The first elections following the fall of Bashar al-Assad were held in Syria on 5 October 2025 under the Sunni Islamist interim government. The process faced numerous challenges, including the methods of candidate selection, the displacement of millions, inadequate representation of women and minorities, and persistent border and integration issues. The elections were widely criticized for failing to guarantee equal suffrage and full political participation.
Electoral framework and procedures
The interim government adopted a complex system of selection[i] and election. According to official decrees, the People’s Assembly consists of 210 members[ii], with seats allocated based on the 2010 national census. To oversee the elections, a Higher Electoral Committee of 11 members was established, supported by district-level subcommittees responsible for organizing local voting and selecting electors.
These subcommittees identified individuals to form electoral colleges, comprising about 6,000 electors nationwide. Each district nominated 30 to 50 candidates competing for a single seat. A preliminary list of candidates was published on 3 September 2025.
At least one-fifth of all electors were required to be women, although no quota was introduced for ethnic or sectarian minorities. To qualify, candidates had to hold Syrian nationality before 2011, be at least 25 years old, possess no criminal record, have no links to the former Assad regime, and not serve in the security forces. Candidate eligibility could be challenged before review panels empowered to address disputes and appeals.
Voting took place on 5 October, and the results were finalized and communicated to the interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, the same day. Official reports confirmed that the elections were conducted through in-person voting, with candidates competing for 219 seats in the People’s Assembly.
The majority of those elected were Sunni Muslims affiliated with the ruling interim government. Among them, only six were women and ten represented religious or ethnic minorities, including two Christians. The president is authorized to appoint 70 additional members, theoretically to enhance minority and gender representation.[iii]
Powers of the Assembly and the presidency
Under the temporary constitution approved in March 2025, the unicameral People’s Assembly is empowered to draft, debate, and enact legislation, amend existing laws, ratify international agreements, and approve the national budget. The assembly’s term is 30 months, extendable pending executive approval or the ratification of a new constitution.
However, despite these provisions, power remains heavily concentrated in the presidency. The president retains authority to appoint judges, nominate one-third of assembly members, and replace any who die, resign, or are disqualified. While the constitution technically allows the assembly to initiate a vote of no confidence with a two-thirds majority, the president’s control over appointments makes such a challenge highly unlikely.
As a result, the president’s dominance effectively reduces the assembly to a rubber-stamp institution. The selective nature of the electoral process further reinforces government control[iv], as most electors were Sunni Muslims aligned with the ruling bloc – raising concerns about ideological bias and political exclusion.
Although Taha Ahmad, head of the Higher Selection Committee, described the elections as “a duty, not an honor,” major regions such as Aleppo, Suweida, Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, Daraa, Quneitra, and Hama lacked representation on the committee. President al-Sharaa publicly endorsed the elections as a democratic process and pledged to appoint more women and minority representatives. Nonetheless, critics argue that the interim government’s previous affiliations[v], coupled with limited transparency and inclusivity, undermine the legitimacy of the entire process – risking a continuation of authoritarian governance[vi] reminiscent of the Assad era.
Minorities and marginalization
Syria’s social fabric is woven from diverse religious, sectarian, and ethnic communities, including Alawites, Kurds, Druze, and Christians. To demonstrate inclusivity, the interim government appointed Hind Kabawat, a Christian, as Minister of Social Affairs. Yet minority groups continue to face insecurity, restricted political participation, economic marginalization, and limited access to state institutions. Many live under constant fear of persecution.
The Alawite community, historically linked to the Assad regime, has been particularly affected. Reports of massacres in coastal regions have deepened mistrust toward the current Sunni-led administration.
In Suweida province, the Druze community faces escalating instability due to Druze–Bedouin clashes, which have caused significant casualties and exposed local divisions. Some Druze groups, having lost faith in the central government, have formed a “National Guard” and reportedly developed ties with Israel. Public demonstrations have featured images of the Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who has openly rejected compromise[vii] with the interim government.
