On 3 July, Russia became the first country to formally recognise[i] the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan by accepting its ambassador—marking a significant departure from its stance during the Taliban’s previous rule, between 1996 and 2001.
At the time, Moscow supported the internationally recognised administration led by President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, who had retreated to the northeast to resist the Taliban, al-Qaida, and other regional terror networks. Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE had recognised the regime at the time.
Russia’s recent decision aligns with its recent strategic doctrine of pursuing “regional solutions to regional problems.”[ii] This approach, which Iran, China, and Pakistan also subscribe to, seeks to diminish Western influence within an evolving regional geopolitical landscape. It aligns with Moscow’s broader vision of a multipolar international order, reinforcing its sphere of influence from Belarus to Central Asia and Afghanistan.
Understanding this shift requires an exploration of Russia’s historical involvement in Afghanistan’s affairs, as well as the principles of its 2023 Foreign Policy Concept[iii] and the Moscow Format on Afghanistan.
An overview of Russia–Afghanistan relations
In the mid-19th century, the tsarist Empire expanded into what became known as Central Asia and the Caucasus. By the 1880s, it reached an agreement with the British Raj[iv] to designate Afghanistan as a buffer state, which remained under British protection.
The Soviet Union later established formal borders across Central Asia and the Caucasus. After India and Pakistan gained independence in 1947, Afghanistan sought to balance its relations between the Soviet Union and post-war Western powers, gradually leaning toward the former. A pro-Soviet coup in 1978 sparked a decade-long occupation of the country by Soviet forces.[v] After Moscow’s withdrawal in 1989 and the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the mujahideen successfully ousted the regime that was aligned with the Soviets.
Initially wary of instability under mujahideen rule, Russia backed the Northern Alliance following the Taliban’s rise.[vi] Led by Massoud, the Alliance resisted the Taliban, al-Qaida, and regional jihadist groups, including Central Asian and Chechen fighters who were backed by Pakistan’s intelligence services.
Under President Putin, Russia initially collaborated with Western efforts in Afghanistan following the events of 11th September 2001.[vii] However, the cooperation shifted after the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Moscow established contact with the Taliban through Iran and created the Moscow Format in 2017. With the Taliban being removed from Russia’s terrorism blacklist in early 2025, formal recognition of the group became politically feasible.
Russia’s foreign policy in Central Asia and Afghanistan
Moscow’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept[viii] outlines Russia’s vision for a multipolar world characterised by different zones of influence. Central Asia is pivotal to this vision and regarded as part of Russia’s “near abroad” based on what the document calls historic, cultural, and institutional connections.
While intended to reduce Western influence, China’s expanding presence in this zone creates certain ambiguities. Regardless, Central Asia remains crucial to Russia’s “Greater Eurasian Partnership,” supported by Russian-led frameworks like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
In this context, Afghanistan re-emerges as a buffer state that is essential to shielding Central Asia from instability. Russia’s interaction with the Taliban aims to counter such instability by means of counterterrorism operations, disrupting the trade of narcotics, and containing other regional security threats.
By extending the doctrine of “regional solutions” beyond Afghanistan, for example, applying it in addressing tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Moscow looks to enhance its leadership in the region while marginalising the role Western-led global institutions play.
The Moscow Format on Afghanistan
Launched in 2017, the Moscow Format includes Russia, China, Iran, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and five Central Asian republics. Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are invited as guest participants in the proceedings of the group. The goal of this initiative is to promote reconciliation, enhance security, and foster economic development through the increased connectivity of members.
Since 2018 onwards, the Format has welcomed Taliban delegates from Doha along with independent political figures, despite protests from Afghanistan’s former republican leaders, including President Ashraf Ghani and foreign minister Dr Abdullah Abdullah.[ix]
After the Taliban regained power in August 2021, the UN-led Doha Process on Afghanistan weakened significantly. As members of the UN Security Council, Russia and China together with Iran now dominate regional discussions and frequently hinder efforts to reach a broader consensus among the international community. This situation highlights a deeper fragmentation of global governance amid the challenges posed by multipolarity.
Implications of Russia’s recognition of the Taliban
Russia’s recognition of the Taliban—a group with deep links to al-Qaida and more than two dozen regional terrorist organisations—sets a troubling precedent. Originally formed in the 1990s through Pakistan’s madrassa networks, the Taliban remains entangled with groups[x] such as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Jamaat Ansarullah (JA), and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP).[xi] Its links to al-Qaida include the multiple of the group’s affiliates, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Al-Qaeda, in turn, is allied with groups like al-Shabaab, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and many more.
Al-Qaida’s leader has pledged allegiance to the Taliban’s “spiritual head,” who, serves as a unifying figure for these organisations.[xii] The United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’s reports[xiii] repeatedly confirm the “symbiotic relations” between these groups. In other words, a substantial part of the global terrorism network is linked to the Taliban, with the notable exception of ISIS.
