Hezbollah functions as both a political organization and a military force according to different observers. It is primarily referred to as a resistance force and social welfare provider according to its supporters yet more than 20 international governments classify it as a terrorist organization[i]. Regardless of the debate regarding which label suits Hezbollah the best, the group has had a significant impact on Lebanon since its creation in 1982.
Recent events from September 2024 have sparked doubts about Hezbollah’s ability to retain power going forward. The Israeli military executed precision strikes that resulted in multiple deaths and injuries among Hezbollah members. Long-time leader Hassan Nasrallah met his end through a targeted assassination. In January 2025 a new Lebanese government took office with Nawaf Salam as its Prime Minister, who promised to disarm Hezbollah. In parallel with these developments, Iran has also decreased its regional involvement in Lebanon and scaled back its support to Hezbollah. Hezbollah has faced significant pressure in recent months, but despite this, the demise of the organization is far from being guaranteed at this point in time.
A September to remember: Hezbollah dealing with the aftershocks of the attacks
The Israeli military conducted ‘Operation Grim Beeper’ between 17th and 18th September 2024, during which they attacked members of Hezbollah using booby-trapped pagers and walkie-talkies[ii]. At least 42 people, including civilians, lost their lives while more than 3,500 Hezbollah fighters and civilians suffered injuries. According to one Hezbollah official the injuries forced 1,500 fighters to become militarily inactive. The ‘pager attacks’ damaged Hezbollah’s leadership structure by breaking their communication network while simultaneously affecting the organization’s overall standing. The sudden and widespread nature of the explosions generated fear among members of the group, instilling doubt about the security of their communications systems and the possibility of discovering moles within their ranks.[iii]
The 27th September Israeli airstrike that killed Nasrallah at Hezbollah’s central headquarters in Beirut’s southern suburbs created a power vacuum.[iv] Nasrallah led the group with his exceptional fervour, uniting ideology with military operations and political movements throughout three decades. Through his leadership, he developed an image that merged religious influence with the ideology of a resistance movement. His successor, Naim Qassem, who has served as Hezbollah’s long-time deputy, demonstrates organizational abilities, yet lacks the leadership charisma and popularity of Nasrallah.[v] Hezbollah members respect Qassem because of his dedication to the organization’s ideology along with his administrative abilities although he has historically operated in the background. Qassem might not gain the same level of dedication from followers as Nasrallah received.[vi]
New dynamics in Lebanese politics: Are people tuning away from Hezbollah?
After years of political deadlock, Lebanon established a 24-member government on 8th February with Nawaf Salam as its Prime Minister. Joseph Aoun became President on 9th January. The current leadership under President Aoun and the government has been received with scepticism by Hezbollah supporters because of their proclaimed opposition to the organization.[vii] In turn, Prime Minister Salam did not receive support from Hezbollah and its political allies. Hezbollah, along with the Amal Movement, holds five positions in the new government, but their overall power has decreased significantly. This decline is not primarily due to a reduction in the number of cabinet positions they hold, which remains relatively stable, but rather reflects a marked decrease in their ability to shape key portfolios, drive policy outcomes, and obstruct or steer government initiatives. Under previous governments, Hezbollah and its allies held sway over critical ministries, such as Health, Finance, and Public Works, allowing them to assert influence over state budgets and the provision of services.
The government has made disarmament a top priority in order to establish state authority over arms while working to execute United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701. UNSCR 1701 from 2006 demands the complete disarmament of all Lebanese armed groups and directly opposes Hezbollah’s autonomous military operations.[viii] The government under Salam has explicitly declared its dedication to maintaining the Lebanese state as the single entity which exercises power to determine peace and war, and possess weapons. The new government presented to parliament policies that eliminated the “article of resistance” which had appeared in every Lebanese government policy statement during the past 25 years while serving as Hezbollah’s justification of its arsenal.[ix]
Since 2019 Lebanon has experienced an unprecedented economic crisis, which now represents a major fault line in Hezbollah’s image too. All Lebanese people, including Hezbollah supporters who traditionally belong to the Shia community, have suffered intensely because of the Lebanese pound’s devaluation alongside rising inflation, the implosion of the banking sector and universal poverty. Throughout its history Hezbollah has maintained strong support through its social welfare programs which have been combined with financial aid provided to Lebanese families to address deficits in the state coffers and government policies. The current economic crisis has significantly undermined Hezbollah’s ability to maintain its former level of support provided to Lebanese people.[x] Combined with the economic troubles Iran is experiencing, the financial support formerly available to Hezbollah has also been reduced.