The Kurds, meanwhile, advocate for a decentralized political system, rejecting the current model that they view as replicating Assad-era centralization. They argue that decentralization should be understood not as partition, but as a path to genuine inclusion and stability. The interim government, however, has struggled to extend authority beyond its core territories. Kurdish leaders insist on retaining cultural identity, administrative autonomy, and local defense forces before agreeing to any formal integration – further underscoring Syria’s ongoing fragmentation.[viii]
Challenges to national integration
According to United Nations reports, nearly 13 million Syrians[ix] have been displaced internally or externally since the start of the conflict. This massive displacement has eroded infrastructure, governance capacity, and social cohesion. As a result, the October elections have been criticized as an exercise in central control rather than genuine democracy, given the weak administrative framework and limited inclusivity.
The interim government has also failed to establish effective control over Raqqa (population 816,000), Hasakah (population 130,000), and Suweida (population 322,000). Elections for 19 parliamentary seats in these provinces were postponed indefinitely, leaving them unrepresented in the new People’s Assembly. The lack of a timeline for rescheduling has raised concerns about political disenfranchisement and exclusion from the upcoming constitution-drafting process.
Analysts warn that prolonged exclusion could threaten Syria’s territorial integrity. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria condemned the postponement as political marginalization, arguing that its region remains one of the safest and most stable in the country. The decision, they claim, contradicts UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for an inclusive political process and the drafting of a new constitution. Without addressing these foundational issues, Syria’s post-election order risks deepening fragmentation rather than achieving national unity.
Conclusion
The Syrian elections have faced widespread criticism regarding their legitimacy, transparency, fairness, and presidential dominance. Elections should mark the beginning of democratization, not its endpoint. Nonetheless, the interim government has introduced modest yet notable improvements during this transitional phase, and some newly elected representatives remain hopeful about the assembly’s potential to shape Syria’s political future.
The new People’s Assembly is expected to strengthen democratic processes through legislation and reforms across political, economic, and foreign policy domains. However, the Sunni majority in parliament and the underrepresentation of minorities and women raise doubts about the inclusivity of decision-making and the development of a truly pluralistic political environment.
Still, many Syrians view participation – even in a flawed system – as preferable to a political vacuum.
[i] Hassan, N. (2025). “New electoral system for Syria’s parliament finalized, announcement expected soon: Spox”, Rudaw, 29 July 2025, retrieved from: https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/28072025?.
[ii] Haid, Dr H. (2025). “Syria’s Parliamentary Elections Explained: Six Key Issues to Watch”, Arab Reform Initiative, 12 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/syrias-parliamentary-elections-explained-six-key-issues-to-watch/?tztc=1.
[iii] Gritten, D. (2025). “Syria acknowledges ‘shortcomings’ in number of seats won by women at election”, BBC News, 7 October 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c3vz44zzp5zo.
[iv] Haid, Dr H. (2025). “Syria’s parliamentary elections: A turning point or another top-down exercise?”, Chatham House, 9 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/09/syrias-parliamentary-elections-turning-point-or-another-top-down-exercise.
[v] Hussein, B. (2025). “Politicians affirm that the scheduled ‘elections’ for the People’s Council in Syria are illegitimate”, ANHA, 16 September 2025, retrieved from: https://hawarnews.com/en/politicians-affirm-that-the-scheduled-elections-for-the-peoples-council-in-syria-are-illegitimate?.
[vi] Reuters (2025). “Syria to establish new parliament, testing inclusivity pledge”, 23 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-establish-new-parliament-testing-inclusivity-pledge-2025-09-23/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
[vii] Knipp, K. (2025). ‘Syria: Are parliamentary elections a new beginning?” DW, 2 August 2025, retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/en/syria-are-parliamentary-elections-a-new-beginning/a-73494093.
[viii] DAnon, N. (2025). “Suweida’s shadow: Why Syria’s Kurds may rethink their future”, The New Arab, 5 August 2025, retrieved from: https://www.newarab.com/analysis/suweidas-shadow-why-syrias-kurds-may-rethink-their-future.
[ix] Al Ibrahim, Y. (2025). “How Syria’s parliamentary elections could entrench, not democratize, power”, The New Arab, 1 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.newarab.com/analysis/how-syrias-elections-could-entrench-not-democratise-power.
