On June 10, 2025, General Michael Langley, Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), issued a sobering assessment before the House Armed Services Committee.[i] While affirming that Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti—the only permanent military base of the United States in Africa—is currently protected, he warned of a rapidly evolving threat: the increasing capabilities of Yemen’s Houthi movement and other militant actors in the region.[ii]
Situated just across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Camp Lemonnier lies within striking distance of Houthi unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and missiles, which have already been used against targets in Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Red Sea commercial shipping lanes. Langley’s remarks shed light on an often-overlooked target,[iii] suggesting that the risk of a direct Houthi attack on U.S. forces in East Africa is no longer a remote hypothetical scenario.
On June 23, Iran launched a missile attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Washington’s largest military hub in the Middle East.[iv] The attack followed the military confrontation between Israel and Iran, and U.S. air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Although U.S. Central Command reported no significant damage or casualties and the choreographed retaliation,[v] purposely limited in scope and damage to guarantee an off-ramp from armed escalation,[vi] the incident sent the message that U.S. bases are firmly within the strategic calculus of Iranian response planning. Together, these developments signal a shifting threat environment, where U.S. forces in the Gulf and the Horn of Africa may face growing risks from state and non-state actors alike.
The expanding threat landscape
The Houthi movement, officially known as Ansar Allah, has grown from an insurgent group in northern Yemen into a well-armed non-state actor with a sophisticated arsenal,[vii] largely supplied by and developed through the technical support of Iran.[viii] Since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023, the Houthis have emerged as a front-line actor in Iran’s regional proxy network, targeting Israeli, American, and Western-linked maritime and military assets across the Red Sea region.[ix] Their use of long-range UAVs, ballistic and cruise missiles, and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) underscores a dramatic evolution in the group’s offensive capability.
What was once considered a local insurgency now has the reach and intent to disrupt global shipping, threaten U.S. naval vessels, and potentially strike American infrastructure in East Africa and the Middle East. According to various intelligence assessments,[x] and backed by evidence of successful Houthi strikes across the Middle East since October 2023,[xi] the range of Houthi drones and missiles has significantly broadened,[xii] covering not only the Red Sea but also extending to most of the Horn of Africa. The Houthis have also demonstrated increasing precision in their strikes, targeting vessels with Western affiliations and operating with a level of tactical intelligence once deemed beyond their grasp.[xiii]
Camp Lemonnier
Camp Lemonnier serves as a critical hub for U.S. operations across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin.[xiv] Hosting more than 4,000 military and civilian personnel, it supports counterterrorism missions, drone operations, and maritime security initiatives. Its proximity to key maritime chokepoints, like the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, makes it indispensable to U.S. strategic interests and naval posture. Another potential target in close proximity is the Chabelley Airfield, which the U.S. military has been using for unmanned aircraft operations since September 2013.[xv]
Until recently, the threat environment around Camp Lemonnier was viewed primarily through the lens of counterterrorism, especially threats posed by Somalia’s al-Shabaab and remnants of ISIS.[xvi] However, the strategic calculus has changed. The Houthis, emboldened by their growing capabilities and Iran’s regional support, now represent a credible state-aligned adversary with the capacity to target high-value U.S. assets.
While the U.S. has invested in surveillance radars,[xvii] and likely counter-drone technologies at Camp Lemonnier,[xviii] the base’s precise missile defense posture remains classified. In January 2024, Djibouti’s Prime Minister, Abdul-Qadir Kamil Muhammad, stated that the Djiboutian government had approved the deployment of a U.S. Patriot air defense missile system at Camp Lemonnier for defensive purposes.[xix]
However, to date, there has been no official confirmation or publicly available evidence verifying that the system has been deployed or operationalized. Given the base’s strategic importance, the Pentagon is almost certainly reviewing and possibly upgrading its defensive systems. Nonetheless, as General Langley hinted, the pace of Houthi capability advancement is outstripping conventional risk models.[xx]
The risk of conflict spillover
The geopolitical implications of a potential Houthi strike on Camp Lemonnier cannot be overstated. Such an attack would not only jeopardize U.S. personnel but would also signal a dangerous escalation in the regional confrontation between the U.S. and Iran. The Houthis, by targeting U.S. infrastructure in East Africa, would demonstrate their capacity to internationalize the conflict in a way that could draw in new fronts and actors.
Moreover, increasing reports about deepening links between the Houthis and al-Shabaab raise additional alarm bells.[xxi] While these ties are not deeply institutionalized, there is growing evidence of tactical and logistical cooperation.[xxii] Any operational synergy between these groups could compound the threat to U.S. interests in the region and complicate AFRICOM’s operational landscape.
