The sectarian violence that erupted in Alawite heartlands in the past week marks a critical hurdle in state-building, and once again indicates the bitter legacy of the Assad regime. More importantly, it has brought the issue of identity clashes back to the forefront in Syria.
On 6th March, pro-Assad militias in the city of Baniyas, northwest Syria, targeted security checkpoints, killing dozens of government forces. Violence quickly spread to other coastal cities and towns. Assad loyalists kidnapped and slaughtered members of the security forces in Latakia and Tartus, which have predominantly Alawite populations. In retaliation, government forces and allied militias – who came to the rescue from Idlib – entered the cities and carried out collective punishment against Alawite families. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), this resulted in 803 deaths, with victims subjected to “systematic mass killings motivated by revenge and sectarianism.”[i] Tragic images of piles of bodies, families fleeing to neighbouring Lebanon, crossing rivers on foot while holding children and elderly people, have emerged, all in the search for survival in the anarchic context of a security dilemma. These images are reminiscent of scenes from Sunni towns that were targeted by Assad’s forces during the war (2011-2024).
In fact, this Sunni/Alawite violence was expected to occur on 9th December 2024, one day after the toppling of the Assad regime. However, it was triggered more fiercely three months after Assad’s fall, inflaming identity clashes.
Sunni/Alawite Identity Clashes: Past and Present
Identity plays a critical role in establishing power among various groups. However, identity is fluid, unstable, and consists of multiple layers that can either integrate in a relatively harmonious way or contradict each other, inciting clashes. The question of identity in Syria is rooted in the history of imperialism, colonialism, and authoritarianism, and was buried for many decades. Yet, during the Syrian uprising of 2011, both Alawite and Sunni identities became subjects of daily reproduction and manipulation, which incited hostilities.
Four variables were responsible for this process: 1) Political entrepreneurs, who seek to reproduce an identity that establishes their hegemony and legitimacy — for example, state and non-state actors such as the Assad regime, Iran, Hezbollah, Salafi figures, and Turkey. 2) Material structures, such as media, arms, and education, which combine to empower a specific identity against others. 3) Symbolic factors, such as flags and songs, which operate at the grassroots level and fuel the clashes. 4) The presence of a security dilemma, which accelerates the outbreak of identity clashes.
After Bashar al-Assad’s fall in December, these variables seemed to be dormant. However, the security dilemma triggered on 6th March reignited the process of identity reproduction and sparked further clashes. The crisis results from the breakdown of order, where each identity group fears the domination of the other, thus trapping all of them in a cycle of mistrust. The material structures — arms-bearing groups and the media — played lethal roles in facilitating clashes while symbolic factors like Salafi flags, the Zulfiqar sword (an Alawite symbol), and the invocation of myths and history surrounding the Umayyad dynasty and Ahl al-Bayt (referring to the Sunni-Shiite struggle in 662 AD) contributed to constructing identity clashes through bottom-up rhetoric.
From Shabiha to Foulul: Political Violence and Identity Clashes
With the onset of the 2011 revolution, the Syrian regime manipulated Alawite identity in its fight against the rebels by deploying security forces and the army—both predominantly composed of Alawite sect members—to crush the Sunni-dominated rebellion. In addition, the Assad regime sponsored militias, known as the Shabiha (translated as “ghosts” in English), to shadow the official forces. The Shabiha committed numerous atrocities, including several massacres against Sunni rebels, such as those in Tal Kalakh (2011), Houla (2012), Tadamon (2013), and Bayada (2013).
After the toppling of Assad, the term fouloul was used by the new government to refer to Assad loyalists, most of whom were former members of the Shabiha. These individuals fled to their hometowns in the mountains and coastal cities, from where they targeted government forces, who were predominantly Sunni. The term fouloul in Arabic means “regime remnants” and was also used to refer to ousted Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. However, in the Syrian context, fouloul, like Shabiha, carries a sectarian connotation, emphasising the divide between different groups.
Deconstructing Identity Clashes and Restoring the Identity Balance
The disarmament and demobilization of radical militias are crucial.
The sectarian clashes of 6th March marked a watershed in Syria’s history, exposing deep fractures within the nation, and should serve as a stark reminder of the urgent need for leaders to address the country’s complex identity issues in a way that fosters national unity. While the interim president, Ahmad al-Shara, attempted to contain the crisis by vowing to punish those responsible[ii]—including members of his own allied forces—a simple policy of containment is insufficient. Although it may work in the short term, it does not tackle the deeper root causes of the conflict.
To truly address underlying tensions, the leadership in Damascus must adopt a more comprehensive approach to deconstruct identity clashes threatening the nation. There are three key pillars that need to be prioritized in future policies; First, disarmament and demobilization of radical militias are crucial. The presence of radical Sunni militias in Idlib, many of whom have been subject to oppression under the Assad regime, poses a significant threat. These militias have undergone long processes of radicalization, turning Idlib into an Islamist stronghold. These groups cannot be incorporated into the official security forces, nor can they be allowed to serve as a shadow force working under the military. If allowed to operate with unchecked power, they could become a Sunni version of the Shabiha. This would only exacerbate sectarian tensions, furthering the cycle of violence and division. Second, accountability for all those responsible for the violence must be ensured. The government should not only punish the perpetrators but also demonstrate a clear commitment to upholding justice. This means creating processes that are seen as fair and unbiased, allowing for public scrutiny and fostering an atmosphere where the public can trust that justice will prevail.
Third, the inclusion of Alawite sect members in the governance process in Syria’s coastal cities is imperative. By fostering a more inclusive governance system, the regime can begin to bridge divides between the various sects and groups within Syria. The Alawites, who have historically been part of the ruling establishment, must not be excluded, as their integration is essential to long-term peace.
However, while the new leadership in Damascus has been focused on convincing the West of its political and ideological transformation, it must recognize that true transformation begins at home, with its own factions. The state is responsible for ending the cycle of fear and violence. Without addressing the internal fractures that fuel sectarianism, Syria’s future will remain uncertain, and the implications of identity clashes could persist for generations.
In fact, the war of identities can be more devastating than a conventional war. It undermines a nation’s very foundation, making reconciliation and peace harder to attain. It is critical for Syria’s leadership to act now, before these divisions irreparably tear the country apart. Only then can the hope of rebuilding a cohesive, unified nation be realized.
[i] Syrian Network for Human Rights (2025). “803 Individuals Extrajudicially Killed Between March 6-10, 2025”, 11 March 2025, retrieved from: at https://snhr.org/blog/2025/03/11/803-individuals-extrajudicially-killed-between-march-6-10-2025/.
[ii] Nakhoul, S. et al. (2025). “New Syrian leader Sharaa says killings of Alawites threaten unity, vows justice”, 1 March 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/new-syrian-leader-sharaa-says-killings-alawites-threaten-unity-vows-justice-2025-03-10/.
