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President Erdogan having a conversation with President Trump while walking outdoors.

Why Trump Needs Türkiye to ‘Make America Great Again’ in the Middle East

As the second Trump administration prepares to lean toward a restrained grand strategy, the U.S. must forge stronger alliances with regional powers like Türkiye to maintain its influence in the Middle East without the burden of overstretching itself militarily.

The Return of Trump’s Grand Strategy of Restraint

As President-elect Donald Trump prepares to ‘Make America Great Again’ both domestically and globally, his foreign policy signals a revived grand strategy of restraint and retrenchment. Focused on reducing direct U.S. involvement in costly, prolonged conflicts[i], this strategy will likely prioritize maintaining influence in strategically important regions such as the Middle East, positioning the U.S. as a ‘balancer of last resort,’ intervening only to prevent the rise of regional hegemons or the outbreak of regionwide wars. This approach departs from the ideals of democratic enlargement and liberal hegemony, emphasizing a pragmatic, realist outlook rooted in power and security rather than ideology.

Reflecting an emerging multipolar international system and intensifying great power competition, Trump’s ‘America First’[ii] policy focuses on containing rising powers like China and Russia, as well as regional disruptors like Iran. By strengthening alliances with capable partners to manage regional threats, the U.S. can reduce defense costs, redirect resources to domestic priorities, and focus on containing China. In this context, Türkiye could prove to be an essential Middle Eastern ally, and the Trump administration must prioritize this strategic partnership to avoid a significant erosion of U.S. influence in the region.

Türkiye: An Anchor of Regional Stability in the MENA

With its growing military strength, expansive diplomatic reach, and autonomous foreign policy, Türkiye has emerged as a significant power in the MENA region. As NATO’s second-largest military force and a stable actor amid ongoing regional turmoil, Türkiye holds the potential to serve as an essential anchor of stability.

As the global order shifts, Türkiye is increasingly adopting a model of strategic autonomy, balancing its NATO commitments with ties to the Sino-Russian sphere to navigate a multipolar world without reliance on any single power bloc. This approach, along with Türkiye’s application to join the BRICS bloc[iii] and its strengthening ties with emerging global powers, has strained relations within NATO, raising concerns about Türkiye’s commitment to the alliance’s strategic objectives.[iv] Nevertheless, Türkiye’s potential to serve as a stabilizing force in the Middle East offers NATO a critical opportunity to leverage its geostrategic position and influence. Constructive engagement with Türkiye could strengthen NATO’s collective security framework while preserving a vital foothold in the MENA region amid intensifying great power competition and increasing U.S. disengagement.

Its diplomatic flexibility is an asset that could support Trump’s vision for ending the conflict in Ukraine. Türkiye’s foreign policy during the Russia-Ukraine conflict exemplifies its balancing act. By maintaining relations with both Russia and Ukraine, Türkiye condemned Russia’s invasion and supported UN resolutions against it, yet refrained from joining U.S. and EU sanctions.[v] Economically, Türkiye could not afford to alienate Russia, a key trading partner and energy supplier, particularly given its dependence on Russian natural gas, critical trade routes, and the significant contribution of Russian tourism to its economy.[vi] This economic reality partly motivated Türkiye’s decision to mediate, enabling it to navigate competing pressures from Western allies and Russia. Türkiye supplied Ukraine with Bayraktar TB2 drones[vii], symbols of Ukrainian resistance, while simultaneously acting as a mediator by hosting peace talks, facilitating a grain export deal, and enabling significant prisoner exchanges between the U.S. and Russia, the largest since the end of the Cold War, demonstrating its ability to operate as an independent regional power and effective mediator.

Additionally, while collaborating with Russia, Türkiye actively opposed the Assad regime in Syria and Iranian militias, although this stance has undergone significant changes, shepherding the country towards rapprochement with Assad in recent months.[viii]

Türkiye has recently strengthened its regional role through active engagement in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Organization of Turkic States, positioning itself as a key partner for stability in the region. Serving as a bridge between NATO, the U.S., and Turkic states, many of which are gradually shifting away from Russia-oriented policies, Türkiye offers strategic leverage against China’s expanding influence in Turkestan, Central Asia.[ix] This relationship would support U.S. efforts to counter China’s reach across the Turkestan region and support Trump’s strategy of pressuring China by leveraging Uyghur-focused human rights issues. Moreover, with its geostrategic location linking the Middle East to Europe and its unique position as a Muslim-majority NATO member, Türkiye can serve as a bridge in strengthening U.S. relations with the broader Islamic world. Furthermore, with Trump’s aim to reduce U.S. troop presence and shift defense costs to European allies, a partnership with Türkiye offers NATO a practical way to bolster European security without overextending resources.

Lessons from Syria: The Cost of Losing Türkiye as a Strategic Ally

U.S. foreign policy in Syria highlights the costs of sidelining Türkiye as a strategic ally. The U.S. decision to partner with the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in counter-DAESH operations since 2015 was driven by operational practicality and military effectiveness. The YPG’s willingness to accept U.S. support without preconditions and their decisive role in key battles, such as Kobani and Raqqa, positioned them as a strategically suitable partner for the U.S. in combating DAESH while minimizing the need for U.S. troop deployment.

However, this tactical and temporary partnership, focused solely on defeating DAESH, overlooked Türkiye’s critical security concerns regarding the YPG’s ties to the PKK[x], a group that Türkiye has vehemently opposed as a designated terrorist organization and a direct threat to its national security and territorial integrity. This disregard significantly strained U.S.-Türkiye relations, eroding mutual trust and prompting Ankara to diversify its alliances, including fostering closer ties with Moscow.