On 8 July, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for the Taliban’s “spiritual leader,” and the head of their supreme court, Abdul Hakim Haqqani, accusing them of committing crimes against humanity, including persecuting girls and women in Afghanistan. This decision will render it more difficult for other countries to follow Russia’s suit and formally recognise the Taliban.
The Taliban as Islamists and Jihadists, not Pashtun representatives
The most important point is that, contrary to their own claims, the Taliban do not represent Pashtun or Afghan rural Islam. The latter has been an integral part of the Persianate world for millennia, and traditional Islam of this vast region has nothing to do with the Islamism the group stands for. On the contrary, similar to al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam aligns more with Islamism or jihadism in the Sunni context.
Recognition of a group that has usurped power through the application of systemic terror can set a dangerous precedent. Since retaking control, the Taliban has reinstated a system of gender apartheid, disenfranchised various communities, violated human rights and targeted civil society at large. Afghanistan, a country with a diverse population and various ethnic minorities now faces an exclusionary rule imposed on them under the umbrella of a religious framework. This regime aims to protect jihadist allies and radicalise youth, especially in provinces bordering Central Asia.
By endorsing the Taliban, Russia has granted support to the group’s practices of misogyny, ethnic discrimination, and a general lack of legitimacy among Afghanis. The move echoes the ‘Great Game’ of the tsar and Soviet aggression of a former era.
A call for regional support
Instead of fostering stability, Moscow’s recognition may increase volatility. In accordance with the UN Resolution from July 2022, which designates Central Asia as a zone of peace, trust, and cooperation[xiv], regional countries must bolster their sovereignty and avoid becoming a part of Russia’s sphere of influence.
As an alternative, they must promote pluralism in Afghanistan—by amplifying the voices of women, resistance movements, civil society, and mosaic communities of the country, while supporting a political process that reflects Afghanistan’s demographic complexity.
The lessons learnt from the 19th and 20th centuries are clear: neither Afghanistan nor Central Asia can afford to be used as pawns in imperial ambitions. Protecting sovereignty involves supporting these countries in realising a future based on dignity, inclusion, and above all the peoples’ right to self-determination.
[i] Trevelyan, M. (2025). ‘Russia becomes first country to recognize Taliban government of Afghanistan’, Reuters, 4 July 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russia-becomes-first-country-recognise-taliban-government-afghanistan-2025-07-03/.
[ii] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2025). ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks…’, 25 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/vizity-ministra/2031649/.
[iii] Ashby, H. and Glantz, M. (2023). ‘What You Need to Know About Russia’s New Foreign Policy Concept’, United States Institute of Peace,10 May 2023, retrieved from: https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/05/what-you-need-know-about-russias-new-foreign-policy-concept.
[iv] Britishempire.me (2025). ‘What was the Great Game?’, retrieved from: https://www.britishempire.me.uk/greatgame.html.
[v] Britannica (2025). ‘Soviet invasion of Afghanistan’, retrieved from: https://www.britannica.com/event/Soviet-invasion-of-Afghanistan.
[vi] Lang, J. (2014). ‘Afghanistan: the view from Russia’, ISS Europa, retrieved from: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_10-Afghanistan_view_from_Russia.pdf.
[vii] Chatham House (2021). ‘9/11 and US-Russia relations’, 9 September 2021, retrieved from: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/members-event/911-and-us-russia-relations.
[viii] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2025). ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks…’, 25 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/vizity-ministra/2031649/.
[ix] George, S. (2021). ‘A ramped-up push for peace is splintering Afghanistan’s already fragile government’, The Washington Post, 10 April 2021, retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/04/10/afghanistan-peace-talks-taliban/.
[x] Mir, A. (2023). ‘Two Years Under the Taliban: Is Afghanistan a Terrorist Safe Haven Once Again?’, United States Institute of Peace, 15 August 2023, retrieved from: https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/two-years-under-taliban-afghanistan-terrorist-safe-haven-once-again.
[xi] Roggio, B. (2025). ‘Pakistani and Tajik Taliban open training camps in Afghanistan’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 13 February 2025, retrieved from: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/02/pakistani-and-tajik-taliban-open-training-camps-in-afghanistan.php.
[xii] Al Jazeera (2015). ‘Al-Qaeda’s Zawahiri pledges allegiance to Taliban head’, 13 August 2015, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/8/13/al-qaedas-zawahiri-pledges-allegiance-to-taliban-head.
[xiii] Security Council Report (2025). ‘UN Documents on Afghanistan’, retrieved from: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/afghanistan/.
[xiv] United Nations Digital Library System (2022). ‘Zone of peace, trust and cooperation of Central Asia’, retrieved from: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3983321?ln=en.
