With Iran’s declining confidence in Russia following the 12-day war with Israel, Tehran has turned to China for aerial defence weaponry, fighter jets and the development of new economic corridors via Central Asia.
Ever since the war in Ukraine began, Russia and Iran have expanded their military and political cooperation, which culminated in the signing of a major bilateral agreement that the two inked earlier this year.[i] The development of their relations, however, always stopped short of achieving a full-scale alliance. Neither side has provided ironclad commitments on mutual defence and such a clause was notably absent from the 2025 comprehensive agreement as well. Moreover, the supply of certain critical air-defence systems (such as the S-400), modern fighter jets (like the Su-35), and other equipment has not materialized, indicating that there are still limits to Moscow–Tehran cooperation.
There were no expectations that Moscow would come to Tehran’s help in the latter’s latest round of confrontation with Israel in June, during which Israeli and U.S. forces bombed Iran’s nuclear and aerial defence sites across the country. Iranian politicians have nevertheless voiced their concern about the state of Russia–Iran ties. This is in large part due to Tehran’s suspicions of Moscow in the wake of US-Russia talks, which they expect will not only concern Ukraine but also cover the Iranian issue in a series of tit-for-tat exchanges.[ii] The fear of this remains a major concern for the Iranian leadership, further nurturing the already present distrust between Tehran and Moscow.
Russia's strategic considerations
Russia’s abstention from the 12-day war, even in a supportive role, cannot be explained by its protracted and resource-consuming war in Ukraine alone. For Moscow, there are important strategic considerations about its evolving position in the Middle East.
To begin with, Russia likely does not believe that Iran could be weakened to a level that it loses its strategic relevance to Moscow. The Kremlin likely considered the 12-day war only as a short, although rather radical episode in the long history of Israeli-Iranian tensions and views Israel as an actor capable of dealing a significant blow to Iran, but still unable to fully neutralize its military potential.
Since late 2024, when Russia lost its major ally, the Assad regime in Syria, Moscow had to contend with its diminishing position across the Middle East. With Turkish influence growing in Syria and Libya too, all at Russia’s expense, Moscow could not afford to openly side with the Islamic Republic as it would have antagonized Israel. In fact, Russia’s ties with Israel have come to the foreground again as Moscow looks toward retaining its military bases in Syria. For years, Israel relied on Russia, permitting it to conduct aerial strikes against Iranian assets in Syria. Israel has come out as a strong supporter of Russian military presence in Syria[iii] as a way of balancing against rising Turkish influence in the north and also preventing Syria itself from becoming a much stronger power in its own right.
Moreover, Russia also regards Iran within the larger picture of its evolving relations with the West and especially the United States. Close cooperation with the Islamic Republic is seen in Moscow as a way to force diplomatic concessions from Washington and Europe on other fronts such as Ukraine. This approach also means that Russia would not go all the way in with its support for Tehran as it would surely limit the space for diplomatic manoeuvring with the Western countries.
In addition to the above, Russia could not risk antagonizing Arab countries of the Gulf. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, including the UAE[iv], Saudi Arabia, Qatar[v], and Oman[vi]—all are highly valuable partners to Russia. Trade and investment ties are ever-expanding, evidenced by a string of high-level bilateral visits. Moreover, though the GCC’s relations with the Islamic Republic have improved to an extent, the inherent distrust and fears of Iran’s regional ambitions still persist among Arab states. They might have officially protested against Israel’s aerial attacks but were relieved to see Iran’s nuclear programme set back.
Iran’s Pivot to China
Russia’s absence during the war pushed Iran to seek closer ties with China. Tehran’s relations with Beijing have been expanding over the past few years, as demonstrated by China’s involvement in the normalization process between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, but also through increasing trade in oil, making Tehran dependent on Beijing to a great extent. There are also signs of increasing military cooperation between the two countries – Iran eyes China-produced fighter jets and air defence systems. Yet, so far, China has avoided explicitly siding with the Islamic Republic, even though the two signed a 25-year comprehensive agreement back in 2021.[vii] Still, in the wake of the 12-day war with Israel, Iran has been less critical of China than Russia[viii], indicating the re-evaluation of relations with the two, even in lieu of an explicit security cooperation agreement for now.
Discontented with the slow pace of weapons deliveries from Russia, the Iranian side hinted at considering buying Chinese J-10C fighter jets[ix] instead of Russian Su-35s. Though it is unclear whether the sale will actually materialize, the outreach to China might signal a long-term shift in Tehran’s calculations. Falling into Tehran’s “look to the East” strategy, closer ties with China are expected to provide Iran with both economic and diplomatic cushions to alleviate pressure from Israel and Western countries.
Tehran has been actively working on developing trade routes through Central Asia to China. In May, Tehran hosted a meeting of senior railway officials[x] from Iran, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey to discuss transit through the heart of Eurasia. Likewise in May, the first freight train from Xi’an, China, arrived at the Aprin dry port in Iran.[xi] China and Iran might even consider avoiding maritime routes for their trade in oil which has come under more intense pressure from the United States. Overall, the new route, if expanded further, would help Iran to remove further pressure posed by Western sanctions.