Furthermore, the SDF’s inability to counter Iran’s expanding influence created new challenges for U.S. strategic objectives in the region, inadvertently strengthening Russian and Iranian footholds.[xi] The Syrian conflict exposed the limits of relying on non-state actors at the expense of established regional allies with shared interests. While Russia, Iran, Türkiye, and the Assad regime are now positioned to shape Syria’s future, the U.S. has been largely sidelined, losing strategic ground. This situation underscores that U.S. interests in the region would have been better served by a closer alignment with Türkiye, which has a vested interest in countering both Russian and Iranian influence in Syria.

Syria has become a geopolitical deadlock and a significant source of U.S.-Turkish tensions, contributing to broader diplomatic crises. Both countries operate in overlapping spheres of influence in Syria. The U.S. seeks to counter DAESH, curb Iranian influence, and ensure regional stability, while Türkiye shares these objectives but prioritizes securing its southern border and countering groups it views as threats to its national security, particularly the YPG. To address these challenges, the U.S. should learn from its missteps in Syria by constructively coordinating with Türkiye to reduce troop presence and leverage Türkiye’s strategic position to restore regional stability and influence in the Middle East.

Overcoming Potential Challenges in U.S.-Turkish Relations through Leader-to-Leader Diplomacy

The crisis in Gaza and unwavering U.S. support for Israel are major points of tension in U.S.-Turkish relations and could deepen as President-elect Trump’s pro-Israel cabinet takes shape. Key figures in Trump’s prospective administration hold critical views on Türkiye’s policies, supporting sanctions against Türkiye and opposing its military operations in Syria, as well as criticizing Trump’s prior decision to withdraw from northeastern Syria. They have also opposed a ceasefire in Gaza and rejected Palestinian statehood.

Despite these challenges, the potential for leader-to-leader diplomacy between Trump and Erdoğan could offer a unique path forward. While the Biden administration emphasized institutionalized, multilateral frameworks, Trump’s approach to direct, one-on-one engagement reflects a more personal and less formalized style of diplomacy. This approach could provide greater flexibility in managing tensions and fostering opportunities for crisis resolution and deeper cooperation. By leveraging this pragmatic, leader-driven approach, Trump and Erdoğan might address sensitive issues more effectively and create avenues for constructive engagement in areas critical to U.S.-Turkish relations.

With a strategy of restraint centered on great power competition, Türkiye emerges as a valuable partner for a prospective Trump administration to sustain U.S. influence and stability across the MENA region and beyond while reducing military commitments.

[i] Gibbons-Neff, T. and Schmitt, E. (2019). “Despite Vow to End ‘Endless Wars’, Here’s Where About 200,000 Troops Remain”, The New York Times, 21 October, retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/world/middleeast/us-troops-deployments.html.
[ii] Trump White House Archives (2017). “President Donald J. Trump at the United Nations General Assembly: Outlining an America First Foreign Policy”, 20 September, retrieved from: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-united-nations-general-assembly-outlining-america-first-foreign-policy/.
[iii] Aydintasbas, A. (2024). “Building BRICS: What Erdogan’s geopolitical gamble could mean for the West”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 27 September, retrieved from: https://ecfr.eu/article/building-brics-what-erdogans-geopolitical-gamble-could-mean-for-the-west/.
[iv] Can, Y. (2024). “Turkey’s Balancing Act: Navigating NATO, BRICS, and Other Global Partnerships”, Wilson Center, 11 July, retrieved from: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/turkeys-balancing-act-navigating-nato-brics-and-other-global-partnerships.
[v] Bechev, D. (2024). “Closer Ties to the West Don’t Mean Turkey Will Give Up on Russia”, Carnegie Politika, 7 February 2024, retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/02/closer-ties-to-the-west-dont-mean-turkey-will-give-up-on-russia?lang=en.
[vi] Coskun, A., Gabuev, A., Pierini, M., Siccardi, F. and Ulmarov, T. (2024). “Understanding Turkiye’s Entanglement With Russia”, Carnegie, 15 October, retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/understanding-turkiyes-entanglement-with-russia?lang=en.
[vii] Euractiv (2022). “Erdogan family firm gifts Bayraktar drones to Ukraine”, 28 June, retrieved from: https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/erdogan-family-firm-gifts-bayraktar-drones-to-ukraine/.
[viii] Ozeren, S. (2024). “Erdogan’s Reconciliation with Reality: Back to Rapprochement with Assad”, Manara Magazine, 18 July, retrieved from: https://manaramagazine.org/2024/07/erdogans-reconciliation-with-reality-back-to-rapprochement-with-assad/.
[ix] Murtazashvili, J.B. (2022). “China’s Activities and Influence in South and Central Asia”, Carnegie, 17 May, retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2022/05/chinas-activities-and-influence-in-south-and-central-asia?lang=en.
[x] Ozkizilcik, O. (2024). “Turkey is searching for a way out of Syria’s impasse”, Atlantic Council, 8 November, retrieved from: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/turkey-syria-ocalan-pkk/.
[xi] Carter, b. and Jhaveri, A. (2023). “The Syrian Democratic Foces’ Arab Coalition is Crumbling, Creating Opportunities for ISIS, Iran, and Turkey”, Institute for the Study of War, 15 September, retrieved from: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syrian-democratic-forces%E2%80%99-arab-coalition-crumbling-creating-opportunities-isis-iran-and.

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