A fragile ceasefire hangs over the region after 12 days of direct confrontation between Iran and Israel. The truce brokered by U.S. President Donald Trump left regional tensions unresolved despite having paused direct hostilities. The fragility of Middle Eastern dynamics was evident in what initially appeared to be a proxy cold war, before escalating into open conflict. While traditionally adept at walking the line between Western alliances and Arab solidarity, the intensity of this moment, and its uncertain aftermath, risk pushing the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan beyond its strategic comfort zone.
The conflict’s epicenter may lie elsewhere, but its effects are rippling through Jordan. Airspace closures in April 2024 and June 2025 underscore the kingdom’s concerns over regional spillover effects.[i] While framed as defensive, these moves have placed Jordan under scrutiny, especially from Iran, raising questions about its neutrality in the conflict.
At the heart of the crisis is Iran’s nuclear program. Although Tehran insists that its enrichment is peaceful, its uranium levels nearing weapons-grade have triggered Israeli strikes under “Operation Rising Lion” and set off a chain reaction of military escalation—classic hallmarks of the security dilemma.[ii]
The two powerful rivals are both distrusted by the majority of Jordan’s population, placing the country in a predicament. While public discourse continues to be dominated by the war in the Gaza Strip, the Iran-Israel confrontation shapes deeper strategic threats posed to the region. How Jordan navigates this high-stakes moment—without being drawn in militarily or politically—will define its role in the Middle East for years to come.
A pause, not peace: Realities of the ceasefire
On 24 June 2025, Israel and Iran agreed to a U.S.-brokered ceasefire after nearly two weeks of direct military confrontation. The deal followed Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Arak, along with Iranian missile retaliation against U.S. military bases in Iraq, Qatar, and Bahrain.[iii] The conflict escalated further through the U.S.’ involvement in launching bunker-buster ammunition targeting underground Iranian nuclear facilities.[iv] Both sides declared their military objectives achieved, and the phased de-escalation was hailed by U.S. mediators—particularly President Trump—as a diplomatic success.[v]
Yet from a realist international relations perspective, the ceasefire is less a resolution than a tactical recalibration. It reflects not trust, but exhaustion—and a mutual desire to avoid a prolonged war that neither side could decisively win without unacceptable costs.[vi] Ceasefires of this nature are often strategic pauses: moments when states conserve strength, reassess risks, and prepare for potential re-engagement.[vii]
The confrontation intensified a long-standing security dilemma: Israel’s pre-emptive strikes, meant to neutralize Iran’s nuclear threat were perceived by Tehran as existentially threatening, prompting asymmetric retaliation via proxies and missile strikes.[viii]. Each side’s quest for security increased the insecurity of the other. In terms of power balancing, Israel demonstrated its deep-strike capabilities and reaffirmed its U.S.-backed military edge. Iran, meanwhile, may respond by reinforcing ties with external allies such as Russia, China, Hezbollah, and the Houthis—actors who play an increasingly central role in Tehran’s asymmetric strategy.[ix] Gulf countries, caught in the middle, are likely to hedge, bolstering missile defenses while maintaining quiet backchannels with both of the primary adversaries.[x]
The great power dynamics underlying the ceasefire cannot be overlooked. The U.S. enabled Israeli strikes while simultaneously brokered the truce in a dual role consistent with hegemonic behavior and aimed at preserving regional order.[xi] Meanwhile, Russia and China are expected to capitalize on Iran’s temporary weakness to extract strategic concessions or expand their influence in the country.[xii] Ultimately, the central driver for both Iran and Israel is survival. Iran’s military posture—anchored in dispersed infrastructure and proxy warfare—is designed to deter existential threats and preserve the Islamic Republic. Israel’s doctrine of qualitative military edge is similarly rooted in pre-emption and strategic dominance.[xiii]
Jordan finds itself in a difficult spot—its location makes it vulnerable; its military ties pull it in multiple directions, and its diplomacy is shaped by a public that strongly opposes a sway towards both Iran and Israel. Jordan has to walk a fine line as great powers adjust their strategies and regional tensions simmer. Even if the fighting is mitigated, its motivators have not disappeared.