In June, Iran signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkmenistan[xii] on boosting shipping and logistics coordination. Earlier, in May, a roadmap on comprehensive cooperation for the period of 2025-27 was reached, covering transport and logistic cooperation.[xiii] In the case of Tajikistan, in January, Tehran and Dushanbe signed 22 memoranda of understanding[xiv], covering infrastructure, trade and other issues.
Looking Ahead
Russia’s evolving calculus in its relations with Iran has been rooted in its broader position in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape in the Middle East. Iran understands some of these strategic considerations and it increasingly seeks alternatives by building closer ties with China. This does not, however, signal that the relationship between Tehran and Moscow altogether lost its clout. In fact, the two continue their cooperation on a range of issues beneficial to both. One example is the expansion of the International North-South Transport Corridor, linking major Russian cities with Iran’s ports in the Persian Gulf. Cooperation also continues in the military and space spheres.[xv] There are additional shared issues of concern, such as the opposition to external geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus region. Iran and Russia strongly oppose the recently reached TRIPP agreement[xvi] between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which envisions the involvement of a consortium of American companies to manage the transit corridor through Armenia. Both also fear Turkey’s growing profile in the region as Ankara seeks greater connectivity with the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Pragmatism will continue to define the nature of Russia-Iran relations going forward, perhaps even on a case-by-case basis, while China will potentially emerge as a country taking a larger stake in Iran’s future.
[i] President of Iran (2025). ‘Full text of Iran-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty’, 17 Janaury 2025, retrieved from: https://president.ir/en/156874.
[ii] Blackburn, G. (2025). ‘Trump and Putin discuss Ukraine war and Iran in sixth known phone call, Kremlin says’, Euronews, 3 July 2025, retrieved from: https://www.euronews.com/2025/07/03/trump-and-putin-discuss-ukraine-war-and-iran-in-sixth-known-phone-call-kremlin-says.
[iii] Gebeily, M. and Pamuk, H. (2025). ‘Israel lobbies Us to keep Russian bases in a ‘weak’ Syria, sources say’, Reuters, 28 February 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/israel-lobbies-us-keep-russian-bases-weak-syria-sources-say-2025-02-28/.
[iv] WAM (2025). ‘UAE President arrives in Russia on official visit’, 7 August 2025, retrieved from: https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bl2r5gq-uae-president-arrives-russia-official-visit.
[v] Soldatkin, V. (2025). ‘Qatari emir offers encouragement to Putin on prospects for Syria ties’, Reuters, 17 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/qatari-emir-arrives-moscow-meet-putin-2025-04-17/.
[vi] Galeeva, D. (2025). ‘What does the recent Russia-Oman rapprochement mean?’, Manara Magazine, 8 May 2025, retrieved from: https://manaramagazine.org/2025/05/what-does-the-recent-russia-oman-rapprochement-mean/.
[vii] Reuters (2021). ‘Iran and China sign 25-year cooperation agreement’, 27 March 2021, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iran-china-sign-25-year-cooperation-agreement-2021-03-27/.
[viii] Citrinowicz, D. and Zimmt, R. (2025). ‘Iran’s Relations with China and Russia Following the Israel-Iran War’, INSS, 31 August 2025, retrieved from: https://www.inss.org.il/publication/iran-china-russia/.
[ix] Kommersant (2025). ‘Su-35 will be put aside’ [Source in Russian], 26 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7835618?utm_source=vybor&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter.
[x] Boltuc, S. (2025). ‘How Will Iran-China Corridor Impact Eurasian Connectivity?’, Special Eurasia, 9 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/06/09/iran-china-railway-eurasia/.
[xi] Tasnim (2025). ‘Freight Route Gets Rolling As Chinese Train Unloads in Iran’s Dry Port’, 25 May 2025, retrieved from: https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2025/05/25/3320800/freight-route-gets-rolling-as-chinese-train-unloads-in-iran-s-dry-port.
[xii] Container News (2025). ‘Iran and Uzbekistan sign agreement for Shahid Rajaee port development’, 9 June 2025, retrieved from: https://container-news.com/iran-uzbekistan-agreement-shahid-rajaee-port/.
[xiii] Daryo (2025). ‘Uzbekistan and Iran sign roadmap for 2025-27 cooperation’, 12 May 2025, retrieved from: https://daryo.uz/en/2025/05/12/uzbekistan-and-iran-sign-roadmap-for-2025-2027-cooperation/.
[xiv] Boltuc, S. (2025). ‘Iran and Tajikistan Forged a Strategic Alliance with 22 New Agreements’, Special Eurasia, 23 January 2025, retrieved from: https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/01/23/iran-and-tajikistan-agreements/.
[xv] Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (2025). ‘Russia, Iran Cooperate to Launch Iranian Satellites’, 25 July 2025, retrieved from: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/07/25/russia-iran-cooperate-to-launch-iranian-satellites/.
[xvi] Hafezi, P. and Osborn, A. (2025). ‘Iran threatens planned Trump corridor envisaged by Azerbaijan peace deal’, Reuters, 9 August 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-threatens-planned-trump-corridor-envisaged-by-azerbaijan-armenia-peace-deal-2025-08-09/.