The Iran-Israel conflagration
The increasing militarization of the Red Sea corridor must also be seen within the broader context of the escalating Israel-Iran confrontation. Despite severe Israeli air strikes against Iran, Tehran has so far refrained from leveraging its proxy network,[xxiii] from Hezbollah and the Houthis to militias in Iraq, to retaliate across multiple theaters, signaling a preference for containing the conflict by conducting limited retaliatory strikes and agreeing on a ceasefire.[xxiv]
Yet, if tensions resume with heightened intensity, the Iranian strategic calculus might change, prompting Tehran to activate its proxy network across the region. Besides, some armed groups enjoying significant firepower on their own, such as the Houthis, might choose to act independently from Iran, thereby escalating conflicts on multiple fronts and complicating efforts to contain the crisis. Therefore, U.S. military installations, even those geographically distant from the core conflict zones, are vulnerable to becoming collateral or intentional targets.
In this strategic equation, Camp Lemonnier represents not only a symbol of American power projection but also a potential high-value target in a broader regional retaliation campaign. If deterrence fails, and the Houthis initiate a direct strike, the U.S. would almost certainly respond militarily, potentially opening a new front in an already volatile region.
As of now, the Houthis have not explicitly and publicly threatened to target U.S. forces at Camp Lemonnier. However, Houthi leaders have menaced to resume attacks on U.S. ships and interests in the region more broadly in the case of Washington joining Israeli air strikes on Iran.[xxv] This raises concerns that U.S. forces stationed in Djibouti, given their proximity and operational role, could become a potential target for Iran’s retaliatory actions, either symbolic or escalatory.
Challenges ahead
General Langley’s testimony should serve as a wake-up call for U.S. defense planners and policymakers, as well as Washington’s like-minded partners in the region and beyond.
First, Washington should deepen intelligence-sharing frameworks with allies and like-minded partners in the region to better monitor and preempt emerging threats. These include France and Japan,[xxvi] which both have military installations in Djibouti, as well as EU naval assets stationed in the Red Sea basin under Operation Aspides.[xxvii] Coordinated deterrence strategies that link Red Sea maritime security with the protection of East African installations could help integrate currently fragmented responses into a coherent regional defense posture.
Second, the U.S. must adopt a more holistic approach to countering Iranian ambitions and regional influence. While targeted military actions against key nuclear sites and proxy groups may provide short-term relief, a longer-term strategy requires addressing the political and economic conditions that fuel instability and allow these groups to thrive. Stabilizing Yemen, curbing Iranian arms transfers, and enhancing regional conflict resolution mechanisms must remain high on the strategic agenda.
As the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa remain increasingly contested and volatile theaters, the threat landscape confronting U.S. forces in East Africa is shifting in real time. General Langley’s warning about the Houthi threat to Camp Lemonnier reflects a broader recognition that non-state actors, especially those backed by capable state sponsors, can now challenge even the most hardened military installations. Strategic adaptation, regional coordination, and renewed vigilance are critical to ensure that the U.S. retains both deterrence and a strong operational capability in one of the world’s most strategically maritime corridors.
[i] U.S. Africa Command (2025). ‘U.S. Africa Command 2025 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee’, 11 June 2025, full speech is available at https://youtu.be/ZS5mr5iYsI0?si=pZ4EELlqj-0N8xRw.
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Mills, A., Hafezi, P., and Cornwell, A. (2025). ‘Iran fires missiles at US base in Qatar, Trump calls for peace,’ Reuters, 23 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-weighs-retaliation-against-us-strikes-nuclear-sites-2025-06-23/.
[v] U.S. Central Command (2025). ‘U.S. and Qatari Forces Successfully Defend Against Iranian Ballistic Missile Attack on Qatar’s Al-Udeid Air Base’, 23 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4223915/us-and-qatari-forces-successfully-defend-against-iranian-ballistic-missile-atta/.
[vi] Martin, P. and Mancini, D. P. (2025). ‘Trump Thanks Iran After Attack Choreographed to De-Escalate,’ Bloomberg, 23 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-23/iran-missile-strike-on-qatar-base-fits-de-escalation-playbook.
[vii] Al-Dawsari, N. (2025). ‘Armed Groups in Context: The Houthis – From Local Insurgency to Regional (Non-State) Powerhouse Shaping Middle East Dynamics’, Armed Groups and International Law, 14 January 2025, retrieved from: https://www.armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2025/01/14/the-houthis-from-local-insurgency-to-regional-non-state-powerhouse-shaping-middle-east-dynamics/.
[viii] U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency (2024). ‘Seized At Sea: Iranian Weapons Smuggled to the Houthis,’ 10 July 2024, retrieved from https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Seized_at_Sea.pdf; Hinz, F. (2025). ‘Made in Yemen? Assessing the Houthis’ arms-production capacity,’ IISS, 10 April 2025, retrieved from: https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/04/made-in-yemen-assessing-the-houthis-arms-production-capacity/.
[ix] Feierstein, G. (2024). ‘Houthis rise in prominence among Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’, Defence News, 7 December 2023, retrieved from: https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2023/12/04/houthis-rise-in-prominence-among-irans-axis-of-resistance/.
[x] Wilson Center (2024). ‘Houthi Arsenal,’ 26 July 2024, retrieved from: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/houthi-arsenal#:~:text=The%20Houthis%20possessed%20missiles%20with,to%20manufacture%20the%20drones%20locally.