Hezbollah maintains considerable backing from the Shia community of Lebanon but evidence now points to changing public attitudes with a rise in dissenting opinions. The 2024 Arab Barometer survey indicated a decrease in Shia trust for Hezbollah in its very core support base. One of the reasons why public opinion has turned against Hezbollah is the perception that the organization puts Iranian priorities ahead of Lebanon’s welfare.[xi] Hezbollah’s rigid adherence to Iran’s Islamic doctrine has resulted in losing its independence, which meant it had operated as a regional proxy of Iran instead of a native Lebanese resistance movement. Hezbollah’s recent military restraint toward Israel also reveals how the group acts on decisions made primarily in Tehran.[xii]
As Iran faces an economic crisis, Hezbollah looks to Latin America
The combination of international sanctions and internal mismanagement has driven Iran toward a projected economic growth rate of zero in 2025 combined with high levels of inflation. The readoption of the US’ campaign of ‘maximum pressure’ has intensified Tehran’s economic troubles.[xiii] Due to these economic restrictions Iran cannot provide sufficient financial support to their proxies as they are seemingly prioritizing operations in Iraq, Yemen and Gaza rather than Lebanon.[xiv]
Hezbollah is not wholly dependent on Iran, however. The organization generates its own revenue through its business networks and smuggling operations as well as via donations from the Shia diaspora.
The operational restrictions that Hezbollah faces in Lebanon might prompt the organization to activate its Latin American networks although such a move would expose it to dangerous strategic challenges. Throughout its history Hezbollah has developed operational bases within Lebanese communities spread across the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, in addition to Venezuela and growing areas of Mexico. This outreach was initially pursued to secure independent revenue streams, evade international financial oversight, and create logistical hubs beyond the reach of U.S. and Israeli intelligence. Hezbollah’s presence in Latin America reflects both opportunism and long-term strategic planning, as the group seeks to diversify its funding sources and establish a transnational infrastructure capable of sustaining its global activities. Hezbollah primarily operates these networks for money laundering and drug trafficking purposes. These groups, including Brazil’s PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital) and Mexican cartel Los Zetas, also provide logistical support. Hezbollah plans to use existing smuggling routes to bring operatives and materials into the Middle East while working with corrupt officials for security and conducting resistance activities to radicalize diaspora members.[xv]
This transnational strategy also mirrors Hezbollah’s entanglement in the Captagon trade, where the group leveraged border control and institutional influence to profit from illicit economies.[xvi] The collapse of Syria’s state-sponsored Captagon production following the downfall of the Assad regime in late 2024 has disrupted one of Hezbollah’s key revenue streams, making its Latin American operations even more critical to sustaining its financial and operational resilience amid regional losses.
However, this also entails significant risks. Hezbollah’s operations away from its core support bases create more opportunities for U.S. and Latin American security agencies to conduct effective counterintelligence activities against the organization. A redirection of Hezbollah’s command structure because of this move would lead to weakened control while any operational failure would lead to worldwide negative reaction. The move toward Latin America serves as a strategic lifeline for Hezbollah yet simultaneously reveals the depth of its displacement from its original Lebanese power base[xvii].
The Assad regime’s collapse in Syria during December 2024 also entailed a significant strategic defeat for Hezbollah. The Syrian territory functioned as a vital connector for years to let Iranian weapons and supplies and military staff reach Lebanon which reinforced Hezbollah’s military power and extended its regional influence. The elimination of this central part of Iran’s “axis of resistance” cuts off Hezbollah’s most important logistical supply line which severely impacts their capability to maintain military power and regional influence. A new Syrian transitional government composed of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other groups in opposition to the Assad regime poses a hostile threat to Hezbollah’s north-eastern border position. Fighting has already started between elements of the new Syrian authorities and Hezbollah at the Lebanon-Syria border.[xviii]
Conclusion
Hezbollah is still trying to recover from the Israeli attacks while dealing with a new Lebanese government that has talked about disarming them. However, it is too early to claim that Hezbollah is dead. Hezbollah has been around for more than 40 years, and has proven to be resilient, adaptable, and established deep roots in Lebanon. Despite the fact that Hezbollah is in a period of relative decline, it remains a powerful and complex actor, both weakened and enduring. The next few years will determine whether this is the beginning of the end or just a break before a new beginning.