Strategic risk to Jordan
Iran claims that its strategic interests stretch all the way to the Mediterranean, with Lebanon and Syria remaining crucial to its regional ambitions.[xiv] Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and Syria’s Golan Heights have offered Iran crucial opportunities for deterrence against Israel. These neighbouring areas directly implicate Jordan in the case of any future confrontation due to their proximity to the kingdom.
Jordan shares a long and porous border with Syria, where the discovery and subsequent Israeli-led destruction of an underground Iranian missile facility near Masyaf in September 2024 revealed the extent of Tehran’s military entrenchment in the Levant. Although Hezbollah’s operational presence in Syria has reportedly diminished with the rise of an interim government led by President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, its influence remains deeply rooted in Lebanon. The strategic calculus for Jordan is clear: as Iran disperses key infrastructure across Syria and Lebanon to offset potential Israeli or Western strikes, the risk of spillover from retaliatory missile strikes, arms smuggling, or cross-border militant activity increases substantially.
Strikes on its domestic military assets and having to spread key infrastructure across fortified areas in Syria and Lebanon have been anticipated by Iran. This decentralized setup reflects an omni-balancing strategy aimed at countering asymmetric threats by building multiple, dispersed deterrence points.[xv] Despite the internationally recognized transition of power to its current president, Syria’s fragmented institutions and tenuous social cohesion render it vulnerable to being a staging ground for regional adversaries.[xvi] For Jordan, whose authorities have already been strained by combatting narcotics trafficking and the influence of militias, the continued use of Syrian territory for Iranian entrenchment compounds existing security vulnerabilities.
Recent public opinion in Jordan indicates cautious optimism about Syria’s political transition. According to a May 2025 national poll conducted by NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions, over 91% of Jordanians believe the ousting of Bashar Al-Assad and the appointment of an interim government is a positive development for Jordan, with 62.6% describing it as “very positive.”[xvii] However, this optimism coincides with some anxiety: 73.4% of Jordanians are wary of Iran’s regional influence, with 44.7% saying they are “very concerned.” Jordanians see the political transition in Syria as an opportunity to mitigate Iranian influence, but with stability not yet achieved.
Still, 30.9% of respondents fear Syria remains unstable and could revert back to chaos. 25.7% are concerned about persistent drug trafficking and insecure borders, and 21.3% distrust Al-Sharaa’s leadership. These concerns reinforce the idea that Jordan’s security calculus is shaped as much by the armed groups that persist on the ground as by who governs Damascus.
Since the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011, Jordan and the United States have deepened their cooperation, particularly in areas relating to counterterrorism, with U.S. personnel stationed at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base under the umbrella of “Operation Inherent Resolve”.[xviii] Given Jordan’s relative proximity to Iran and its hosting of U.S. military bases, it may be regarded as a potential staging ground or collateral target, especially if its territory is utilized for logistical or surveillance operations.
Additional considerable challenges await Jordan if regional tensions between Iran and Israel exacerbate anxieties over oil security. The Jordanian energy minister’s recent activation of contingency fuel plans to offset potential gas shortages signals growing concern over supply disruptions and rising costs.[xix] Prior to the Israel-Iran conflict’s unfolding, polling by NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions revealed that Jordanians were already deeply burdened by rising living costs, particularly the price of energy. These risks come at a time when 89.4% of Jordanians view energy as a major burden on their household, with 77.5% describing energy prices as “very expensive.” As geopolitical instability drives up global fuel prices and threatens regional supply routes, Jordan may face increased fiscal pressure from subsidy demands, inflationary spillovers, and a tightening of household consumption—posing broader risks to economic stability and growth.[xx]
Interpreting the Jordanian dilemma
Growing tensions between Israel and Iran are shaking up the region’s political landscape and putting pressure on Jordan’s long-held strategic approach. At the same time, public opinion in the kingdom is slowly starting to change.
When asked, “If there were a conflict between Iran and Israel, who should Jordan support?”, polling by NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions revealed that 57.7% believe Jordan should support neither side, while 35.6% favored Iran and only 5.4% Israel.[xxi] The tilt toward Iran is not so much about shared ideology as a reflection of Jordanians’ deep frustration with Israel. Still, this does not mean Jordanians are comfortable with Iran’s regional role—73.4% say they are worried about Tehran’s influence. The duality of seeing Iran as both a counterbalance and a potential threat captures the complexity and ambivalence of Jordan’s population.
