During the Syrian civil war, U.S.-Turkish relations went through a rough patch over diverging policies.[i] Washington, lacking a clear policy on the Assad regime[ii], was preoccupied with combating ISIS, whereas Ankara feared spillover as Turkey took in the brunt of Syrian refugees fleeing the conflict.[iii]
Avoiding a full-scale invasion of Syria to defeat ISIS, both due to domestic pressure and potential fears of a wider confrontation with Russian and Iranian forces, the U.S. counted on Syrian-Kurdish militias. The U.S. selected Syrian Kurds to form the base[iv] of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) around, relying on them as their militias consolidated territories in the northeast of Syria as the civil war expanded.
However, partnering with Syrian Kurdish militias came with a price as the forces’ YPG and YPJ were directly linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)[v], which both Turkey and the United States designate as a terrorist organization. The partnership led to an immediate rift between Ankara and Washington, however, the Turkish government decided on a course of strategic patience to solve the SDF question.
Turkish-SDF conflict and split in Turkish-American relations
Having brought the YPG and YPJ under the umbrella of the SDF, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) gradually recruited Arab tribal fighters[vi] west of the Euphrates river to join as well. Turkey saw no difference between the SDF and YPJ/YPG fighters, which had previously fought against Turkish forces[vii], and thus, Ankara gradually reduced cooperation[viii] with Washington over Syria.
The U.S. was restricted from using the Incirlik Airbase for anti-ISIS operations[ix], and in the same period, Washington halted[x] the sale of the patriot missile system sale to Ankara. Turkey would procure[xi] the Russian-made S400 system instead, leading to further political tension as operating Russian air defences is incompatible with NATO principles due to the spyware incorporated in its systems.
Relations deteriorated to the point where the U.S. would rescind Turkey’s role in the F-35 and F-16 Block-C programmes.[xii] The tensions did not significantly undermine Turkey’s military operations in Syria, which were increasingly aimed at weakening both the Assad regime and SDF by supporting their own de facto proxy militia, the Syrian National Army (SNA).[xiii] Turkey would conduct multiple offensives against the SDF[xiv], both in Afrin and northeast Syria. In addition to this, Turkey deployed its armed forces around the Idlib enclave[xv], which blocked the Ba’athist army and Russian forces from further offensives against the battered rebel opposition and Islamist fighters part of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). That respite allowed Ankara to help the opposition build a base with Ahmed al-Sharaa, ultimately becoming the face of armed opposition against Assad in late 2024.
Patience in exerting influence over Syria
Ultimately, the SDF, with American air cover and support from special forces, dislodged ISIS[xvi] from its key strongholds in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Even with American air power backing them, the SDF lost 11,000 fighters[xvii] with additional tens of thousands wounded during the counterterrorism operations.
In the meantime, Ahmed al-Sharaa, then operating under his nom de guerre, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, distanced himself from al-Qaeda[xviii] and turned HTS into a purely Syrian liberation organization. Sharaa started to fight al-Qaeda’s remnants in Idlib as well as ISIS[xix], which the U.S. and Turkish governments quietly backed.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 fundamentally changed strategic calculations. As Turkey began to fight Russian-backed mercenaries in both Syria and Libya[xx], Ankara’s actions became a part of Washington’s considerations for a solution to end the war. The Biden Administration allowed Turkey back into the F-16 block-c program[xxi], and Trump’s second term as president led to the re-admission of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan into the fold on Syria.
As troops and air defence systems began to be relocated from Syria to Ukraine[xxii], Russian forces accumulated heavy losses and Moscow overextended itself.[xxiii] Meanwhile, Sharaa built numerous institutions in Idlib between 2019 and 2024, and consolidated control[xxiv] over several militias with Turkish support. These factions would strike the Assad regime in a lightning offensive in late November 2024.
The HTS-led Syrian rebel offensive successfully toppled Assad[xxv], and both the Turkish-backed SNA and the SDF moved to consolidate their positions in their respective areas of influence. Al-Sharaa became interim president and the Trump Administration made the stabilization of Syria a priority.
SDF miscalculations vs. Syrian government and Turkish gains
Against the backdrop of the collapse of the Assad regime, the new Syrian interim government under al-Sharaa faced numerous hurdles. Remnants of Assad loyalists[xxvi] in the Alawite strongholds of Latakia and Tartus, and brewing separatist sentiments[xxvii] among the Syrian Druze of Suwayda province continue to challenge the establishment of sovereignty over all of Syria. An important part of Syria’s fractures sovereignty has been the SDF stronghold in the northeast. The group, despite its recent ceasefire with the government, is not eager to integrate into the Syrian state.
