conflict Mediation,’ Mediterranean Politics, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 53-77, retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2023.2266665.
[xx] Al-Jaber, K. and Theros, P. (2024). ‘The Importance of Diplomacy: How Qatari Mediation is Impacting Gaza,’ Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 13 June 2024, retrieved from: https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/the-importance-of-diplomacy-how-qatari-mediation-is-impacting-gaza/.
[xxi] Al-Khulaifi,S. (2023). ‘Qatar’s Relations with Hamas: Misconceptions and Reality’, LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 3 February 2023, retrieved from: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2023/02/03/qatars-relations-with-hamas-misconceptions-and-reality/.
[xxii] Henderson, S. (2023). ‘Qatar’s Relations with Washington and Israel Are Being Tested,’ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 24 October 2023, retrieved from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/qatars-relations-washington-and-israel-are-being-tested; Bakir. A. (2024). ‘Washington’s Dilemma over Hamas in Qatar,’ Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 8 April 2024, retrieved from: https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/washingtons-dilemma-over-hamas-in-qatar/; Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies (2025). ‘Israel’s Campaign against Qatar over Its Support for Gaza and a Ceasefire,’ 24 February 2025, retrieved from: https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/the-israeli-campaign-against-qatar-because-of-its-role-in-supporting-gaza-and-the-ceasefire.aspx.
[xxiii] Roman, G. (2025). ‘How Qatar Made Itself Crucial to Israel-Hamas Hostage Mediation,’ Middle East Forum, 29 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/how-qatar-made-itself-crucial-to-israel-hamas-hostage-mediation.
[xxiv] Graham-Harrison, E. (2025). ‘Qatari, US and Egyptian negotiators set up Cairo hub to shore up Gaza ceasefire,’ The Guardian, 21 January 2025, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/21/qatari-us-and-egyptian-negotiators-set-up-cairo-hub-to-shore-up-gaza-ceasefire.
[xxv] Manley, T. and Rossi, L. (2023). ‘Mediating Multipolarity: Qatar’s Role in U.S.-Venezuela Negotiations,’ Carnegie Endowment for a New Peace, 5 September 2023, retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2023/09/mediating-multipolarity-qatars-role-in-us-venezuela-negotiations?lang=en.
[xxvi] Čok, C. (2025). ‘Qatar’s mediation diplomacy enters new stage in Africa,’ Amwaj Media, 15 July 2025, retrieved from: https://amwaj.media/en/article/qatar-s-mediation-diplomacy-enters-new-stage-in-africa.
[xxvii] Saidy, B. (2017). ‘Qatari-US military relations’, Contemporary Arab Affairs, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 286-299, retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2016.1244902.
[xxviii] Kamrava, M. (2017). ‘Iran-Qatar Relations’, in Ehteshami, A., Quilliam, N., Bahgat, G. (eds) Security and Bilateral Issues between Iran and its Arab Neighbours, (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham), retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43289-2_8.
[xxix] Rasgon, A. (2025). ‘How Qatar Helped Broker the Israel-Iran Cease-Fire,’ The New York Times, 24 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/24/world/middleeast/iran-israel-qatar.html.