Jordanians’ views on non-state actors also underscores this. While 84% consider Hamas a legitimate resistance movement, only 41.2% say the same about Hezbollah.[xxii] In contrast, 43% label Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Although both groups receive backing from Iran, Hezbollah’s close ties to Tehran—especially its role in the Syrian conflict—have diminished its credibility in the eyes of many in Jordan. At the same time, there is strong agreement among Jordanians when it comes to extremist groups, with 93.5% labeling Daesh (ISIS) and 69.7% labeling Al-Qaeda as terrorist organizations. This widespread rejection suggests that people are judging these groups more by their regional actions and impact than by their ideology.
Public sentiment constrains Jordan’s foreign policy. While 75.9% want to limit ties with Israel, only 14.4% support stronger relations with Iran, suggesting a broad mandate for disengagement. This narrows Jordan’s ability to project clear policy positions, particularly as neutrality becomes harder to maintain in the face of drone interceptions, regional escalation, and strategic blame narratives.
Strategic and economic fallout beyond Jordan
The United States’ direct military intervention—led by President Donald Trump’s authorization of strikes on Iran’s Natanz, Fordow, and Arak nuclear sites—marked the peak of the Israel–Iran confrontation that ultimately gave way to an uneasy ceasefire. Domestically in the U.S., the move has sparked criticism from both Republicans and Democrats. The move revived long-standing concerns about how far presidential war powers should go. While Trump had long positioned himself as reluctant to engage in new wars, the latest strikes represent a return to high-stakes U.S. militarism in the region. Arab governments and publics alike viewed Washington’s posture during the escalation not as a stabilizing deterrent, but as alignment with Israeli strategic interests. Many people view U.S.-led peace efforts as coming at the expense of Iran and Palestine, which has fueled public distrust further. In places like Jordan, where 57.7% of the population leans towards taking a neutral stance in the Israel–Iran conflict and just 5.4% support Israel, these strikes risk reinforcing the belief that Western powers apply double standards and continue to dominate the region politically.[xxiii]
Iran’s influence spans a vast proxy network from Hezbollah in Lebanon and militias in Syria to the Houthis in Yemen and Iraqi paramilitary groups, positioning Tehran as a central force behind asymmetric threats across the region.[xxiv]
If Iran were to surrender or be decisively defeated, it could create a dangerous vacuum in the regional balance, potentially paving the way for a resurgence of Sunni extremist groups, similar to those that thrived in previous power vacuums across Iraq and Syria.[xxv] The dismantling of a dominant Shiite actor like Iran could upend deterrence dynamics, embolden non-state actors, and destabilize areas where fragile governance persists. The Levant, in particular, could witness heightened cross-border militant activity and a recalibration of extremist networks seeking to exploit weakened state structures and sectarian grievances.
Holding the line in a region on edge
As the Israel–Iran confrontation halts under a fragile ceasefire, Jordan finds itself navigating a conflict it cannot fully avoid. With shared borders, security partnerships, and domestic pressures, the kingdom is at the crossroads of regional escalation and internal restraint.
Public opinion offers no clear mandate for alignment, only a consistent call for distance from both rivals. Yet Jordan’s geography and alliance network pull it in the close proximity of the very conflict it seeks to evade. This stance does not come from apathy, but from caution. Most Jordanians welcome the transition in Syria, but remain wary of Hezbollah, while they strongly oppose Iran’s growing influence in the region.
Jordan’s challenge will be staying firmly neutral, avoiding being pulled into regional divides while continuing to play its part as a source of stability in a volatile neighborhood. As the security dilemma intensifies, Jordan’s ability to hold the line, shaped by both public sentiment and geopolitical realities, may prove to be its most valuable strategic asset.[xxvi] The ceasefire may have paused open warfare, but Jordan’s strategic calculus must now shift to anticipating the next phase—one that will likely unfold not on battlefields, but across borders, alliances, and public opinion.