[xi] ACLED, ‘Red Sea Attacks Dashboard’, retrieved from: https://acleddata.com/yemen-conflict-observatory/red-sea-attacks-dashboard/.
[xii] Raydan N. and Nadimi, F. (2024). ‘Tracking Maritime Attacks in the Middle East Since 2019,’ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 22 Janaury 2024, retrieved from: https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be.
[xiii] Knights, M. (2024). ‘A Draw Is a Win: The Houthis After One Year of War,’ CTC Sentinel, October 2024, 17(9), retrieved from: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-draw-is-a-win-the-houthis-after-one-year-of-war/.
[xiv] America’s Navy, ‘Welcome to Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti’, retrieved from: https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/Camp-Lemonnier-Djibouti/.
[xv] Tech. Sgt. Burns, J. (2023). ‘Chabelley Airfield celebrates 10-year anniversary,’ U.S. Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces Africa, 28 March 2023, retrieved from: https://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3342622/chabelley-airfield-celebrates-10-year-anniversary/.
[xvi] Gartenstein-Ross, D. and Appel, H. (2014). ‘Al-Shabaab Strikes in Djibouti,’ War on the Rocks, 2 June 2014, retrieved from: https://warontherocks.com/2014/06/al-shabaab-strikes-in-djibouti/; International Crisis Group (2024). ‘The Islamic State in Somalia: Responding to an Evolving Threat,’ 12 September 2024, retrieved from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/islamic-state-somalia-responding-evolving-threat.
[xvii] Staff Sgt. DeNault, T. (2016). ‘Camp Lemonnier to increase air traffic safety with new radar system,’ Air Mobility Command, 16 June 2016, retrieved from: https://www.amc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/800875/camp-lemonnier-to-increase-air-traffic-safety-with-new-radar-system/.
[xviii] Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (2020). ‘An Emerging Frontier: Task Force Bayonet Soldiers train in electronic warfare,’ 27 September 2020, retrieved from: https://www.hoa.africom.mil/article/23496/an-emerging-frontier-task-force-bayonet-soldi.
[xix] Daljir Media (2024). Retrieved from: https://x.com/radiodaljir/status/1745312789869011397.
[xx] U.S. Africa Command (2025). ‘U.S. Africa Command 2025 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee.’
[xxi] Allen, D. and Volpitta, M. (2024). ‘Turning West, Across the Gulf of Aden: The Houthis and al-Shabaab,’ Small Wars Journal, 12 May 2024, retrieved from: https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/12/05/turning-west-across-the-gulf-of-aden/; Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2025). ‘Expanding Al Shabaab–Houthi Ties Escalate Security Threats to Red Sea Region,’ 28 May 2025, retrieved from: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/al-shabaab-houthi-security-red-sea/.
[xxii] Jalal, I. and Al-Jabarni, A. (2025). ‘Dhows, Drones, and Dollars: Ansar Allah’s Expansion into Somalia’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14 March 2025, retrieved from: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/dhows-drones-and-dollars-ansar-allahs-expansion-into-somalia?lang=en; Allen, K. (2025). ‘Houthis in Somalia: friends with technological benefits?,’ ISS, 10 June 2025, retrieved from: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/houthis-in-somalia-friends-with-technological-benefits.
[xxiii] Sewell, A. (2025). ‘Why some key Tehran allies have stayed out of the Israel-Iran conflict,’ AP, 22 June 2025, retrieved from: https://apnews.com/article/iran-hezbollah-iraq-militias-houthis-israel-a257b8e55a96a536710fce91fe022915; Raghavan, S. and Said, S. (2025), ‘Why Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ Is Missing in Action,’ The Wall Street Journal,’ 18 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/axis-of-resistance-iran-israel-strategy-103e6226.
[xxiv] Al Jazeera (2025). ‘Israel and Iran agree ceasefire amid waves of missiles,’ 24 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/24/israel-and-iran-agree-ceasefire-amid-waves-of-missiles.
[xxv] Reuters (2025). ‘Houthis threaten U.S. ships if Washington joins strikes on Iran,’ 21 June 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthis-threaten-us-ships-if-washington-joins-strikes-iran-2025-06-21/.
[xxvi] Africa news (2024). ‘France’s president sees new role for its Djibouti military base’, 21 December 2024, retrieved from: https://www.africanews.com/2024/12/21/frances-president-sees-new-role-for-its-djibouti-military-base/; Kamata, J. (2023). ‘Why Does Japan Have a Military Base in Djibouti?,’ The Diplomat, 28 April 2023, retrieved from: https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/why-does-japan-have-a-military-base-in-djibouti/.
[xxvii] Mazzucco, L.J.M. (2024). ‘The EU Moves to Counter Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea,’ Gulf International Forum, 29 October 2024, retrieved from: https://gulfif.org/the-eu-moves-to-counter-houthi-attacks-in-the-red-sea/; EUNAVFOR Operation Aspides, retrieved from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eunavfor-aspides_en?s=410381.
