On 1st June 2025, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Lammy expressed the United Kingdom’s official support for Morocco’s Autonomy Plan, referring to the framework as the most “credible, viable, and pragmatic” solution to the five-decades-long conflict in the Western Sahara. Lammy’s remarks signal a notable shift in British foreign policy vis-à-vis the issue. The UK has now joined the United States and France—two other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—in supporting the plan that envisions regional autonomy for the disputed territory under the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Morocco.
This pivot, however, does not only come in response to the Western-led momentum behind Morocco’s Autonomy Plan that has been steadily growing in recent years. Importantly, it reflects the UK’s changing strategic considerations in North Africa, the African continent, more broadly, and the Mediterranean region. The British Government’s decision also mirrors the findings of the Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum’s (MENAF) policy brief from July 2024, which analysed the opportunities and risks associated with the UK’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. The report highlighted how this recognition could potentially enhance British foreign policy objectives in high-priority areas ranging from security and counterterrorism to trade and energy in North Africa, the Sahel and beyond.
In parallel with Lammy’s announcement, the UK also signed a number of cooperation agreements with Morocco in sectors covering healthcare, innovation, and infrastructure development. UK Export Finance could indeed participate in supplying the necessary financial support of up to 5 billion Pounds for infrastructure-building projects in both Morocco and Western Sahara, suggesting the interest of the government in the territory’s economic potential.
As Morocco is set to co-host the 2030 FIFA World Cup in collaboration with Spain and Portugal, the timing of the UK’s declaration of support for the Autonomy Plan suggests that the country is hoping to position itself to partake in the wave of investment that has targeted Morocco’s southern regions, including Western Sahara. A key driver of this investment momentum is the Dakhla Atlantic Port, a major infrastructure project aimed at transforming the region into a trade and logistics hub connecting Africa to global markets. This would align well with the post-Brexit foreign policy strategy of “Global Britain”, targeting closer engagement with emerging markets, especially in the UK and Europe’s more immediate regional neighbourhoods.
Beyond the economic incentives, the support for the Autonomy Plan also reflects longer-term geostrategic considerations and planning as the Western Sahara conflict has been one of Africa’s longest unresolved disputes. Since the Spanish colonial administration withdrew from the area in 1975, the territory has been contested by both Morocco and the Polisario Front, an armed group which has enjoyed the military and diplomatic support of Algeria. The 1991 UN-brokered ceasefire and the ongoing presence of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) represent international efforts aimed at resolving the conflict. Notwithstanding, the Polisario resumed armed attacks against Morocco in 2020, and the territory remains divided by the militarized Berm line between the two forces.
Morocco first presented its Autonomy Plan to the UN in 2007. The plan offers the Western Sahara’s Sahrawi population self-governance under Moroccan sovereignty, and proposes the establishment of regional institutions, including a parliament, a judiciary branch of government, and a local police force. Several protections for collective and individual freedoms, both personal and political, would also be enshrined in the Moroccan constitution. The proposal has garnered the support of over 110 UN member states, including Spain, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, as well as the United States. Having endorsed the plan, the UK joined a growing Western chorus that views autonomy as the only realistic path forward.
Cambridge MENAF’s policy paper concluded that supporting the Autonomy Plan would benefit the UK’s foreign policy initiatives in four key strategic areas: countering Russian influence in the Sahel, enhancing regional security, mitigating irregular migration towards Europe and the UK, and capitalizing on economic development in the region.
Firstly, as a result of Russia’s expanding military and proxy activities across the Sahel region the geopolitical stakes in North Africa have also increased. Via its partnerships with Algeria and the deployment of the paramilitary Wagner Group in Libya, Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic, Moscow has built a strong sphere of influence in the region. The Polisario Front’s ties to Hezbollah, Iran, as well as other extremist groups have compounded the risks associated with their armed struggle against Morocco. Morocco, by contrast, has been one of the UK’s closest allies in the region. It is a Western-aligned security partner that has actively participated in counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations. The modernization of its military, which has been bolstered by the acquisition of Western equipment and weaponry, also demonstrates the country’s commitment to NATO-compatible interoperability.
Secondly, migratory pressure persists along the Atlantic route as thousands attempt to cross the sea to Spain’s Canary Islands, often leaving from the vast, sparsely populated area of the Western Sahara, which has also become a hub for human traffickers. Moroccan sovereignty and the extension of the country’s security umbrella over the area could help build conditions for greater governance and law enforcement in the Western Sahara, bolstering European efforts to curb irregular migration and human trafficking.
Thirdly, stability in the region could greatly accelerate plans for the establishment of an Atlantic trade corridor connecting the Sahel to the global economy. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have already expressed interest in capitalizing on the use of Moroccan ports for their export purposes. With the UK’s trade and development strategy focusing more closely on Africa under the country’s Labour government, Moroccan-led integration of the Western Sahara could lead to significant commercial opportunities.
Finally, the UK’s support for the Autonomy Plan could move the scale within the UN Security Council. The UK, the US and France’s backing of the Autonomy Plan represent three of five permanent members in favor of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara. This could affect the stances of the undecided remaining states—Russia and China—who continue to resist a Moroccan-led solution to the conflict.
Notwithstanding, the UK’s policy shift is not without risks. Algeria has been suspicious of Western and Western-allied presence in the region, and may consequently be prompted to further deepen its cooperation with Moscow in response. Tensions with certain members of the African Union who back the Polisario, including South Africa and Nigeria, may also rise as a direct consequence. On the flip side however, this decision may bring an increased level of support from other members of the Commonwealth. Many of these countries already consider Morocco to be constructive actor in the region.
If the broader North Africa and Middle East region is concerned, the UK’s endorsement also strengthens the Abraham Accords, which witnessed Morocco’s normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with the State of Israel in 2020. The UK has backed the Accords and their vision of furthering regional peace through economic integration. Morocco’s role as a bridge between Africa, the Middle East, and Europe is central to that vision.
For decades, British foreign policy on the Western Sahara was marked by caution and ambiguity. Lammy’s declaration represents a calculated departure from this stance. With it, the UK is signaling that it is ready to stake its position in the Maghreb as a more proactive strategic partner for her allies.
Whether the promises of this move will be realized will depend not just on Moroccan stewardship of the autonomy framework and the Western Sahara, but also on the UK’s own follow-up mechanisms in its political, diplomatic, development and investment initiatives.