[i] Barrington, L. and Plucinska, J. (2025). ‘Middle East airspace shut after Israel strikes Iran, airlines cancel flights’, Reuters, 13 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/after-israel-strikes-iran-airlines-divert-flights-airspace-closed-2025-06-13/.
[ii] Robert J. (1978). ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30(2), 167–214.
[iii] Beaumont, P. (2025). ‘Israel and Iran agree to US-brokered ceasefire after 12 days of conflict‘, The Guardian, 24 June 2025, retrieved from: Outcome of Israel’s war with Iran is uncertain even if US joins conflict | Israel | The Guardian.
[iv] The Economic Times (2025). ‘US B-2 Stealth Bombers, GBU-57 Bunker-Buster Bombs, Tomahawks and Bases behind the Strikes on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities’, 25 June 2025, retrieved from: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/us-b-2-stealth-bombers-gbu-57-bunker-buster-bombs-tomahawks-and-bases-behind-the-strikes-on-irans-nuclear-facilities/articleshow/122001775.cms?from=mdr.
[v] The Guardian (2025). ‘Trump announces ceasefire between Israel and Iran after brokered deal‘, 24 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/24/trump-announces-iran-israel-ceasefire-what-we-know-so-far.
[vi] Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton.
[vii] Waltz, K.N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill.
[viii] Jervis, R. ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma‘, World Politics, 30(2).
[ix] International Crisis Group (2024). ‘Iran’s Network of Influence in the Middle East’, February 2024, retrieved from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran.
[x] Baabood, A. (2024). ‘How Gulf States Are Reinterpreting National Security Beyond Their Land Borders’, Carnegie Endowment, 1 August 2024, retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/08/how-gulf-states-are-reinterpreting-national-security-beyond-their-land-borders-abdullah-baabood?lang=en.
[xi] Lake, D.A. (2009). Hierarchy in International Relations, Cornell University Press.
[xii] Vinjamuri, Dr L. et al. (2025). ‘Competing visions of international order’, Chatham House, 27 March 2025, retrieved from: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/competing-visions-international-order/03-russia-stakes-global-ambitions-regional-dominance.
[xiii] Arabia, C.L. et al. (2020). ‘Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates’, Library of Congress, 26 October 2020, retrieved from: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46580.
[xiv] Azizi, H., and Barnes-Dacey, J. (2024). ‘Beyond proxies: Iran’s deeper strategy In Syria and Lebanon’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 5 June 2024, retrieved from: https://ecfr.eu/publication/beyond-proxies-irans-deeper-strategy-in-syria-and-lebanon/.
[xv] David, S.R. “Explaining Third World Alignment.” World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991): 233–256.
[xvi] International Crisis Group (2024). ‘Avoiding a Regional War in the Middle East’, July 2024, retrieved from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine-iran/avoiding-all-out-war.
[xvii] NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions. Current State of Affairs – Spring 2025.
[xviii] Wallin, M. (2018). ‘U.S. Military Bases and Facilities in the Middle East’, American Security Project, June 2018, retrieved from: https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Ref-0213-US-Military-Bases-and-Facilities-Middle-East.pdf.
[xix] The Jordan Times (2025). ‘Energy Ministry Activates Fuel Contingency Plans to Offset Gas Shortage’, The Jordan Times, 17 June 2025, retrieved from: https://jordantimes.com/news/local/energy-ministry-activates-fuel-contingency-plans-to-offset-gas-shortage.
[xx] International Energy Agency (2025). ‘Oil Market Report – April 2025‘, retrieved from: https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-april-2025.
[xxi] NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions. Current State of Affairs – Spring 2025.
[xxii] Ibid.
[xxiii] Ibid.
[xxiv] International Institute of Strategic Studies (2019). Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East.
[xxv] Abdo, G. (2023). ‘The Sunni-Shia Divide: Understanding the Religious Conflict Fueling Middle East Politics’, Brookings Institution, 27 April 2023, retrieved from: https://www.cfr.org/article/sunni-shia-divide#!/.
[xxvi] Ryan, C. (2018). Jordan and the Arab Uprisings: Regime Survival and Politics Beyond the State. New York: Columbia University Press.