President Tayyip Erdogan saw a key opportunity to dislodge the U.S. from the norhteast, and together with Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, he vouched for al-Sharaa[xxviii] as a capable partner in conducting anti-ISIS operations. In May 2025, President Trump met al-Sharaa in Riyadh and invited him to the White House in November.[xxix]
Simultaneously, Trump would give credit to Erdogan for his support in Assad’s ousting[xxx] as Turkey’s role in patrolling frozen contact lines allowed rebel groups to recuperate after their losses. Under orders from the President, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Middle East envoy Tom Barrack would oversee negotiations[xxxi] on the full integration of the SDF into the new Syrian army.
The SDF has resisted this for several reasons beside the sacrifices they had made during years of fighting against ISIS. First, some of the Kurdish militias within the organization fought against al-Sharaa[xxxii] when he originally led the al-Qaeda-affiliated Syrian branch of al-Nusra, which later rebranded itself as HTS. Secondly, ethnic massacres in coastal and southern Syria against the Alawites[xxxiii] and Druze[xxxiv] respectively led to fears of the same retaliation against Kurds in the north. Lastly, being in control of Syria’s oil fields[xxxv], the SDF leadership under Mazloum Abdi hoped that oil could be used in negotiations for retaining some degree of autonomy in the northeast.
A turning point was the removal of Caesar Act sanctions[xxxvi], which devastated the Syrian economy during the Assad years. With the sanctions lifted, al-Sharaa’s government became open to international investments and stands on a stronger footing when it comes to reunification efforts. In a final blow, the Sunni Muslim base of the SDF[xxxvii], who had long been marginalized[xxxviii] in the Alawite-led years of the Assad regime, saw an opportunity to join forces with al-Sharaa, defecting the Kurdish-led grouping en masse.
U.S. strategic interests
During the post-Assad transition period, Turkey moved to align the U.S. with its own strategic interests in Syria. Erdogan and al-Sharaa capitalized on Trump’s planned withdrawal from Syria[xxxix] during his first term, and pushed to facilitate this outcome since the end of 2024. Syria’s interim government dramatically increased raids against ISIS cells[xl] in the country, impressing CENTCOM. Simultaneously, Turkey pushed for an integration agreement[xli] between the SDF and the Syrian interim government in which the Kurdish-led forces would come under pressure for ‘stalling.’
Mazloum Abdi’s red line is retaining full rights for Kurds, including the protection of their language, culture, and guaranteeing their right to serve in the new Syrian government. Al-Sharaa made a symbolic gesture[xlii] by designating Nowruz as a national holiday in Syria and establishing a curriculum for Kurdish education. Still, tensions around the integration of the Syrian army and the SDF and concerns about Kurdish autonomy remain strong.
Collapse of the SDF
Some of the first major combat operations against the SDF took place in the autumn of 2025 as the Syrian army moved to cordon off the Kurdish-held Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods in Aleppo. Sporadic clashes took place in October[xliii] and December 2025[xliv], which ended with U.S. mediation. Al-Sharaa and Turkey would truly test America’s Syria policy in early 2026.
On 6th January 2026, Syrian forces conducted an offensive[xlv] to dislodge the SDF from the Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods, which Damascus achieved with relatively low casualties. This was followed by a deal to evacuate Kurdish fighters from Aleppo city towards the countryside. Several days later, the SDF was forced to withdraw[xlvi] west of the Euphrates as their positions became untenable. With little U.S. mediation, Damascus saw the inaction as a green light to force the SDF into a deal.
Only a week after the Aleppo clashes, al-Sharaa’s forces, backed by Turkey, launched a major offensive[xlvii] against the SDF west of the Euphrates. This was widely seen as successful as many of the Arab tribes within the SDF defected to the government’s side and helped dislodge remaining Kurdish fighters from Sunni-Arab majority areas such as Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor.
The Kurdish-led SDF overestimated the loyalty of Arab tribal fighters. This is surprising considering the heavy armed clashes[xlviii] between the Arab-led Deir ez-Zor military council and the SDF in late 2023, which saw dozens of deaths. Arabs and Kurds have indeed had historically turbulent relations, and the SDF was bound for combustion if a charismatic leader in Damascus could sway tribal fighters to defect.
The SDF also overestimated how long the U.S. government would be willing to sponsor them, especially under a president that had looked to scale down operations in Syria. The SDF was the bulwark for counterterrorism options against ISIS, but as the Islamist militant group weakened, so did the American-led mission and Washington’s loyalty to the Kurds in Syria.
The U.S. emphasized[xlix] the Syrian interim government’s cooperation to dismantle ISIS cells along with joint patrols with the STG. As al-Sharaa’s profile strengthened, Abdi’s hesitance to integrate became thorn in the side of unfolding joint American-Turkish interests.
In conclusion, with losing their core Arab tribal fighters, strategic terrain, and full backing by the U.S., the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces have few options but to accept an unfavourable American- and Turkish-backed deal proposed by Damascus. Despite ethnic tensions and a history of massacres, the U.S. has made its new Syria strategy clear – full centralization under Ahmed al-Sharaa, with growing defence partnerships with Turkey in the Levant.
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