[i] Deutsche Welle (DW) (2024). ‘What you need to know about Hezbollah’, 27 July 2024, retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/en/what-you-need-to-know-about-hezbollah/a-67093061.
[ii] Doran, M. (2024). ‘The Brilliance of “Operation Grim Beeper”’, Hudson Institute, 20 September 2024, retrieved from: https://www.hudson.org/technology/brilliance-operation-grim-beeper-lebanon-pager-explosion-israel-iran-michael-doran.
[iii] Murphy, M. (2024). ‘What we know about the Hezbollah device explosions’, BBC, 20 September 2024, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz04m913m49o.
[iv] Lubell, M. and Gebeily, M. (2024). ‘Israel kills Hezbollah leader Nasrallah in airstrike’, Reuters, 29 September 2024, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-airstrikes-rock-beirut-hezbollah-command-centre-hit-2024-09-28/.
[v] Fahs, B. (2024). ‘Naim Qassem: The austere ex-chemist now leading Hezbollah’, Al Majalla, 3 November 2024, retrieved from: https://en.majalla.com/node/322902/profiles/naim-qassem-austere-ex-chemist-now-leading-hezbollah.
[vi] Al Jazeera (2024). ‘What do we know about Hezbollah’s new leader, Naim Qassem?’, 30 October 2024, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/30/what-do-we-know-about-naim-qassem.
[vii] The Economic Times (2025). ‘War-torn Lebanon forms its first government in over 2 years to end deadlock’, 9 February 2025, retrieved from: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/war-torn-lebanon-forms-its-first-government-in-over-2-years-to-end-deadlock/articleshow/118095425.cms.
[viii] Emirates Policy Center (2025). ‘Between Monopoly and Dismantling: Prospects for Disarming Lebanese Hezbollah’, 19 May 2025, retrieved from: https://epc.ae/en/details/scenario/between-monopoly-and-dismantling-prospects-for-disarming-lebanese-hezbollah.
[ix] Ghanem, V. and Ali Harisi, M. (2025). ‘Lebanon scraps ‘armed resistance’ from ministerial statement for first time in two decades’, The National, 19 February 2025, retrieved from: https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2025/02/19/lebanon-scraps-armed-resistance-from-ministerial-statement-for-first-time-in-two-decades/.
[x] Dal Bello, G. (2021). ‘Managing a Crisis: Hezbollah’s Welfare Expansion’, E-International Relations, 26 April 2021, retrieved from: https://www.e-ir.info/2021/04/26/managing-a-crisis-hezbollahs-welfare-expansion/.
[xi] Arab Barometer (2024). ‘Arab Barometer VIII. Lebanon Report’, September 2024, retrieved from: https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/AB8-Lebanon-Country-Report-EN.pdf.
[xii] Saab, B.Y., ‘Why Hezbollah Fell’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 31 March 2025, retrieved from: https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2025/03/31/why-hezbollah-fell/.
[xiii] Calabrese, J. (2024). ‘Iran’s Economy: Past the Point of No Return?’, Modern Diplomacy, 15 November 2024, retrieved from: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/11/15/irans-economy-past-the-point-of-no-return/.
[xiv] Bremmer, I. (2026). ‘Hezbollah’s downfall exposes Iran’s weakness and reshapes the Middle East’, GZERO, 2 October 2026, retrieved from: https://www.gzeromedia.com/by-ian-bremmer/hezbollahs-downfall-exposes-irans-weakness-and-reshapes-the-middle-east#toggle-gdpr.
[xv] Giambertoni, M. (2025). ‘Hezbollah’s Networks in Latin America. Potential Implications for U.S. Policy and Research, RAND, 31 March 2025, retrieved from: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA3585-1.html.
[xvi] Ali, M.H. (2025). ‘Double Dealers: Lebanon and the Risks of Captagon Trafficking’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 March 2025, retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/double-dealers-lebanon-and-the-risks-of-captagon-trafficking?lang=en.
[xvii] Levitt, M. (2016). ‘Iran and Hezbollah Remain Hyperactive in Latin America’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11 August 2016, retrieved from: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iran-and-hezbollah-remain-hyperactive-latin-america.
[xviii] Makooi, B. (2024). ‘Iran in a ‘position of unprecedented weakness’ after the fall of Assad in Syria’, France 24, 9 December 2024, retrieved from: https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20241209-iran-position-unprecedented-weakness-after-fall-of-assad-syria-proxies-hezbollah-middle-east.
